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                            Abstract              
            In the 1950s, the Caribbean island of Cuba underwent a series of emphatic and 
revolutionary changes, culminating in Fidel Castro's regime coming to power in early 1959. A 
year later, relations between the Cuban government and their American counterpart had 
deteriorated rapidly to the point of rhetoric, economic sanctions, and covert military actions. Yet, 
both nations laid claim to the same national pastime: the sport of baseball. Since the 1860s, 
America's game of choice had been played passionately by Cubans, helping facilitate their social 
assimilation into the U.S. economic sphere. There was arguably a cultural sporting bridge 
between the two nations, and during the Cuban Revolution this relationship was arguably at its 
most important stage. In fact, the Havana Sugar Kings played in the highest tier of minor league 
baseball, the International League, from 1954 to 1960. By examining local newspapers from 
Rochester, New York, another IL city, this study portrays how this shared pastime impacted 
American front section media coverage about their southern island neighbor during the Cuban 
Revolution. 
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           Frequently Used Terms Page 
IL-International League 
D & C- Democrat and Chronicle 
T-U- Rochester Times-Union 
MLB- Major League Baseball 
NLB-Negro League Baseball  
OB- Organized Baseball 
CWL-Cuban Winter League 
AP- Associated Press 
UPI-United Press International 
FIL-Florida International League 
M-26-7- 26th of July Movement. 
DR- Directorio Revolucionario 
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                             Chapter 1 
 
                From the Straits to the Lake1 
 
“The Cubans were such a slick and speedy ball club, and so colorful . . . but I guessed they were 
just a little too hot-blooded, as a people, to play in the International League . . . O those crazy 
Cubans!”- Howard Senzel2  
 
                                                        
                                                  Introduction 
When you look at Rochester, New York on a map, it seems about as far from the tropical 
Caribbean and Castro’s unique brand of communism as one can get. I should know, I was born 
there.  Januarys of bitter cold, the wind whipping in off Lake Ontario, a collection of upper 
middle class suburbs surrounding a large capitalist metropolitan area where votes carry more 
weight than the punch of an AK-47, Rochester, Havana is clearly not.  But, in the 1950s these 
two communities were linked to one another through the All-American institution of Triple AAA 
baseball. The Rochester Red Wings have a long and extensive history with the sport.  The city’s 
professional diamond legacy itself dates back to 1886 and the founding of the International 
League (hereafter referred to as IL) and the Rochester Maroons.3  In addition, baseball has been 
                                               
1
 The Straits of Florida is a body of water which seperates Cuba from the mainland United States.  Lake Ontario 
seperates Southern Ontario from Western New York. 
2
 Howard Senzel, Baseball and the Cold War: Being a Soliloquy on the Necessity of Baseball (New York: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, 1977). Senzel, a graduate of Brighton High School (my alma mater), was an avid Rochester Red 
Wings fan during the time period of this study. After graduating from college, he returned to his hometown 
searching for why those “Crazy Cubans” were forcibly removed from the International League, and rediscovering 
the role baseball played in his childhood along the way. 
3
 Jim Mandelaro and Scott Pitoniak, Silver Seasons and a New Frontier: The Story of the Rochester Red Wings 
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2010). Other minor league teams Rochester fielded between 1886 and 1928 
(many times it was the same franchise under a different name) include: the Jingoes, Broncos, Hop Bitters, Flour 
Cities, Browns, Blackbirds, Brownies, Patriots, Bronchos, Hustlers, Colts, and Tribe. 
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well documented in Cuba, both historically and sociologically, in the national narrative since the 
19th century, including the IL Havana Sugar Kings, whose brief existence began in 1954.4  
Both cities, Rochester and Havana, shared the IL spotlight together from 1954-1960. 
Frequently, baseball reporters from both Flower City (Rochester’s nickname) dailies, The 
Democrat & Chronicle and the Rochester Times-Union, made the trip south to the Cuban capital 
to cover games between their hometown Red Wings and Havana’s Sugar Kings.  However, AAA 
baseball was not the extent of newsworthy events in Havana.  From 1953-1959 revolutionaries of 
the 26th of July movement under the command of Fidel Alejandro Castro Ruz, waged a campaign 
across Cuba.  Needless to say, the paths of rebellion and baseball aligned before the eyes of beat-
writers George Beahon and Al C. Weber, and on the front pages of their respective newspapers. 
The cross-hairs of a lens embellishing baseball and a revolution featured outside the sporting 
pages is the examination herein pursued. 
 From 1954 to 1960 the IL “truly” featured international baseball.  During that period, 
franchises located in three countries were members: the United States, Canada, and Cuba.  The 
Havana Sugar Kings, formed during American-patronized President Fulgencio Batista’s reign, 
were an anomaly in the history of baseball.  Though affiliated with American professional clubs 
and featuring numerous American players, the franchise, for all intents and purposes, was a 
Cuban production.  The club, padded with Cuban baseball veterans such as Rafael Noble and 
Angel Scull, was owned by Havana businessman Roberto “Bobby” Maduro.   The nation’s 
leaders treated the Sugar Kings with great deference.  For instance, Batista kept the “Cuban 
Mafia” from extorting money from the club. Later, Fidel Castro’s communist regime allowed 
                                               
4
 Roberto Gonzalez Echevarría, The Pride of Havana: A History of Cuban Baseball (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1999). The island had been a scouting outpost for the Washington Senators Major League Baseball franchise 
since the turn of the 20th century. The Sugar Kings were also not the first “organized baseball” franchise in the 
capital city, the Havana Cubans of the Class C Florida International League, existed from 1946 through 1953. 
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Maduro to remain in operation even though many American enterprises were seized and 
“nationalized” by the Revolutionary government.5  Castro, an avid baseball fan and 
mythologized former player, allocated funds for games to be broadcast on the national radio 
station as one measure to keep the Kings financially stable.  However, in midsummer of 1960, 
the team departed Cuba and moved to Jersey City, New Jersey due to increasing pressure from 
the other IL club owners.  Even though Havana won the 1959 league title over Minneapolis, 
AAA baseball under a Caribbean sun had set.6 
                                                       Purpose of the Study   
This study examines how Rochester’s local newspaper coverage of minor league baseball 
factored into its overall portrayal of the Cuban Revolution.  By examining the archives of the 
Democrat & Chronicle (hereafter referred to as D & C) and the Rochester Times-Union 
(hereafter referred to as T-U), I address the following question:  
Was the local newspaper reporting sympathetic or critical of Cuba’s move towards Castro 
and eventual communism, and how did baseball coverage factor into this reporting outside of the 
sports section? 
 
                                                           Literature Review 
The concept of baseball serving as a cultural Bridge between the American “North” and 
the “Pearl of the Antilles” has arguably been present ever since the game was brought to Cuba by 
“university students returning from the United States sometime in 1865 or 1866.”7  This alleged 
transnational sporting dynamic is examined more thoroughly in the study proper, specifically in 
                                               
5
 However, Batista did not spend any money on the club himself. 
6
 Roberto Gonzalez Echevarría, Cuban Fiestas (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010); Rory Costello, Society 
for American Baseball Research: Bobby Maduro, http://sabr.org/bioproj/person/c34ce106 
7
 Thomas F. Carter, The Quality of Home Runs: The Passion, Politics, and Language of Cuban Baseball (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2008). 
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Chapter 2.  However, a brief chronological introduction to its presence is necessary to understand 
the information and arguments it precedes.  In addition it will help to establish how intrinsically 
intertwined the two countries’ cultures are, especially via America’s pastime. 
As Louis Pérez Jr.’s excellent magnum opus On Becoming Cuban poses: “There has 
always been a temptation to address these issues (the Cuban-North American connection) 
separately in monographic form . . . Protestant missionaries, or tourism, or baseball and boxing . 
. .  But such an approach seemed incapable of yielding the desired outcome: names, to 
understand the context and complexity of these linkages as a totality, as a system.”8  To attempt a 
study, especially from the Cuban viewpoint on a singular issue of this complex transnational 
relationship, fails to provide readers with the tools to understand the “totality” of this dynamic.  
Pérez Jr. feels that the “objective is to examine the relationship between . . . baseball and national 
identity, Protestant missionaries and revolution . . . how, in short, these and other factors 
contributed to arranging the terms by which nationality in Cuba assumed a distinctive form.”9  
Based on this insightful assumption, my background section attempts to convey some of that 
cohesive whole or “strands of a web.”  However, it focuses on baseball’s role with a few of the 
other “strands” as I do not want to stray too far off topic.  Also, no pun intended, but by 
condensing 579 pages into 8, important details may be lost in the translation.  
While the history of pre-revolutionary baseball on the island (1860s-1959) is extensive 
and detailed in both English and Spanish, there are, for this study’s purposes, three distinct time 
periods to be covered.  I briefly examine the first two here and the third extensively later in its 
own separate chapter.  The first such period spans from the arrival of baseball to Cuba’s shores 
in the mid-1860s to the end of the Spanish-American War in 1898.  As several Cuban historians, 
                                               
8
 Louis A. Peréz Jr., On Becoming Cuban: Identity, Nationality, and Culture (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1999), 5. Parenthesis mine. 
9
 Ibid. 
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sporting and otherwise, have attested, baseball became embedded in the local populace partially 
because it represented America or the concept of a “modern” nation.  Pérez states: “But it was 
baseball that took hold most firmly.  Cubans were introduced to sport at a critical moment in the 
formation of national identity, assembling the elements on which to base a separate 
nationality.”10  Until the late 1860s, coinciding with baseball’s Antilles importation, Pérez 
argued that a Cuban nationalism for all intents and purposes did not exist, though with help from 
American economic and cultural influence it had begun to take shape as early as 1819.  This 
began to change as an increasing reliance on the United States for trade and tourism through 
much of the 1800s diluted dependence on both Spain and the colonial system as a whole.11 
At the close of the American Civil War, the strong economic and cultural relationship 
between the island and the “North” exploded, causing an irreparable economic rift with 
motherland Spain.  More and more “Cubanos” realized that what benefited the Spanish crown 
went against their own best interests. Cuba, and by extension America, represented modernity; 
Spain illustrated backwards barbarism: “This . . . is not a war between Cubans and Spaniards, but 
between the past and the future, between a spirit that renovates and another that petrifies.”12  
Pérez records an account of a narrator who later commented: “And he naturally desired that this 
great civilization (United States) be channeled to Cuba, that Cuba would be free to introduce 
these customs.”13  As such, it was no surprise that the majority of rapidly-increasing Cuban 
independence movements received their funding and cultural philosophies from the United 
States.14  
                                               
10
 Ibid., 75. 
11
 Ibid., 17-24. 
12
 Ibid., 86-87. 
13
 Ibid., 85. Parenthesis mine. 
14
 Ibid.,  89-95 
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During the 1860s, 1870s, and 1880s, “the growing popularity of baseball in the United 
States coincided with years of mass (Cuban) immigration.  Cubans could not ignore the sport that 
had captured the imagination of the North American public.”15 In fact, Thomas J. Carter quotes 
famed Cuban freedom fighter José Martí Pérez, who, while exiled in New York City, espoused: 
“In every neighbourhood there is a baseball game.”16  Just as baseball popularity drastically 
increased in the 1860s and 1870s in the United States, a similar wave struck Cuba with the 
arrival of returning students and hopeful revolutionaries such as Martí.17 
Baseball spread rapidly from Havana to the eastern rural provinces, with almost every 
town having at least one team.  In fact, at least 200 teams are confirmed to have been formed 
during the 1880s.  Six thousand fans attended the national championship in 1886, though this 
figure dropped slightly to four thousand two years later.  American clubs also began 
barnstorming tours around the island in the 1880s.  The Rochester (New York) Hop Bitters were 
the first such “Yanqui” team.  In 1881 they arrived in Havana to play a series of exhibition 
contests against the soon to be legendary Almendares of the Cuban Winter League.18  Major 
League Baseball teams soon followed, most notably the Philadelphia Athletics in 1886 and the 
New York Giants in 1890. In 1887, the Cuban Giants, a Negro club with no Latinos on its roster, 
toured the island.19  Just 12 years later, Cuba began barnstorming campaigns of its own, when 
Abel Linares led the All-Cubans on a tour of the northeastern United States. 20 
Several Cuban historians theorize that one of the major reasons baseball latched onto the 
national consciousness during this time was the simple fact that it was not Spanish in origin. 
                                               
15
 Ibid., 75. 
16
 Carter, The Quality of Home Runs, 49-50. 
17
 Pérez Jr., On Becoming Cuban, 76-78. 
18
 Ibid., 76. 
19
 Adrian Burgos Jr., Playing America’s Game: Baseball, Latinos, and the Color Line (Berkley, University of 
California Press, 2007), 46-51. 
20
 Ibid., 81-82. 
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With at least two violent rebellions already a part of its history, Cubans’ desire to remove the 
Spanish crown from their heads only seemed to increase as the 1890s wore on.  Baseball was 
often used to instill the spirit of revolution, both in actuality and in the imagination of the 
Spanish occupation forces.21  The Cuban exile community in Tampa, Florida held several charity 
baseball tournaments to raise funds for various revolutionary organizations on the island.22  Even 
the American barnstorming teams got into the act, sometimes inadvertently.  During the Hop 
Bitters 1881 tour, American flags the team had brought to pass out to spectators were confiscated 
by Spanish authorities, worried that “it would encourage the Cubans to rebellion.” 23 
In 1895, the Cuban War for Independence broke out, and, almost immediately, Spanish 
authorities passed various ordinances banning baseball across the island, but that did not keep it 
from being played or from being used in revolutionary propaganda.  Even though the rebellion 
was crushed in 1898, almost immediately afterwards the Spanish-American War began with the 
mysterious destruction of the USS Maine berthed in Havana.  In total, 260 American sailors 
perished, including all but one member of the Maine’s baseball team, “The crack club of the 
fleet.”  Barnstorming tours from both nations briefly stopped while the conflict raged in Cuba. 
Several months later, under the banner of “Cuba Libre,” American forces emerged victorious 
over the Spanish.  America’s  “game” and its armed forces had won over the Cuban people, but 
as the just “liberated” islanders soon realized, they had simply traded one imperial regime for 
another, and this would reflect itself in future transnational baseball exchanges.24 
If the 1860s-1900s represent a period of Cubans embracing American ideals, the 1920s-
1940s represent a period of Americans disregarding the separate nature of Cuban national 
                                               
21
 Pérez Jr., On Becoming Cuban, 81-83. 
22
 Echevarría, The Pride of Havana, 83-84. Most of these were sponsored by the owners of local cigar factories. 
23
 Burgos Jr., Playing America’s Game, 31. 
24Robert Elias, The Empire Strikes Out: How Baseball Sold U.S. Foreign Policy and Promoted the American Way 
Abroad (New York: New Press, 2010), 37-38. 
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character.  The period in between, 1900-1920, was by no means unimportant in terms of 
American-Cuban baseball relations.  Barnstorming on both sides of the Florida Straits continued 
at a furious pace during this period. Negro and Major league clubs frequently toured the island, 
most notably Ty Cobb and the Detroit Tigers in 1909.25  It was during these American tours 
Miguel Ángel González were discovered by scouts.  This first notable example of Cubans being 
exported to the American majors only increased the cultural baseball marker between the two 
nations.26  In addition to this exportation, Cuban clubs, mainly under the guidance of the 
aforementioned Linares, continued to tour Florida and the northeastern states during the period. 
Of particular note were the 1913 Long Branch Cubans, a squad composed entirely of Cuban 
players who played in the Class D New York-New Jersey League.27  However, what happened 
during this period pales in comparison to what began in 1919 with the passage of the Volstead 
Act, more commonly known as Prohibition. 28 
As Roberto Gonzàlez Echevarría points out in his history of Cuban baseball, The Pride of 
Havana, American and Canadian tourism had already begun to steadily increase to the island 
from 1914-1918, due to the ongoing war which made European vacation travel disappear.  But 
this tourism was usually restricted to the American “elite of elites.”  Much of what could be 
found in Havana, could just as easily be found ninety miles north in Miami, Florida.29  This 
changed in 1919 with the passage of the Volstead Act, which added the 18th Amendment to the 
American Constitution.  From 1920 until its repeal via the 21st Amendment, signed into law by 
                                               
25
 Roberto Gonzalez Echevarría, The Pride of Havana, 135-136. 
26
 Samuel O. Regalado, “The Latin Quarter in the Major Leagues: Adjustment and Achievement,” in The American 
Game: Baseball and Ethnicity ed: Lawrence Baldassaro and Richard A. Johnson (Carbondale, Ill: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 2002), 164-166. 
27
 Burgos Jr., Playing America’s Game, 94. 
28
 Pérez Jr., On Becoming Cuban, 167-169. 
29
 Echevarría, The Pride of Havana, 163-164. 
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President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1932, the production, transportation, and sale of 
“intoxicating liquors” was illegal within the borders of the United States.30 
American tourists flooded Havana almost overnight, and a city already heavily influenced 
by the United States was now consumed by the bigger nation’s cultural sphere.  With liquor still 
legal under Cuban law, along with other vices such as gambling and prostitution, upper and 
middle class Americans vacationed frequently to the island during the 1920s and early 1930s.31 
Pérez’s research concluded that between 1920 and 1940 over two million Americans travelled to 
Cuba at least once, showing that the island’s tourism industry was “driven by North American 
tastes and preferences.”32  With over 7,000 bars and taverns located in Havana by the end of the 
1920s, along with numerous American-owned-and-operated hotels, the city placed tourists 
comfort above a Cuban cultural survival.33  As Adolphe Roberts commented: “He (an American 
tourist) will be helped in argument or fight by a tourist policeman who will generally give the 
short end to the Cuban involved.”34  This newly established social hierarchy with the American 
vacationers at the top lasted until 1960, until the triumph of the Cuban Revolution and the ouster 
of capitalism.  This change in the American-Cuban social dynamic also affected the transnational 
baseball exchange in many ways, including three representative themes of this study.  
The first theme is the concept of Cuba, particularly Havana, being considered by 
Americans as a foreign extension of the United States.   Marketed as: “So close to home and yet 
so foreign,” both the familiar and exotic elements of the island were constantly promoted by the 
American media, and on some occasions by the United States government.35  This message was 
                                               
30
 Michael A. Lerner, Dry Manhattan: Prohibition in New York City (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
2009).  
31
 Pérez Jr., On Becoming Cuban, 168-174. 
32
 Ibid., 167-168. 
33
 Ibid., 169. 
34
 Ibid., 188. 
35
 Ibid., 172-218. 
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widely read and viewed by American baseball fans during the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s.  While 
“Yanqui” spectators at Cuban League contests never represented a significant draw to Havana 
promoters, even during Prohibition, the exotic qualities of the island were heavily promoted by 
teams touring the United States. 36 At the turn of the 20th century, Negro squads sometimes 
added the moniker of Cuban to their team names in order to convey a sense of exoticness.37   
The Abel Linares Cuban Stars continued their American barnstorming tours, staging one 
every year from 1908 until 1930.38 Noting the drawing power of the island to baseball fans, 
Cuban-American businessman Alejandro “Alex” Pompez formed his own Cuban Stars, with 
plans to tour the United States in 1916.  During the 1920s, both Stars organizations competed in 
rival Negro Leagues in America, officially becoming a part of the African-American baseball 
scene.39  After the Linares club folded in the mid-1920s, Pompez permanently located his squad 
in the New York City neighborhood of Harlem, rebranding them in 1935 as the New York 
Cubans.40  In their intial season, the New York club consisted solely of Cubans and other dark-
skinned Latinos but, by the 1930s and 1940s, half of their roster was African American.  
Representing a rare combined effort in the American-Cuban baseball exchange, they competed 
in the Negro League World Series on two occasions, in fact, winning in 1947.41 
The second theme is the increasing attachment to the Cuban leagues by the American 
Major Leagues, collectively known as Organized Baseball.  As part of the Roaring 20s tourism 
boom in Cuba, many white American ballplayers began joining island clubs during the winter 
season as a way to supplement their incomes.42  Not only did this exchange increase “Yanqui” 
                                               
36
 Burgos Jr., Playing America’s Game, 88-92. 
37
 Ibid., 65-67. 
38
 Ibid., 106-118. 
39
 Ibid., 116-117. 
40
 Ibid., 126. 
41
 Ibid., 189. 
42
 Echevarría, The Pride of Havana, 171-173. 
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stereotyping and social Americanization of Havana, but it also forced Organized Baseball by the 
1940s to be further involved with the Cuban leagues.  The major leagues, essentially via their 
monopoly, forcibly implemented rules to make sure Cuban clubs compensated their American 
counterparts for use of their players during the northern nation’s off-season.43  This 
compensation did not extend both ways.  
Despite the unwritten yet readily enforced “color barrier” which effectively barred 
African Americans from participating in Organized Baseball, in the 1920s several light-skinned 
Cubans such as Adolfo Luque and Miguel Gonzàlez tested the limits of the color line.44  By the 
1930s, Cuban ballplayers began to seem less an anomaly and more an inexpensive force of labor, 
compared to white Americans.45  When US ball-clubs signed a Cuban player, his former team 
received minimal compensation, if any at all.  In the eyes of American organized baseball, Cuba 
was just another part of its baseball empire, just like the island nation was essentially an 
extension of the United States.46  This dynamic will be further examined at the beginning of 
Chapter 3, especially with regard to the likes of Clark Griffith, long-time owner of the 
Washington Senators during the 1930s, and Gabe Paul, general manager of the Cincinnati Reds 
in the 1950s.47 
The third and final theme relates to an increasing interest and devotion held by Cubans 
towards following American major league baseball.  The Cuban circuits, both the amateurs of the 
sugar mill clubs and the professionals of the Winter League, never lacked local support. 
                                               
43
 Ibid., 46-48. This was a secondary reason for driving Organized Baseball towards Cuba. The main reason was 
businessman Jorge Pasquel’s Mexican League signing or “stealing” many American players from the majors in the 
late 1940s. 
44
 Samuel O. Regalado, “The Latin Quarter in the Major Leagues: Adjustment and Achievement,” 164-166. 
45
 Burgos Jr., Playing America’s Game, 151-153. 
46
 Echevarría, The Pride of Havana, 48-51. 
47
  Burgos Jr., Playing America’s Game, 151, 214-216. Paul is not mentioned by Burgos by name but he was the 
general manager of the Reds during their years as major league affiliate of the Havana Sugar Kings, which features 
briefly in his book. 
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However, the increasing presence of Organized Baseball on the island, according to Pérez, 
naturally increased its fan base towards enveloping a majority of Cubans, particularly in Havana. 
The Cincinnati Reds developed a sizable fan following in the 1920s due to the exploits of 
Luque.48  The now anglicized “Mike” Àngel Gonzàlez, as well became a national hero by briefly 
coaching the infamous “Gas House Gang” St. Louis Cardinals in 1938.49  Pérez points out that: 
“From the conservative Diario de la Marina to the communist daily Hoy, papers (were) filled 
with news about the major leagues, including AP and UPI wire stories of the previous day’s 
games.”50  In fact in several instances, American baseball seemed to be considered of more 
importance than news regarding the volatile Cuban political scene.  
As Pérez quoted journalist Mariblanca Sabas Aloma in 1932 during the violent reign of 
President Gerardo Machado: “Five assassinations right here in the capital that have not in the 
slightest diminished the extraordinary enthusiasm of the Cuban fans.  Days that should be given 
to mourning have been spent by the radio that is transmitting the World Series.”51  And, 
according to Robert Elias, after a weeklong 1933 communications blackout following Fulgencio 
Batista’s first coup d’etat: “Cubans wanted-before all else-to know the American baseball scores 
they had missed.”52   That is how hooked on baseball, especially that of the American major 
leagues, many Cubans were.   It was this island cultural scene that formed the stage for the 
arrival of the Havana Cubans in 1947, as well as their successors, the Cuban/Havana Sugar 
Kings in 1954.53 
Exploring the shared baseball relationship between Cuba and the United States is by no 
means a rare or untapped field of academic research.  Histories of the sport in the Cuban context 
                                               
48
 Pérez Jr., On Becoming Cuban: Identity, Nationality, and Culture, 260-261. 
49
 Echevarría, The Pride of Havana: A History of Cuban Baseball, 8, 19.  
50
 Pérez Jr., On Becoming Cuban, 261. Parenthesis mine. 
51
 Ibid., 263-265. 
52
 Elias, The Empire Strikes Out, 108. 
53
 Pérez Jr., On Becoming Cuban, 259-260. 
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abound, most notably Pride of Havana by Roberto Echevarría,54 and Peter C. Bjarkman’s A 
History of Cuban Baseball,55 two extensively-researched narrative accounts.  Sociological 
examinations on baseball and sport in Cuban culture include: Milton H. Jamail’s Full Count: 
Inside Cuban Baseball,56 Pettavinno and Pye’s Sport in Cuba: The Diamond in the Rough,57 and 
arguably the most informative, The Quality of Home Runs: The Passion, Politics, and Language 
of Cuban Baseball by Thomas F. Carter.  The latter is a sociological study of Cuban national 
identity through baseball, or “Cubanidad.”  Carter concludes that: “Baseball is a definitive Cuban 
spectacle.”58  Writings about baseball’s role within American imperialism, with substantial focus 
on Cuba, are not unheard of in academic circles.  Such works include Robert Elias’s The Empire 
Strikes Out,59 The Nationalist Pastime by Russ Crawford,60 and Gerald R. Gems’s Sport, 
Colonialism, and the United States.61  All three contain examples of how the structure of 
organized baseball throughout the Caribbean was inextricably linked to the American 
government’s political agenda. 
 Examinations of baseball and America’s national identity are prolific.  Most of the 
compiled essays within The American Game: Baseball and Ethnicity examine the theme to 
greater or lesser extents.  The Lawrence Baldassaro-authored introduction surmised that: 
“baseball history mirrors the larger patterns of American life.” 62  A similar trend is found in 
many of the journal articles compiled in The Politics of Baseball.  The editor Ron Briley noted: 
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“the national pastime was a reflection of and not an escape from the American political scene.”63 
David Q. Voight’s Reflections on Diamonds, Baseball and American Culture proclaims 
fascination at the ability of “baseball research to reveal fresh insight into American culture and 
our national character.”64  The first episode of Ken Burns’s landmark eleven-part documentary 
mini-series Baseball makes this narrative its central focus.65   
The crossing of American and Cuban baseball nationalism has been covered to a brief 
extent.  The 1999 two game exhibition series between Cuba’s national team and Major League 
Baseball’s Baltimore Orioles featured heavily in The Quality of Home Runs.66  By far the most 
relevant examination of this international sporting relationship to my study is Baseball and the 
Cold War: Being a Soliloquy on the Necessity of Baseball by Howard M. Senzel, which 
specifically referenced the potential bonding agent of the Havana Sugar Kings to American 
baseball fans in his hometown of Rochester, New York.67 
At first glance, Senzel’s 1977 book seemingly renders my research proposal redundant. 
He analyzed the archives of the D & C from 1954-1960, specifically trying to discover what 
happened on the night of July 26, 1959, and how the Rochester community and federal 
government reacted to the incident.  However there are several major problems with attempting 
to classify Baseball and the Cold War as an academic source.  
Despite the fact that at least one source, The Empire Strikes Out,68 used Senzel’s work to 
support its main argument, his credibility comes into question.  First there are no endnotes, 
footnotes, bibliography, index, or literature citations in his work.  In the book proper, Senzel 
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does list article headlines along with the date published, but for this study that is not enough. 
Also he only looks at the D & C, leaving the Times-Union unanalyzed.  Furthermore, he does not 
attempt to tie this into any existing academic theories, nor does he reference relevant literature, 
or any literature for that matter.  Finally, and most importantly to my study, Baseball and the 
Cold War has information gaps prevalent throughout regarding Senzel’s research methods, 
which could potentially mislead the reader.  For example, he proclaimed: “I had read through the 
entire 1957 season and there was never any mention of rebel scares affecting the attendance at 
baseball games.”69  And yet, 1957 reports from D & C columnist George Beahon referenced at 
least three separate examples: “Rebel propaganda designed to keep tourists out of Havana and 
natives off the streets;”70  “Wings Get Warning Letters from Cuban Rebels;”71 and “Rebel 
Bombings and Censorship.”72  For these reasons, Senzel’s work, arguably the premier example 
for this topic, can by no means be considered an academic source.  This realization supports the 
necessity for this study to have been undertaken.  
There are three gaps pertinent to the remaining secondary literature examined that give 
this thesis significant purpose.  The first major gap is the time period questioned: The Cuban 
Revolution, 1953-1960.  While the Cuban Revolution is hardly unexplored territory (My Life,73 
That Infernal Little Cuban Republic,74 The Cuban Insurrection,75 Contesting Castro,76 Making 
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State Action Possible,77 The United States and Batista78), the role baseball played in the said 
relationship is sorely unappreciated, much less explored.  The three sources which can be 
described as making some contribution to this theme are either non-academic,79 focus soley on 
the baseball itself,80 or are personal recollections of a local Cuban fan.81  
Most of the literature dedicated to the US-Cuban relationship via baseball focuses on 
either the pre-revolution period (The Pride of Havana,82 Sport and Colonialism83) or more 
frequently the post-revolution period (History of Cuban Baseball,84 Full Count,85 Quality of 
Home Runs,86 and 1970’s Baseball Diplomacy87).  Arguably, the most important moment 
between the United States and Cuba, and the most visible cultural link during the Revolution, has 
remained primarily unexamined.  This is the central literature gap that this study attempts to 
address. 
The second academic gap centers upon a lack of variety in American communities 
examined.  Much of the relevant literature, with limited examples via sports, focuses primarily 
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on Southern Florida,88 or cities with large Cuban populations.89  Senzel’s Baseball and the Cold 
War is the only attempt at discourse aimed at a metropolitan area lacking a substantial Cuban 
contingent: Rochester, New York.90  The one reason why American cities such as Miami, 
Tampa, or New York City are written about is precisely because of the prominent Cuban 
communities they each embrace.91 
 However, due to the time period of this study, finding out how such an important 
political event was received, in an area far removed from the conflict, ie average America, is 
clearly worthy of academic exploration.  How did Rochester, New York, a city without a “Little 
Havana”92 or “Miami Mafia”93 interpret the Cuban Revolution?  Unlike other American cities, 
Rochester had a visible window into the Cuban cultural sphere, perfect for the study undertaken 
here.  A secondary goal of this study is to see if that connection of playing in the same 
professional baseball league was enough to have any sort of impact on the reception an 
American community held towards the Cuban Revolution. 
The final gap featured specifically regards the Havana Sugar Kings franchise.  Aside 
from Baseball and the Cold War,94 Bobby Maduro,95 and a chapter in Roberto Echevarría’s 
Cuban Fiestas, 96 most relevant sources relegate the franchise to footnotes, and sadly, sometimes 
incorrect footnotes.  The next closest in detail to the aforementioned three, When a Dream Plays 
Reality in Baseball: Roberto Maduro and the Inter-American League by John Cronin, incorrectly 
                                               
88
 Andrew Lynch, “Expressions of Cultural Standing in Miami: Cuban Spanish Discourse about Fidel Castro and 
Cuba,” Revista Internacional de Lenguistica Iberoamericana, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2009): 21-48. 
89
 Andrea O’Reilly Herrera, editor, Cuba: Idea of a Nation Displaced (Albany: SUNY Press, 2008). 
90
 Senzel, Baseball and the Cold War. 
91
 Herrera, editor, Cuba: Idea of a Nation Displaced. 
92
 Ibid. 
93
 Castro with Ignacio Ramonet, My Life. Castro constantly refers to the Cuban community in Southern Florida as 
the “Miami Mafia.” 
94
 Senzel, Baseball and the Cold War. 
95
 Rory Costello, Society for American Baseball Research: Bobby Maduro, http://sabr.org/bioproj/person/c34ce106. 
96
 Echevarría, Cuban Fiestas. 
18 
 
18 
 
referred to the club as the Havana Sugar Canes.97  The Pride of Havana, also written by 
Echevarría, does focus on the IL franchise for six pages, however he neglects to mention the 
Verdi shooting incident at all.98  Bjarkman relegates the franchise to less than four pages in his 
pre-revolutionary chapter, and another four separate pages on the shooting incident.99  I find this 
lack of research, and in some cases, incorrect information cited, quite baffling.  How is it that a 
franchise that not only was the highest tier-ranked professional team in the history of Cuba, 
played in the highest-ranked minor league in North America, was the top farm club for the Major 
League Baseball Cincinnati Reds, whose lifespan ran almost parallel to the Cuban Revolution 
itself, that Castro went against his ideological position to preserve, has so little written about 
it?100   
During Castro’s first visit to Canada as the leader of Cuba, he was scheduled to throw out 
the first pitch at a Sugar Kings’ contest against the baseball rendition of Toronto’s Maple 
Leafs.101  The famous picture of Castro in his Barbudos (Bearded Ones) baseball jersey was 
taken before a Havana-Rochester game: a contest that would mark the prelude to the franchise’s 
eventual departure for New Jersey.  During their first IL campaign in 1954, a conga band 
followed them on every road trip.102  Their lifespan is so quirky and so interesting that one could 
imagine several academic articles being written on this franchise on a variety of topics, adding 
much to the literature of sports history.  Yet, within the works available in English, they remain 
footnotes of history. This study attempts to rectify the disproportionate situation.   
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                                         Methodology 
It occurs to me that an explanation of the “main title” of my thesis is necessary at this 
point.  I have not adopted the phrase “Beyond the Sport Pages” without design.  The thrust of my 
thesis examines editorial comment, analysis, public reaction, perception, opinion, and stance, 
each an approach that is not commonly highly profiled on sports pages.  Because baseball is a 
major theme of the thesis, one would normally think that the sports pages would be the primary 
newspaper section of investigation.  But, the above-listed factors of examination are not often 
embedded in material found on the sports page, where, generally, upcoming sporting events and 
their results are reported in detail but little else appears in the way of superimposing a sporting 
theme on greater social or world events, and hence, the quest to look “beyond the sports page” 
for the primary sources of data.                       
Starting with Havana’s IL entry in 1954 and ending with its forced 1960 departure, I 
examined microfilm scans of the two daily newspapers: Rochester, New York’s Democrat & 
Chronicle and Times-Union.  Particular attention was paid to the front page and local news 
sections.  Additionally, the feature writings of George Beahon and Paul Pinckey for the D & C 
and Matt Jackson and Al C. Weber for the T-U were examined.  When IL baseball and the Cuban 
situation interfaced, how did these writers cover the events?  How did their opinions intersect 
and differ with one another?  Did their love for baseball make them sympathetic to the Cuban 
cause?  Was communism too great a presence for them to forgive; or did they feel the 
revolutionaries deserved a second chance?  Though these questions were addressed and 
analyzed, they are secondary to the thesis’s purpose.  The main focus was on how the respective 
editors for the D & C and the T-U portrayed the American-Cuban Baseball lens outside the 
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sporting pages.  The feature sections of both dailies were examined with respect to how the 
Cuban narrative was portrayed separate from the sporting context.  Was Cuba portrayed in the 
same light in both newspapers?  How did they react to important figures such as Batista and 
Castro? Did Cuba feature much in the “Letters to the Editor Section”?   Most importantly, did 
baseball make its way into articles on the Cuban Revolution?  These questions are answered by 
using a thematic analysis to construct the narratives within this study. 
              Thematic analysis, simply put, is the pinpointing, examination, and recording of patterns 
within data.  By discovering these patterns or “themes” across a determined data set using 
“grounded,” established theory, research questions can be formed and/or answered.103  One 
overarching theme, the crux of this study, is baseball as a “strong link between the Cuban and 
American peoples.”104 
Cuba’s developing communist ideologies and Fidel Castro’s government represented 
dogma America allegedly stood against.  However, the game of choice for many a Cuban, Castro 
included, was baseball, America’s national pastime.  During the mid-1950s, Rochester was a 
stronghold for the Republican Party, no friend to the communist community.  Frank Gannett, 
owner of the two major Flower City newspapers, frequently supported Republican political 
candidates, and even ran briefly for the party’s presidential nomination.105  And yet, the passion 
his dailies held for baseball was rivalled only by the Sugar Kings’ supporters in sunny Havana. 
These two cities were thousands of miles apart, both geographically and ideologically.  Yet 
sport, a common ground, for shared “American” ideals could have proven a bonding agent if 
presented to enough of the local Rochester community.  As such, examinations of three themes 
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were explored: American’s national identity regarding baseball, likewise for their Cuban 
counterparts, and how the two intersected with one another. 
                                         Outline of Study 
This paper is divided into five sections, four not counting this introduction chapter.  The 
second chapter presents further examination of American and Cuban historical and sociological 
uses of baseball to define their national characters.  In addition, it also attempts to convey that 
the alleged baseball bridge in itself is not critical to this study but, rather, how the American 
media portrayed that bridge to its viewers.  Continuing onwards with a short but necessary 
history of Cuban baseball from the 1930s to 1953, the third chapter tightly interweaves the 
political turmoil on the island with play on the diamond.  Of particular focus is the professional 
Cuban Winter League of the 1930s and 1940s and the Class C/B Havana Cubans of the Florida 
International League during the reigns of Gerardo Machado and Fulgencio Batista, respectively.  
This interweaving continues with the major focus on this third section.  I portray the 
Cuban/Havana Sugar King’s historical and cultural significances, while separately examining 
major Cuban Revolution events.  This establishes potential Cuban stories, both culturally and 
militarily, that the Rochester editors could choose to cover for their readerships.  The two 
Rochester dailies are the focus of the fourth chapter.  This section’s introduction provides a brief 
background on the two newspapers themselves, along with a short informed look at how 
Rochester operated as a civic community during the 1950s.  Then the focus shifts to the primary 
narrative: the role the IL and the Cuban Revolution played in each daily’s respective coverage 
beyond the sports page.  By subjecting front section articles about Cuba and/or the IL to in-depth 
thematic analysis, the timelines established in the previous two chapters come into clearer focus.  
How did the politics surrounding Cuba on what seemed to be a weekly basis incorporate the 
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baseball lens outside the sports sections of the T-U and D & C?  By observing these collisions, 
themes came to the forefront of this study’s overall narrative.  The fifth and final section offers a 
conclusion and summary of findings noted in the previous three chapters and what this means for 
the relevant historical literature.  More importantly, however, a judgement can be made on how 
sports can bridge political and social gaps, albeit at a superficial level. 
                                                Chapter Structure 
1. Introduction 
2. “Nocout” On a Walkoff 
• Sociological Analysis of Americana: What Baseball Means to the United States 
• Sociological Analysis of Cubanidad: What Baseball means to Cuba 
3. Pre /Post Cuban Revolution & the Havana Sugar Kings 
• History of Cuban Baseball from 1930 to 1953, with specific mention of US-
Cuban interaction 
• History of the Cuban/Havana Sugar Kings 
• Basic Timeline of the Cuban Revolution, with specific mention of US-Cuban 
international relations 
4. Rochester Times-Union and Democrat & Chronicle. 
• Brief Background on the Rochester Times-Union and Democrat & Chronicle  
• The Cuban Revolution and Baseball in the Front Sections 
5. Findings and Conclusions 
 
                                                Delimitations 
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The main delimitation is the brief written treatment I give the newspaper sports sections. 
While they provide a secondary lens for the study, covering what they said in detail was 
superfluous.  I tried to view the newspapers from a perspective of a non-sporting-fan, to judge 
the representations any American-Cuban baseball bond may have had on the Rochester 
community.  With that said, I did limit my study focus to the baseball season, when the majority 
of relevant stories would have appeared.  In addition, this also increases the likelihood of the 
baseball reporters themselves writing pieces, either in or outside the sports section.  
In the world of sports reporting, the coverage of a particular sport or team does not 
necessarily end when the season is over or the playoff champion has been determined.  Off-
season moves such as player trades, free agent signings, or general interest stories often crop up 
in particular daily newspapers.  During the mid-20th century, the reporters in Rochester covered 
baseball nearly 365 days a year.  There is too much strictly baseball reporting to extensively 
search every day of every month from 1954 to 1960, especially since I am not trying to prove 
Rochester was a baseball city; there is more than enough secondary literature to make that point. 
Also, the rebels of the Cuban Revolution, which began in 1953, didn’t limit their operations to 
the timetable of the IL baseball season.  Not everything that occurred is relevant to this study.  
With that in mind I set up my research timeframe.  For both the D & C and the Times-
Union, I looked at microfilm scans of each day from April 1 to October 31, spanning the entirety 
of the IL baseball season. I hold to this pattern for 1954, 1955, 1956, and 1957.  For 1958, I also 
looked at the months of November and December, as they were the decisive months of Castro’s 
military campaign, which saw Batista flee Cuba on New Year’s Eve.  To this extent, I also 
focused on January, February, and March of 1959, to shed light on how the world was reacting to 
this regime change and the resulting foundation of a possible new communist enclave less than 
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90 miles from American soil.  The remainder of research for that year was restricted to the April-
October timeline, as were the issues analyzed from 1960.  
                                                     Limitations 
My only primary sources are the newspapers in question.  I am unable to use a Havana 
newspaper as I do not speak or read Spanish and to my knowledge there were no major English 
language dailies in Cuba during the Revolution.  This study is restricted to a one-way viewpoint. 
Further, it is hard to gather exactly how important the role Havana’s IL franchise played in the 
civic culture of the Cuban capital, let alone the Cuban nation.  Not much has been written on the 
Havana Sugar Kings outside of basic information.  Most books on the revolution fail to mention 
them.  Also, due to time constraints as well as access limitations to the Times-Union microfilms 
that required me to travel to Rochester, I may have mistakenly passed over smaller articles.  As a 
result, the scans I made of the microfilm, which I took back to London for careful examination, 
may be missing a few minor articles related to the narratives involved.  However, since this is 
strictly a thematic analysis, I believe the damage these oversights create is minimal
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                                Chapter 2 
                “Nocout” On a Walk-off 
On 26 April 2014, the Chicago White Sox were hosting the Tampa Bay Rays in an MLB 
regular season contest at U.S. Cellular Field on Chicago’s south side.  In the bottom of the 9th 
inning, the Rays led the home team by a score of 6-5. With the bases loaded and two outs, White 
Sox first baseman Jose Abreu, “recently escaped from Fidel Castro,”1 stepped up to the plate.  
On a 0-1 count, the native of Cuba’s Cienfuegos Province hit a grand-slam home run, 
winning the game for Chicago.2  Abreu’s home run not only signified a White Sox victory, or 
further cemented his then league lead in home runs; it also represented a complex merger of 
Cuban and American nationalist ideologies through the sport of baseball.  
Being in America, Abreu had by virtue of hitting his home run, also achieved a walk-off 
victory.  The term, first coined in 1988, refers to a game winning run, after which the players 
“walk off” the field.  However, due to his Cuban nationality and upbringing, Abreu would likely 
remember this home run as his first MLB “nocout,” or knockout, a phrase that pays homage to 
the other national sport of Cuba, boxing.3  The emotional context of a “nocout” in Havana’s 
Estadio Latinamericano is similarly revered, if differently expressed, than a walk-off victory is in 
the United States.  Since they occur in the bottom half of an inning, the fans “walk out” of the 
stadium happy, the runners having triumphantly crossed the plate.  Famed Cuban exile and 
baseball historian Ronaldo Gonzàlez Echevarría proclaimed: “Reaching home calls for a fiesta.”4   
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Americans and Cubans, told by their governments to behave as mortal enemies, celebrate 
in the same manner over the same event.  Sporting moments such as Cuban outfielder Eduardo 
“Sandy” Amoros’s game-saving basket catch and successive series clinching RBIs in Game 7 of 
the 1955 World Series for Brooklyn are as fondly remembered in Havana as they are in New 
York City.5  This trend most recently occurred when Cubans illegally watched Game 7 of the 
1997 World Series between the Florida Marlins and Cleveland Indians.  After the Marlin’s walk 
off win in the 11th inning, joyous Habanos poured onto the capital streets to celebrate Florida’s 
championship, made possible by Cuban-exile pitcher Livàn Hernàndez.6  In doing so, they were 
simultaneously participating with American fans celebrating in the stadium across the Straits in 
Miami.7 
The purpose of this chapter was not to examine the modern day context of these events as 
they have been examined more thoroughly by writers and historians much more experienced 
than myself. Nevertheless, the first section will focus on American conceptualization of baseball 
as the nation’s pastime and as a promoter of alleged American values from the 1870s to the mid-
twentieth century. The second section focuses upon Cuba’s historical conception of baseball 
representing “cubanidad,” or “what makes one Cuban” during the 19th and early 20th centuries, 
and the frustrating attempts by my secondary sources to attach symbolism upon it. By the end of 
this chapter, the transnational ‘beisbol’ bridge between the United States and the island of Cuba, 
circa 1930, will be exposed for the readers to absorb. 
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                          America’s Pastime 
 It's our game. That's the chief fact in connection with it. America's game has the snap, go, fling 
of the American atmosphere. It belongs as much to our institutions, fits into them as significantly, 
as our Constitution's laws; is just as important in the sum total of our American life. — Walt 
Whitman, 18898 
 
Pioneering sports historian David Voight once exclaimed: “It seems that once one grasps 
the broad historical outline of a sport like major league baseball, one’s imagination turns up 
endless leads for exploring the connections between stages of baseball history and their 
counterparts in American life, particularly insights into that will o’ the wisp we call our national 
character.”9  Almost as long ago as whenever the first baseball game was played, people from all 
sorts of sporting, academic, and sometimes unrelated disciplines attempted to, for one reason or 
another, examine baseball’s relationship with this transparent citizen that is marketed, packaged, 
and sold as America’s national pastime.  
And it is the sheer number of these publications that is of valuable note in regard to this 
study. How America’s pastime has been portrayed, propagandized, criticized, and analyzed is of 
substantial importance to my work, but that it has ocurred to such a great extent is in itself of 
extreme value. The sole fact that academic organizations and journals such as the Society of 
American Baseball Research, Nine, North American Society of Sports Historians, and the 
Journal of Baseball Review exist speaks volumes about how big a role, imagined or real, that the 
sport has impacted upon the course of American history.10  The most visible, if not most 
important historical work, despite its controversial methods and the debate such methods have 
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created in the sports history community, is the eleven-part documentary mini-series simply 
entitled: Ken Burns’ Baseball.11   
In my opinion, there are two common portrayals of baseball in American society: as an 
intangible representation of the “will o’ the wisp” national character, or as a contained 
unremarkable yet magnetic microcosm of whatever the current political and social problems then 
absorbing the country.  Ken Burns’ Baseball attempts and somewhat succeeds to be the second. 
It is filled with input from noted American historians such as John Thorn, Doris Kearns 
Goodwin, and even famed Cuban historian Manuel Marquez-Sterling.12  And yet, that “will o’ 
the wisp” permeates the entire documentary from start to finish.  It begins each episode by 
playing the Star Spangled Banner, the last two words of which Burns declares are “play ball.”13 
The first episode or first inning is colloquially dubbed: “Our Game.”  The first man on screen 
giving analysis in “Our Game” is not a historian, nor is he an economist or sociologist, or any 
other kind of academic.  The man in question is Bob Costas, who surmised:14  
"The first thing about it — and this seems so obvious that maybe we overlook it — 
baseball is a beautiful thing: the way the field fans out, the choreography of the sport, the pace 
and rhythm of it, the fact that that pace and rhythm allows for conversation and reflection and 
opinion and comparison..."15   Moments like these, by a famed sportscaster, seem to bookend the 
various segments and episodes throughout,  acknowledging the flawed logic in the “will o’ the 
wisp,” while simultaneously revelling in it.   As Costas later espoused: "Baseball is a human 
enterprise. Therefore, by definition, it's imperfect, it's flawed, it doesn't embody perfectly 
everything that's worthwhile about our country or about our culture. But it comes closer than 
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most things in American life.”16  America doesn’t want that “will o’ the wisp to fade away or be 
proven false, so everyone, including academics, continue to promote this ideal.  That enthusiasm, 
that joy, that conscious reliance on myth speaks to the role baseball has played throughout 
history on American society and national self-understanding.  This role makes possible a 
potential cultural bridge between the United States and other nations.  However, what has 
occurred more often throughout history via the promotion of this “American pastime” is a forced 
subjugation to “Yanqui” values and the “superior” cult of baseball.17 
What historian Adrian Burgos called a personal “initially flawed hypothesis,” and a 
central theme of his book, Playing the American Game: Baseball, Latinos, and the Color Line, 
was that baseball had been cemented in Latin American culture because of United States 
imperialism.18  American foreign incursions during the turn of the 20th century, both militarily 
and economically, helped establish baseball as a cornerstone of Caribbean sporting culture. Most 
baseball historians agree with this premise of “U.S. Marines shouldering bats next to their rifles 
when they imposed imperial order in a region by blood and fire.”19  However, as Burgos 
elaborated with his hypothesis: “Baseball’s infusion into Latino culture involved a much more 
complicated process of transnational exchange . . . In different contexts, Latinos adopted 
“America’s game” and gave the sport meaning that went beyond athletic competition.”20  But as 
I stated before, what is important to my study is not how the game became entrenched in the 
Caribbean, but how Americans at the time viewed the national role in the entrenchment: How did 
the media view the “spreading of the baseball gospel,” specifically to its southern neighbors?  
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According to Robert Elias, they viewed it as a part of the “white man’s burden,” one that most 
were quite proud to shoulder.21  While the extent to which the United States cemented baseball in 
the Caribbean may be open for debate, that the sport heavily promoted American superiority in 
the hemisphere is not.  Much of the following argument was gleaned from Elias’s The Empire 
Strikes Out: How Baseball Sold U.S. Foreign Policy and Promoted the American Way Abroud. 22 
During the Spanish-American War, baseball promoters and stars were firmly behind the 
Cuban freedom fighters, or at least the American interpretation of what a Cuban freedom fighter 
represented.  The sailors and the “crack club of the fleet” of the ill-fated USS Maine were 
heavily promoted as the first casualties in the war for “Cuba Libre!,” a war which was welcomed 
by Organized Baseball.23   An unidentified primary or secondary source was quoted by Elias in 
his book as arguing: “Spanish colonial rulers had been the main obstacle to the unfettered 
movement of baseball talent within America’s transnational circuit.”24  Elias also stated that 
former barnstormers got into the act as well, with former player Frank Bancroft commenting that 
Americans like him were: “dyed-in-the-wool rooters for the Cubans in their struggle for 
independence from Spanish tyranny.”25  And yet, the Cubans in much of Elias’s source literature, 
are referred to as: “squealing, watermelon-eating imbeciles and infants.”26  Elias argued that 
America, including baseball promoters, was more interested in “liberating” Cuba than in winning 
freedom for Cubans.  In 1901, the United States gained an economic stranglehold over the island 
via the Platt Amendment’s addition to the Cuban Constitution.27  In response to Cuban protests, 
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this same American exceptionalism was used to condemn many of the same freedom fighters 
who had fought under the banner of “Cuba Libre!”28   
According to Elias, however, baseball was never withheld from the Cubans by the United 
States, as it was viewed as a way “to promote political order and social control.”  Even Cuban 
ballplayers in America, such as the 1899 All-Cubans, were forced to adapt to America’s view of 
society.  Their United States tour was cut short when it was revealed that black players would be 
playing with and against whites, something that ran counter to segregated American ideals.29 
Nevertheless, baseball was still alleged to be a “goodwill mission,” spreading democracy around 
the globe.  Some iniatives operated under “peaceful” circumstances, such as in Japan; others 
occurred in the face of bloody insurrection such as in the Philippines.  However, despite the wide 
scope of these efforts, the Caribbean remained the most active region both in the plans of 
American imperialism and in expanding baseball’s reach.  
Elias stated: “From 1899-1933, the U.S. Marines hit the beaches at least thirty-four times 
in ten different Caribbean nations. . . And wherever the ‘big stick’ of military might or the ‘big 
trick’ of economic dominance went, baseball was not far behind.”30  In 1913, editors of Baseball 
Magazine took Organized Baseball to task for not having “established in [these] fertile fields a 
branch extension of our national game . . . [and to] exploit our South American neighbors.”31 
During this period prior to World War I, Marines also established beachheads in Nicaragua, 
Panama, and the Dominican Republic.  In each case, baseball was allegedly brought to “civilize” 
those who many Americans perceived to be “barbarous peoples.”32  During a 1914 American 
occupation of the Mexican port city of Veracruz, U.S. Navy captain John Leonard claimed that 
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‘baseball would civilize the country.”33  Back home, newspapers were mainly focusing on the 
positives of “diamond diplomacy,”34 with baseball claims such as those of a 1913 U.S. minister 
in the Dominican Republic who believed that the sport was: “an outlet for the animal spirits of 
the young men . . . It is a real substitute for the contest in the hill-sides with rifles [and] might 
[help save] the nation.”35  This belief that a game, simply by the nature of its national origin, 
could instill democracy shows the extreme dedication many Americans reserved for that ‘will of 
the wisp’ idealism regarding the Caribbean.  
Beginning in the 1920s, many in the American sporting media and the missionaries 
themselves declared that the goodwill mission of baseball was a failure.  However, their 
reasoning held nothing against baseball, but instead relied heavily on perceived Caribbean 
genetic faults.  Elias reports that after American occupying forces left the Dominican Republic in 
1923, baseball’s popularity on the island decreased greatly.  William Pulliam, a Christian 
missionary, reasoned that their giving up on America’s pastime showed: “Just another example 
of the lack of sustained effort [by] the average Latin-American in anything calling for 
perseverance.”36  The Sporting News reported that “the military occupation by Americans (in 
Haiti and the Dominican Republic) is regarded by the natives as a bum decision because it 
interfered with their national sport of revolution.”37  Again, the notion of American moral 
superiority, and that if one truly loved baseball, there was no reason to revolt against American 
friendly governments, seemed quite popular in the American press.  This is a prime example of 
the United States putting the integrity of their ‘will of the wisp’ above condemning the 
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oppressive actions of American-installed right wing dictators.   The adherence or rejection of this 
trend by the Rochester dailies is addressed in Chapter 4.   
                 Béísbol y Cubanidad   
Is there anywhere a land where baseball passions run deeper or where baseball tradition 
stands more ingrained in the national psyche than it does right here in the United States of 
America? The answer…. Is a resounding “YES!” on both counts -Peter C. Bjarkman38 
 
Baseball will survive one way or another . . . regardless of what happens in Cuban 
politics after the King of Sugar (Fidel Castro)’s long awaited demise, because it is 
consubstantial with Cuban culture and superior to his individual will- Roberto Gonzàlez 
Echevarría39 
 
 Cuban historian Graciella Pogolotti once surmised: “Cuba is a country that floats. The 
great interchange of here with there and there with here. And one of the things that has 
characterized us is the capacity to synthesize, to take a little of all parts and give it form.”40  
Further elaborating on Pogolotti’s statement, Thomas F. Carter correctly pointed out that to view 
Cuba as existing in one place as one people, with exiles, natives, and Fidel Castro’s government 
representing the same Cuba is to “deny the very history of Cuba.”41  I will add that the concept of 
a Cuban fluidity not only applies to the current state of Cuban life, let alone baseball, but to the 
entire chronological extent of Cuba’s national character. 
The ‘will of the wisp’ Cuban national identity is known as cubanidad, or “what makes 
one Cuban.”42  And one thing that seems to be a common trait of cubanidad is that it tends to be 
defined either through the embracing or rejecting of another cultural source, whether that may be 
another nation such as the United States, or another differing Cuban ideological group.  Baseball 
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is a prime example of this trend occurring throughout the island’s tumultuous history, stretching 
from the end of Spanish colonial rule.   
As mentioned before in the background introduction, the period of the 1860s through the 
1890s featured a Cuban quest for both modernity within the United States global economic 
sphere and political freedom by removing the Spanish crown from their heads.  The increasing 
economic and cultural transnational exchange between Cuba and the “North” near the turn of the 
20th century coincided with baseball’s arrival and cultivation on the “Pearl of the Antilles.”  This 
gave baseball the opportunity to transform into one of the earliest cornerstones of Cuban 
expression of a national identity. 
From the 1870s until the Spanish-American War in 1898, bullfighting was frequently 
ignored if not blatantly criticized and condemned by Cubans, especially when compared to the 
unprecedented support baseball received across the island.  This rejection of Spain’s “national 
sport” in favor of a more American or “modern” game not only reveals the popularity  baseball 
had in Cuba, but also serves as an example of a deliberate attempt by locals to vocally express 
their distinctive cubanidad.43  As Pérez concluded: “Baseball was not merely an alternative for 
the bullfight . . . it carried a political subtext that both formed and gave form to Cuban 
discontent.”44   In On Becoming Cuban, Pérez utilizes two primary source quotations that quite 
effectively sum up the growing anti-Spanish sentiment on the island and how this was expressed 
passionately and emphatically via baseball.  The first is from one Wenceslao Gàlvez, who 
proudly proclaimed: “One of baseball’s greatest achievements is without doubt to have turned 
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our youth away from the bullfight, an achievement I applaud, even if some quixote brands me as 
anti-patriotic.”45  
The second comes from a visiting Spanish poet, Manuel Curros Enríquez.  Enríquez, after 
he was told it (baseball) was a North American game, claimed: “I had a presentiment that Spain 
had died for Cuba . . . Yanqui ways conquer with such finesse . . . when a people are influenced 
to the extent that they allow games of childhood to be replaced, how can it not be dominated . . . 
the future which is a peoples’ principal essence no longer belongs to them . . . that is why the 
popularity of baseball made me realize . . . that I found myself in a foreign country.”46  Both 
Cubans, the ones who favored baseball such as Gàlvez and those who lamented its presence such 
as Enrìquez, were unwittingly using the sport to define their “fluid” notions of cubanidad.  The 
sport continued to “dominate” in similar ways long after the Spanish fleet left Havana harbor for 
the last time in late 1898.47 
Most of the sources I utilized came to the same conclusion, some more reluctantly than 
others, regarding the period between the 1902 constitutional installation of the Platt Amendment 
and the first military coup of Fulgencio Batista in 1933.  The Cuban people, or at the very least 
middle-class white habanos, desired to become more closely linked to the United States both 
culturally and economically, and baseball was one such way to achieve this.48  But to single out 
middle-class white habanos and to declare all of Cuba was equally invested, would be extremely 
short-sighted.  Due to segregation found in American baseball and “North” society in general, 
Cuban blacks stood to lose much racial equity by moving closer to the American system, both on 
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and off the diamond.49  Lower and working class Cubans in and outside of Havana did not stand 
to gain much from having their sport taken over by Americanos at all levels of operation.  In 
addition, most could not afford to vacation to the United States outside of Florida and thereby, 
were unable to experience the “freedom” of American culture first-hand.50  Much of the positive 
outlooks on this change came from the white upper and middle-class habanos.  
However, as Pérez surmises: “It (the North American presence) became a permanent 
condition . . . a way to take measure of the world and be measured by it.”51  Essentially, 
cubanidad was measured in a variety of ways.  However, those ways always filtered through the 
American lens, whether the Cubans measuring it liked it or not.  For example, much of the 
baseball on the island was organized by Americans.  
While the Cuban Winter League dominated interest in the capital, the level of baseball 
that dominated the entire island was “sugar mill” baseball.52  American and wealthy Cuban 
economic executives, namely owners of sugar mills and nickel mines, set up the corporate Sugar 
League to give their Cuban employees entertainment to enjoy.  With the locals inclined to: “talk 
about their imaginary grievances and create discontent,” baseball was viewed by many elites and 
government bureaucrats as a form of social control.  By watching and competing in the Sugar 
League, where future big leaguers such as Eduardo “Sandy” Amoros and Saturnino “Minnie” 
Minoso honed their talents, Cubans were projecting their cubanidad by comparing and 
contrasting their baseball with that in the North.53  The Cuban Winter League, by being so 
intertwined with Organized Baseball, was also participating in this transnational exchange, or, 
more succinctly, transnational engulfment. Again, as Pérez concludes: “Participation (in 
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baseball) provided access to equality, an opportunity to compete and prevail within a North 
American framework and thereby affirm the value and validity of being Cuban by meeting and 
surpassing standards set and recognized by the United States.”54 
Even academic historians fell prey to presenting Cuban baseball or their cubanidad 
through the lens of the American variety or American society in general, with both positive and 
negative viewpoints.  Louis Pérez Jr., by combining all aspects of Cuban life into one work, 
seemed to avoid these pitfalls for the most part, yet he still acknowledged that for better or for 
worse, cubanidad was inseparable from American cultural influence.55  When historians fail to 
acknowledge this concept, or overdramatize it, their own personal biases seep through, which 
only further supports Pérez’s conclusion as well as supporting my decision to focus soley on 
American newspapers for this study. 
I was not expecting to find one true Cuban baseball identity from the past; I knew no 
such thing exists: It differs from person to person, and that the heated political diatribes between 
the two sides permanently taints the sources with bias.  But, I thought I would at least be able to 
find some sort of consistent cultural existence, i.e., how the sport was used to define cubanidad 
during the Revolutionary Years from 1954 through 1960.  However, the level of bias present in 
the sources, especially in the works of Roberto Gonzàlez Echevarría and Peter C. Bjarkman, 
made this virtually impossible.  Yet this impossibility proves extremely beneficial to my study as 
it further shows how, in large measure history, is viewed through the American baseball lens.  
By focusing on the complete inability of Bjarkman and Echevarría to separate their political and 
cultural biases from their writings, it becomes clear that a Cuban’s view of cubanidad is 
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relatively unimportant to my study when compared to what Americans think “makes one 
Cuban.” 
I placed academic sources into two categories based on ideological slant, or what I 
perceived as such. The first of these are firmly anti-Castro, who believe comparisons between the 
“Maximum Leader” and Hitler and Mussolini are fairly warranted.56  Two of the most 
informative sources, The Pride of Havana: a History of Cuban Baseball and Baseball and 
Revolution in Cuba, were both written by an exile of Castro’s regime, Roberto Gonzàlez 
Echevarría.  He acknowledges the fluidity between American and Cuban cultures, when he 
states: “One thing appears to be clear: Cuban national, cultural and political identities can only 
be carved out of their involvement with the United States . . . The process through which national 
and political identity are defined on the island is a complex mixture of admiration for and 
rejection of the United States.”57  However, his failure to truly understand this concept is 
revealed in between those two sentences, where he proclaims: “All the paeans to the Soviet 
Union in the recent past, to the sister countries of the Communist block, to the third world, and to 
Latin America were largely propaganda.”58  
 According to Peter C. Bjarkman, Echevarría tends to underplay the brutality of 
Fulgencio Batista’s reign so that his beloved 1930s-1950s baseball, the “Golden Age” that he 
grew up with on the island, is not sullied.59  While he does refer to Batista as a dictator, and in 
fact draws parallels between him and Castro as “strongmen,” he also attacks those he feels 
oversimplify the Revolutionary period. “Batista was a populist dictator,” Echevarria explains. 
“As for dictatorship, Batista was very unlike Trujillo and Somoza. These tyrants owned their 
                                               
56
 Echevarría , Cuban Fiestas. He places three photographs of rallies held by Castro, Hitler, and Mussolini and calls 
them one and the same. 
57
 Echevarría, The Pride of Havana, 353. 
58
 Ibid. 
59
 Bjarkman, A History of Cuban Baseball: 1864-2006, 5-8. 
39 
 
39 
 
countries . . . Not Batista, who, for all the millions he misappropriated, owned very little in Cuba, 
and was far from being in control of the economic elite.”60  In his Baseball and Revolution 
chapter of his book Cuban Fiestas, Echevarría essentially describes his life growing up under 
Batista, especially with regard to the Cuban Sugar Kings, as a fiesta.61  He further elaborates on 
his earlier stance that Batista: “is not an evil monster of historic deminsions.”62  I will not enter 
into a judgement of Batista’s character as this is not the point of this study. However, 
Echevarria’s failure to admit the possibility that his life experience could potentially slant his 
historical recreation of these events, makes me question if his works can be relied upon when 
trying to define a collective cubanidad.  
On the other end of the spectrum, is what I would call the American defenders of the 
Revolution, led by Peter C. Bjarkman.  Though some have called him a “Castro stooge,”63 of the 
two major English historical volumes on Cuban baseball, I perceive his to be less biased than 
Echevarría’s.  On several occasions throughout his History of Cuban Baseball: 1864-2006, 
Bjarkman commended Echevarría for his “great storytelling and wonderful research on the pre-
revolutionary period.”64 Like his predecessor, Bjarkman made a painstaking effort to disprove 
the myth of Fidel Castro being a pitching prospect for the Washington Senators.65 On occasion, 
he begrudgingly admitted faults with the Castro regime, much more so than Echevarría did with 
the Batista administration. 
Bjarkman submits to Pérez Jr.’s conclusion by espousing: “University of North Carolina 
cultural historian Louis Pérez Jr. eloquently captures much of the connection between Cuba’s 
19th century national origins and the foundations of the Cuban national game of baseball . . . 
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How Cubans of the fifties had ultimately become fed up as a society with their loss of national 
identity with related wholesale submergence of everything that was natively Cuban to the 
pervasive intrusion of all that is covetously and embarrassingly North American.”66  Finally, the 
area where much of Bjarkman’s bias is found, in his extensive post-revolutionary section, is 
mostly irrelevant to my study, so it does not hinder my ability to establish a collective 
cubanidad.67  However, the bias that springs up elsewhere in the work, while not prevalent, 
definitively mar the work as too slanted to be valuable to my research. 
While Bjarkman criticized Echevarría for being too nostalgic to be accurate in the latter’s 
coverage of baseball under Machado and Batista, the former still neglects to address his own 
biases for the 1961 to the present “amateur” period.  Bjarkman does admit that he is perhaps 
being a bit selfish with wanting to keep Cuban baseball amateur, or, in his words, “pure.”68 
However, he refuses to fully acknowledge how his preference for the modern era of Cuban 
baseball, one which he developed with full cooperation and access to INDER, Castro’s sporting 
arm, could unfairly slant his judgement of Echeverría’s work.69  In his introduction, Bjarkman 
wrote: “the baseball reorganization under Cuban government control that emerged in the sixties 
was for the first time one that existed solely for the benefit of the collective Cuban people and 
thus no longer controlled and exploited … by U.S. professional organized baseball.”70  He 
continues his “unbiased” claims when he trumpets yet fails to name: “those factors that truly 
make Cuba’s game one of the truest treasures of international baseball play.”71 
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 Bjarkman, ironically, is one of the same “American tourists who only see what they want 
to see,” that he openly loathes.72  Just as vehemently as Echevarria bashes Castro’s alleged 
amateurism and “holding athletes hostage,” Bjarkman constantly informed the reader about 
alleged impurity and corporate excess in the American professional game.73  Bjarkman was at his 
most hypocritical, however, when he criticized the United States government for: “restricting our 
constitutional right to visit the communist country,” while simultaneously defending Castro’s 
declarations of baseball defectors as national traitors.74   In my opinion, like Echevarría, 
Bjarkman is an idealist who wrote an extensive and informative account on Cuban baseball.  
However, also like Echevarría, his ideology muddles whatever trace of true cubanidad might 
have been found within. 
What this section has proved is that especially when it comes to the decade I am 
studying, everything revolves around the American role, or how Americans perceive the Cuban 
role regarding the two nations’ respective baseball identities.  It is impossible to separate the two. 
On the American side of the equation, historical longevity of the game is on their side as well as 
geographical size and economic might.  By the time the allegedly first Cuban baseball game was 
played in 1875, the sport had been America’s national pastime for at least a decade or more. 
Baseball had been firmly woven into American culture and national character no matter 
which side of political issues Americans found themselves.  In addition, Americans introduced 
baseball to the first Cubans to play it.  As such, no matter what the Cuban role in this 
transnational baseball and cultural exchange, or how emphatically unbiased an American author 
tries to be, the lens expressed via Ken Burns’ Baseball will always be the one through which this 
role is examined. 
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Finally, this study, as I slowly came to realize, is not about the Cuban baseball scene but 
how the American media and their readership perceived that scene.  Even if  I could read Spanish 
in addition to having access to local Havana sources, my paper always has been about American 
perceptions, nothing more and nothing less.  Admittedly, how Cubans perceived their own scene 
and that of their U.S. counterparts, is important, it is at best secondary, as their accounts are not 
what the denizens of Rochester were reading, at least firsthand.  They were reading the opinions 
of a couple of local American sports writers who, in turn, were writing through the lens of  the 
long established cultural ideal of America’s national game, whether a positive or negative report. 
So the mystical “floating” cubanidad of the period, while by no means irrelevant, does not need 
to be delved into further.
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                               Chapter 3 
                       Just One More Step 
To understand Rochester’s media reaction to the revolutionary events in Cuba, we must 
discuss the events themselves, both on and off the baseball diamond. As I have stated in previous 
chapters, Cuban professional baseball from the 1930s until its abrupt end in the 1960s grew 
closer and closer to the American organized variety. This strengthening relationship coincided 
with the political unrest and unsure social atmosphere of Cuba’s government, both nationally and 
abroad. The parallel nature of these two circumstances, not just in a chronological sense, but how 
both would receive coverage in Rochester newspapers, shows the importance of documenting 
both Cuban narrative strands before beginning the thematic analysis of their American 
interpretations.  
The first section in this chapter focuses on the island’s baseball and political backgrounds 
prior to 1954.  Cuba’s increasing role in organized baseball’s hierarchical structure is discussed 
in detail, namely the pressure local promoters felt until they signed an official agreement with 
MLB in 1947. In addition, the section specifically documents the 1930s arrival of professional 
scouts, Cuban players appearing on 1940s and 1950s major league rosters and finally, the 
presence of the Florida International League’s Havana Cubans from their 1946 creation until 
their 1953 dissolution. This beginning section concludes with a brief description of the Cuban 
political situation during this transitory period, in particular the reigns of Gerardo Machado, 
Ramón Grau San Martín, and Fulgencio Batista. 
In its second section, Chapter 3 covers the brief yet tumultuous history of the Havana 
Sugar Kings. It references the Revolution only in instances where the war directly impacted the 
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Havana franchise, such as increased security measures imposed by Batista during the 1957 
season, the constant complaints made by other IL owners during the 1958 campaign, the eventful 
26 July 1959 game, and the Sugar Kings’ eventual 1960 relocation to Jersey City.  However the 
main focus is spent on events away from the front lines, namely upon the team’s diamond 
exploits, attendance and gate receipt trends, in addition to the naïve, sometimes xenophobic, 
perceptions of many North American baseball insiders.  Unlike the first, the second section does 
not attempt much in the way of in-depth thematic discussion. It strictly relies upon basic facts 
and narratives, as Chapter 4 features the majority of the relevant academic analysis.  
Finally, the Cuban Revolution is chronologically detailed, from the 1956 arrival of Fidel 
Castro aboard the Granma on the eastern shores of Oriente Province1 to Batista’s flight into exile 
on 31 December 1958.2  Castro’s first year and a half in power, which directly coincided with the 
remaining days of the Sugar Kings, is also documented. The time period from his victorious 8 
January 1959 arrival in Havana to the Americans severing economic relations with Cuba on 6 
July 1960 was invaluable to this study.3   
This chapter reveals tightening American grips on the island through baseball, 
characterized by the Havana Cubans and through political means via a revolving door of 
dictatorial regimes. It explores the life and times of the Cuban/ Havana Sugar Kings, the 
franchise without which Rochester’s media would have never travelled to the “Pearl of the 
Antilles.”  Finally, the chapter chronologically details the Cuban Revolution, the four-year war 
which occurred parallel to the Sugar Kings’ seven year existence. Covering both narratives, the 
baseball and the politics, this chapter puts the remainder of the study into necessary perspective. 
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A full picture here in Chapter 3 is provided so the readers can understand how it was edited, 
cropped, highlighted, and exposed by the local Rochester press, as detailed in Chapter 4. 
     Scouts to Smokers to Strongmen 
  As stated before, in the 1920s and 1930s American baseball truly began expanding its 
efforts regarding Cuba, particularly in the search for new sources of talent. However, the 1920s 
Cuban-American exchange mostly consisted of NLB players swapping with CWL counterparts 
during their respective seasons, and American white players barnstorming the island in winter. 
MLB examples such as Adolfo Luque and Miguel Gonzàlez were rare exceptions. In addition, 
with American organized baseball still two decades away from integration, talented Cuban 
blacks such as pitcher Martín Dihigo and power-hitter Crístobal Torriente were limited to 
performing in the NLB.4 It wasn’t until the mid-1930s that anyone in American organized 
baseball turned a serious eye to Cuba to acquire new talent. It had nothing to do with finding the 
next Babe Ruth, Josh Gibson, or even the next Luque. It had everything to do with one man’s 
realization he could pay light-skinned Hispanics far less than American whites to do the same 
job of hitting or throwing a baseball. That man was Clark Griffith, long-time owner of the 
American League’s Washington Senators. 
 With the Senators winning zero World Series titles since their 1901 foundation, many 
Washington baseball fans felt that times were changing when former player/manager Clark 
Griffith bought the team in 1919.5  In the short term, this was indeed true as the Washington club 
won the American League pennant in 1924 and 1925, winning its first World Series in the 
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former.6 However by the mid-1930s, while not wholly worthy of their World War II byline: 
“First in war, first in peace, and last in the American League;” the Senators rarely finished out of 
the second division.7  
Instead of trying to build a competitive team, Griffith pursued a path to obtain high 
profits with little money spent. With his lacklustre clubs drawing low attendance figures, Griffith 
looked elsewhere to make money. For example, he charged the local professional Negro club, 
the Homestead Grays, a team that frequently drew higher crowds, a sizable rental fee to use the 
Senators’ Griffith Stadium.8  However, Griffith’s biggest concern was finding ways to lower his 
talent payroll. With black ballplayers still barred from MLB, he turned his attention southward, 
to the white and light-skinned “mulattoes” of the Caribbean.9  
In 1934, Senators’ scout and “erstwhile Baltimore laundryman,” Joseph Cambria, was 
sent to Havana per Griffith’s orders.10  A few months into the season, Cambria signed outfielder 
Bobby Estalella, and assigned him to the Senator’s Double-A Albany farm team.11  In 1936, at 
least three other Cubans joined him in New York’s capital.12  This was only the beginning for the 
Senators. From 1934-1960, Bjarkman estimated Cambria signed over four hundred “Cubanolas” 
to varying Washington contracts. Less than half that number ever saw Griffith Stadium.13 In this 
regard, Cambria’s Cuban signings definitively helped produce the baseball scouting frenzy that 
arrived in Havana’s 1940s-50s era. It should be noted that most of his acquisitions either didn’t 
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pan out or simply filled empty uniforms playing on the Senator’s lacklustre World War II era 
clubs.14 However, Cambria’s resulting establishment of durable minor league prospects, plus his 
few quality major league signings such as Estalella, outfielder Roberto Ortíz, and junk-ball 
pitcher Conrado Marrero, made other organizations factor Cuba into their scouting plans. 15 
Cuban sportswriter Jess Losada, mainly due to his dislike for Cambria, helped the 
Cincinnati Reds scout Cuban talent in the early 1940s.16 Other teams such as the Brooklyn 
Dodgers began holding exhibition contests in Havana to scout potential prospects, in addition to 
testing the waters for general manager Branch Rickey’s integration plan.17 Cambria and 
colleagues were both a blessing and a bane upon island baseball, on the field and off. The risk 
was minimal for these owners and scouts, but severe for their Cuban acquisitions. If they signed 
an organized baseball contract, they subjected themselves to verbal racial abuse, poor 
transportation and housing, along with a substantial language barrier. MLB clubs, in essence, 
usually paid their Cuban recurits a one-way ticket to the United States and accomodations in 
segregated housing.18  These contracts were clearly one-way agreements as far as profit was 
concerned. Despite this, the interest organized baseball showed in the island only served to draw 
American-Cuban business relationships closer. By 1947, these relationships reached a climax 
due to the actions of a man with no involvement in Cuban or American baseball. The actions and 
dreams of Jorge Pasquél, a Mexican businessman, drastically raised the price of securing not 
only Cuban players, but Americans as well. In doing so, Pasquél forced Cuban baseball 
promoters to jump into Organized Baseball’s arms.  
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Pasquél, a native of Veracruz, was determined to make baseball thrive in Mexico. While 
he did not found the Mexican League, in 1940 he established the two most popular franchises, 
Mexico City and Veracruz.  He eventually owned the entire circuit.19  But Pasquél’s main 
objective was to make his league comparable in quality to MLB, hoping to eventually force the 
creation; “Of a truly World Series.”20 To achieve this, he offered MLB, NLB, and CWL players 
expensive contracts, with the intent to lure them to play in Mexico.21 Being offered in some cases 
three times what the other club owners paid them, many players accepted Pasquél’s enticements. 
In the mid-1940s, each of the three aforementioned circuits lost quality talent to their “outlaw” 
Mexican counterpart. MLB lost stars such as St. Louis pitcher Max Lanier,22 New York Giant’s 
moundsman Sal Maglie,23 and Brooklyn catcher Mickey Owen.24  NLB lost future Hall of 
Famers Josh Gibson, James “Cool Papa” Bell,25 and Roy Campanella.26 The CWL lost the 
services of manager Adolfo Luque, pitcher Napoleón Reyes, and Cambria signee Roberto 
Ortìz.27 
In response to Pasquél’s tactics and furious American owners, MLB commissioner Albert 
“Happy” Chandler decreed in 1946 that any player abandoning his Organized Baseball contract 
would be banned from playing in any affiliated league.28 This not only included players who 
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went to Mexico, but those who played against them in the various winter ball leagues of Cuba, 
Puerto Rico, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic.29  
 For much of 1946 and 1947, Chandler pressured many of these winter circuits to become 
official MLB minor league feeder systems.30  By far, Cuba was the most sought after in this 
move to increase Organized Baseball’s influence.  In April of 1947, Chandler and Clark Griffith 
flew to Havana in an attempt to convince their Cuban counterparts to sign a binding agreement, 
one which would effectively tie the island’s baseball system to MLB. When they failed to 
achieve this, Chandler said, in Echevarría’s words, “That baseball, after all was an American 
sport that had to be played by American rules.”31 However, despite the clear bitterness felt on 
both sides, the dispute came to an end three months later. After the Cuban owners discussed the 
issue further, they collectively came to the decision to sign, realizing MLB would otherwise 
eventually drive them out of business.32  On 10 June 1947, a Cuban delegation headed by 
Almendares shareholder Dr. July Sanguily, approved a working agreement with the National 
Association of Professional Baseball Clubs, regulator of the American minor leagues.33  
The impact this document had on the Cuban-American baseball relationship was 
fourfold: First, with the signing of the agreement, the CWL had to abide by the rules Chandler 
set forth regarding Mexican League “jumpers.” The likes of Max Lanier, who in February helped 
Almendares win the CWL championship, was banned from the league.34  Famed Cuban mangers, 
such as Luque and Miguel Gonzalez, were also banned.  Since Luque coached in Mexico, and 
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Gonzalez allegedly helped several St. Louis players including Lanier to defect, these two CWL 
icons were forced to technically retire, albeit only until 1949 when Chandler reversed his ban. 35 
 Second, it further regulated the talent pool to the point where a Cuban who wanted to 
make playing baseball his livelihood was essentially forced to do so through MLB’s system. This 
meant that Cuba further became an extension of American baseball. Cuban baseball was drifting 
away from the sugar mill and amateur contests towards joining ranks with American 
professionalism.  
 Third, it was the preceding forbearer to a summer 1955 dispute between the various Latin 
American winter leagues and MLB.  In 1954, there was a cap from each MLB club allowed to 
play in the Latin leagues: “three men . . . who had been on the roster 45 days or more, and two 
others who had been on the roster less than 45 days.” This cap extended to native Latins as 
well.36  In addition, the previous summer Organzied Baseball had attempted to pressure the 
Caribbean leagues to cut their seasons in half to reduce wear and tear on participating MLB 
players.37 In protest, the winter circuits, lead by the CWL, each threatened in 1955 to bar for life 
any native MLB star who without “‘justifiable cause’ does not play in his home country during 
the Caribbean season.”38 This led to a war of words between various MLB owners and their 
Latin counterparts.  Frank Lane, then GM of the Chicago White Sox, echoed many of his fellow 
American colleagues when he commented: 
 
  In one way, adoption of such of a rule might be a good thing . . . it would make the 
players put their cards on the table as to whether they want to play major league ball in the States 
or winter league ball in the Caribbean sector . . . some of the players are more concerned with 
landing a job in winter baseball than they are with holding the ones they have in the majors . . . 
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especially the Caribbean natives . . . We have received letters in the White Sox office from fans 
who are demanding to know whether the players are ‘saving themselves’ for winter ball.39   
 
An anonymous “topline executive from the National League,” further argued: “Nobody 
can make me believe that anyone can play 325 days a year and still operate at the top of his 
ability. The human body just cannot stand that incessant nervous strain, as well as the wear and 
tear physically.”  Executives even accused the various Latin American circuits of “exerting 
pressure on the individual players . . . to dictate to the major leagues who can and who can’t play 
winter ball.”40  The CWL responded: “If you bar our own players competing in our leagues, you 
will kill us.”41 Although this issue was somewhat resolved for the start of winter play in August, 
tensions between the two groups was palatable and represents how truly one-sided Organized 
Baseball preferred to operate their relationship with its Cuban counterparts.42  
 Finally, in regard to forces that specifically prompted Rochester and Havana to collide in 
the 1950s IL, the 1947 working agreement that tied the CWL to the American minor leagues was 
critical.43  This cut through a lot of the red tape involved with transporting recently-signed 
Cubans, mainly by the Senators, from the island to their minor league clubs scattered throughout 
the Southern United States.44  More importantly, it came a year after the creation of a 
Washington affiliated franchise in Havana. With financial help from Griffith and former 
Senators prospect Merito Acosta, Cambria formed the Havana Cubans Baseball Club in 1946, a 
founding member of the Class C/B Florida International League.45  Its eight-year competitive 
and financial success, caused in part by the 1947 agreement, served as a precedent that led to the 
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creation of the Sugar Kings and bringing Roberto “Bobby” Maduro into the business of 
professional baseball.46 
 Throughout much of the Havana Cubans’ existence, they were financially run by the 
aforementioned trio of Cambria, Griffith, and Acosta. It was not until 1953, contrary to many 
sources, that Maduro owned a majority stake in the team.47  From 1947 onwards, however, he 
was indeed the co-owner of Gran Estadio de La Habana, the 35,000 capacity ballpark where the 
Cubans played their home contests.48 With the franchise being the stadium’s primary summer 
tenant, Maduro heavily promoted the team and, since he was Cuban, unlike Cambria, he likely 
became cemented in the eyes of local fans, incorrectly, as being the true owner.49  Whatever 
“Bobby’s” true role in running the team prior to 1953, the impact the team had on the Havana 
baseball scene was indisputable. 
The new league instantly provided give Havana new competitive diamond rivals, such as 
the Miami franchises, the Flamingoes and Sun Sox, and Tampa’s Smokers.  Both Miami and 
Tampa had large Cuban populations.50  Smoker/Cuban contests could not compete with “eternal 
rivals” Habana/Almendares games, but the club nevertheless played, according to Echevarría, 
“Triple-A caliber” baseball.51  Under the field management of Oscar Rodríguez, the Havana 
Cubans won the pennant in each of their first five seasons.52  In 1947, the Cubans won the league 
title by amassing an astonishing record of 105 wins and 45 losses.53  They won the championship 
again the following year, and made it to the final round in 1949 and 1950.  The fans responded in 
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kind, with over 200,000 fans passing through the turnstiles in their first four seasons, and just 
under 170,000 in the fifth.54  Their final three seasons, however, bore witness to a drastic slide 
both on the field and in the grandstands.  The Cubans never finished higher than fourth, failed to 
make the playoffs every year except 1953, and drew under 100,000 consecutively, including a 
disappointing 23,460 final campaign.55  The attendance drop was in part due to the poor 
performance on the field, but other factors also contributed. Two such factors in particular 
prompted Maduro to seek entrance into the Triple-A IL the following year, while also 
highlighting important historical differences between the Cubans and their Sugar King 
successors.  
 First, unlike their NLB namesakes in Harlem, the Havana Cubans were, until 1951, 
entirely white, with a couple of fair-skinned “mulattos.”  This was due to a Florida ordinance, 
found in many Southern states which forbade blacks and whites from taking part in the same 
athletic contest.56  According to Costello, Havana’s roster featured at least six Negro players in 
their 1953, their last FIL campaign. This mirrored the composition of future Sugar King 
lineups.57 Also Maduro’s SABR entry mentions that he was criticized for allegedly complaining 
that his 1953 roster contained, “Frankly . . . too many Negroes.”58  Until 1951, however, one 
could argue that this meant the club did not symbolically represent Cuba.  Even Echevarría 
points out that at the time, “It was the only professional Cuban team without black players even 
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after the Dodger’s signing of Jackie Robinson.”59  Despite the admitted quality of Cuban icons 
such as Conrado Marrero and Roberto Estalella, until Negro players competed for Havana in 
1951, the franchise was not considered representative of island baseball.  
 The second factor was the low level of playing classification in which the Cubans 
competed. Class B was just two steps above the lowest tiers of Organized Baseball.60  Maduro, 
ever the ambitious dreamer, felt that Cuba deserved only the highest quality of the diamond 
sport.  To remain toiling in a circuit far below the stature of the American Major Leagues, 
especially with the lacklustre results the previous three seasons, would obviously have trouble 
drawing fans.61 Both the quality of play and racial tensions could only be improved by a move to 
a higher designated league, such as to the historic and established IL.62  
Jim Crow laws of the American south did not apply to the IL, with each franchise located 
in either the Northeast U.S. or Southern Canada.63  The league already had shown its acceptance 
to integrated teams, as the 1946 Montreal Royals proved when they fielded Jackie Robinson.64  If 
Maduro was given virtually zero restrictions on the team’s ethnic makeup, while keeping a 
prominent national roster presence, he could appeal to a wider Cuban audience. The quality of 
play would be solved as well. The IL was designated as a Triple-A circuit, the highest 
certification a minor league could obtain, meaning their players would be more talented and 
athletic than their FIL counterparts. Along with the Pacific Coast League and the American 
Association,  the IL served as the literal final step before the majors, 65  a fact touted by 1954 
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Sugar Kings advertisements: “Un Paso Màs y Llegamos,” roughly translated as “One More Step 
and We Get There.”66  Organized Baseball’s Cuban relationship hit its apex, and reached a new 
level of stability. In a far more brutal and repressive manner, however, the same description 
could not be applied to the political and social upheavals then plaguing the island nation. 
In the 1930s and 1940s Cuba was, simply put, a revolving door of dictatorial leadership. 
The nine year period of 1925-1933 was ruthlessly ruled by Cuba’s fifth president, Gerardo 
Machado.  While freely elected, his reign was frequently marked with despotic tendencies and 
repressive decrees, which included instituting martial law during his final months.  Anti-
Machado protests and demonstrations occurred often during this time, eventually coalescing into 
a general strike across all walks of Cuban life in early August 1933.  Faced with such 
overwhelming opposition, Machado fled.67  On 4 September, Fulgencio Batista, a prominent 
noncomissioned officer in the Cuban Army, launched a “Sergeants’ Uprising,” in which the new 
president Carlos Manuel de Céspedes was ousted and replaced by Ramòn Grau San Martìn.68 
From 1934 to 1940, Batista was the head of the Cuban military, and allegedly the strongman 
leader behind a host of one-term puppet presidents.69  These included the aforementioned San 
Martìn, Manuel Márquez-Sterling,70 and Carlos Hevia.71  After Federico Laredo Brú held the top 
post from 1936-1940, Batista was chosen to serve as the ninth Cuban President in what most 
observers claimed were fair elections.72  
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  After his willing 1944 abdication at the end of his term, Batista retired to live on the 
Miami beachfront.  His political rival San Martìn won the election to replace him. Batista 
remained heavily involved in island politics.  He was elected to the Cuban Senate in 1948 and 
returned to Havana.73  In 1952, the former general ran again for president, with full support of 
both the labour unions and his biggest power base, the army.  However, it became obvious in the 
months before Election Day that Batista would finish behind frontrunners Roberto Agramonte 
and Carlos Hevia.74  On 10 March 1952, with the support of the Cuban Army, Batista overthrew 
President Carlos Prío Socarrás75 in what Echevarría called a “bloodless coup.”76  It was during 
the beginning of Batista’s new reign that the Havana Sugar Kings came into existence. 
                              Sugar’s International Flavor 
 As mentioned previously, in 1953 Roberto Maduro bought a majority stake in the Havana 
Cubans.  This was the Cubans’ worst campaign in their eight year existence, finishing with a 
paltry record of 63-69 and drawing well under 30,000 fans.77  Yet this setback did not dampen 
Maduro’s spirit.  According to Echevarría, it only increased his determination to “make Havana 
the spearhead of a well-coordinated Latin American invasion of organized baseball.”78  Despite 
Bjarkman retroactively calling the Cuban businessman’s vision, “An entirely futile dream from 
the outset,” he remained intensely obsessed with the notion of the island capital hosting a MLB 
franchise.79  It was through this obsession, filtered through the lacklustre demise of the Havana 
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Cubans, that Maduro came up with the concept and business model for the yet-to-be-named 
Sugar Kings. 
On 5 September 1953, Jack Sheehan, GM of the IL’s Springfield (Massachussets) Cubs, 
announced the club would likely fold following the current season.80  This put the circuit with 
only seven teams and the owners wanted it to remain an even-numbered league.  IL 
Commissioner Frank Shaughnessy responded by pressuring Sheehan to find a buyer for the 
Springfield franchise while simultaneously attracting potential cities to fill the open slot. 
Sometime in either September or October, Maduro answered Shaughnessy’s overtures by 
submitting a franchise bid on behalf of Havana.81  He spent much of the following three months 
trying to convince IL owners of Cuba’s baseball potential, at the same time keeping FIL officials 
informed of his activities.82  Maduro faced three major stumbling blocks: Springfield’s refusal to 
commit to either staying or folding, the Baltimore franchise turning defunct due to the Maryland 
city’s acquisition of an MLB club,83 and transportation costs to the island.84  Despite this, the IL 
owners seemed to want Maduro and Havana in the league. On 3 November, Montreal Royals’ 
GM Guy Moreau stated, “There are many good players in Cuba . . . A Cuban team would be 
more of an attraction in Montreal than Springfield.”85   On the 15th, Shaughnessy declared 
“Havana is definitely in if the league operates as an eight team circuit.”86   Eventually on 13 
January 1954, following Springfield’s official withdrawal, the Commissioner announced 
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Havana’s IL admission along with Richmond, Virginia, replacing Baltimore.87  Two days prior, 
Maduro had announced the name of Cuba’s new baseball franchise: The Sugar Kings.88 
Before the 1954 season began, however, one major issue had to be addressed: the 
aforementioned concern IL owners had regarding transportation expenses.  Even with 
Richmond’s inclusion enabling a reasonable game and travel schedule, it did nothing to defray 
what Shaughnessy described as “prohibitive” costs involved.89  Maduro’s response was to 
effectively remove the issue from the table.  In exchange for his franchise, the Cuban agreed to 
personally pay each team’s airfare to Havana, excluding Richmond, for the Sugar Kings’ first 
two IL campaigns.  While Maduro knowingly assumed a very large financial risk, he felt it a 
necessary short-term loss to ensure Cuba’s long-term Triple-A survival.90  The issue of travel 
costs affected the Sugar Kings for each of their seven IL seasons. 
                                                 1954 
The inaugural 1954 campaign could easily be considered an overall success, especially 
when put into context of the problems Maduro had to overcome to gain IL admission.  The other 
major problem that could have hindered the King’s competiveness was the lack of a working 
agreement with a major league club.  If they were stricken with injuries or the players were not 
performing at the Triple-A level, Havana would have either had to individually negotiate with 
MLB teams in the hopes of getting the necessary replacements or make do with their current 
roster; nothing was guaranteed.91  Despite this, Maduro’s “Cubans” were competitive from their 
opening contest to the season’s final day. 
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While by no means dominant, the Kings surprised everyone, not just by winning a few 
games against more established teams such as Rochester and Toronto, but actively competing for 
one of the league’s four playoff spots.  Led on the field by manager and former Washington 
Senator Reggie Otero, the club finished with a 78-76 record, placing them in a fourth-place tie.92 
Although Havana lost the ensuing one-game playoff against the Syracuse Chiefs, 13-4, their fifth 
place finish was much higher than anyone expected.93  Havana’s stellar field performance was 
made possible by the likes of ex-Major Leaguers such as Clint “Hondo Hurricane” Hartung and 
Johnny Lipon, and local Cuban favorites Angel Scull and Julio Becquer.94  Most importantly for 
the Cubans’ future competitiveness, however, was when Maduro signed a MLB working 
agreement with the Cincinnati Reds on 4 August.95  
The Kings finished second in overall attendance, with 295,453 fans for the season.96  It 
was not uncommon to see over 15,000 Havanans cheering on the home team in a 35,000 capacity 
stadium.97  For road trips, Maduro hired an 11-piece charanga band to accompany the team, to 
perform “Cuban” or “jungle” music to curious foreign fans.98  In every opposing IL city the 
Sugar Kings visited, home town spectators came out in droves to see these “hot-blooded” Latins 
perform America’s pastime.99 
Covering their opponents’ airfare was a bit more expensive than Maduro had anticipated.  
The businessman’s total operating costs for the 1954 IL campaign were approximately around 
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$50,000, $40,000 of which was reserved for transportation expenses, this 4/5ths of Maduro’s 
entire budget.100  However, Maduro acknowledged that if his 1955 home attendance figures 
remained the same, air transportation costs would have a negligible effect in this regard.101  
Financial issues aside, his fellow IL owners were quite happy with the Sugar Kings’ 
performance.  The Cubans provided quality completion, Maduro’s transportation deal prevented 
opposing teams from losing money on the Havana venture, and, in fact, their marketing as the 
exotic baseball team helped draw fans to IL ballparks.102  As such, the Kings’ 1955 expectations 
were quite understandably raised. 
                                                  1955 
Havana’s 1955 season not only met these increased expectations, but managed to raise 
the bar.  With Otero again serving as manager, his Cincinnati-reinforced squad raced ahead to a 
third-place finish with a record of 87-66, losing to Toronto four games to one in the first playoff 
round.103  Despite the MLB working agreement, the most productive Sugar Kings were Latin 
Americans, featuring the productive base running of Cubans Alberto Baro and Ray Noble, 
Puerto Rican Nino Escalera, and Venezuelan Pompeyo “Yo-Yo” Davillo.104  Power hitting was 
still an issue, but stellar pitching from the likes of Pat Scantlebury, Emilio Cueche, Bubba Harris, 
and even the forty-four year old Connie Marrero, dominated IL opponents.105  Home field 
advantage was present more than any other campaign, with the Kings losing less than twenty 
Gran Stadium contests.106  However, their away record was well under .500.  This obvious 
distinction between the two records resulted in opponents blaming outside factors such as the 
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“jungle music,” inedible food and water, away players spending more time partying than playing, 
and umpires intimidated by the local fans.107 
Attendance rose, with 313,232 fans on hand for Havana’s home ballgames, as the club’s 
gate total finished second only to Toronto.108  However, the Cuban economy started to take a 
decline around the midway point of the season. The local sugar harvest, more important than 
normal, likely prevented cane cutters and other field workers from attending contests, as it had 
the previous year.109   However, the Kings’ unexpected winning ways, combined with the 
relative calm in regards to the Cuban political situation, enabled the team to avoid any long-term 
drain from their fanbase.  It was not uncommon for opponents to have played in front of 25,000 
“howling fanatics”110 with waving neckerchiefs, banging drums, aka “Baseball, Cuban style.”111 
Though airfare continued to be an issue, the rise in attendance, along with local television and 
radio contracts, greatly boosted the Kings’ financial margin.  In fact, Havana’s total 
transportation costs came to approximately $24,000, just over half of their 1954 receipts.112  
However, the following year, nothing went right for Maduro nor the team he fielded at Gran 
Stadium. 
                                              1956 
 Although the Cubans’ home domination of teams barely remained intact, in 1956 their 
away record was absolutely dreadful.  They finished in sixth place.113   As a result, complaints 
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against Havana’s supposed unnatural home field advantages decreased dramatically.114  Halfway 
through the season, Otero was fired and replaced by his assistant, “Nap” Reyes.  The coaching 
swap did nothing to change the Kings’ fortunes, as they stumbled to a 72-82 finish.115  Hitting 
was still an issue, with only six players in the IL top fifty, and only a single Cuban in the top 
twenty.116  Pitching was subpar as well, with only Rudy Minracin in the top twenty.117  In 
addition, the Cincinnati working agreement was decidedly one-sided, with only two players, 
pitchers Scantlebury and Don Gross, spending time on both rosters.118   
 Attendance dropped off slightly with only 220,357 fans coming through the Gran 
Stadium turnstiles.119  In addition, this was the first season that Maduro did not have to pay 
airfare for visiting clubs.120  However, while Maduro’s home profits rose as a result, those of his 
fellow IL clubs suffered as they now had to finance their own Cuban trips.  This sparked a 
lowering of American enthusiasm for Havana’s place in the IL.121  This downward trend both on 
the field and at league headquarters only deteriorated further in the next two years. 
                                                           1957 
 The 1957 IL Havana season was almost a mirror image of the preceding campaign.  The 
Kings finished with the same record, 72-82.  Even with a full season at the helm, Reyes was 
unable to improve their fortunes.122  The Cubans’ bats were largely silent, with only Danny 
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Morejon ranked in the IL top twenty-five.123  Havana’s pitching rebounded slighty, with five 
hurlers ranked in the top twenty-five.124  The Reds sent little help during the season with only 
pitcher Vincente Amor representing both Cincinnati and Havana.125 
 Gran Stadium attendance was at its lowest, with only 84,320 fans bothering to show 
up.126  Although most of Castro’s revolution was limited to the easternmost Oriente Province, 
Batista’s government imposed curfews, which drastically curtailed fan turnout.127  In addition, 
two Havana bombing campaigns in July and August, tightened the curfews even more, with one 
Rochester reporter joking that a third of a Kings crowd of 2,000 were comprised of policemen.128 
It was no surprise that Maduro’s team finished dead last in attendance.  
1957 also featured American opinion turn firmly against Cuba’s further IL participation. 
Since the league operated under a revenue-sharing agreement, visiting teams received half the 
gate receipts.  With the likes of Rochester and Toronto now forced to pay their own transit to 
Cuba, making only $500 on a four-game stand in Havana was considered decidedly 
unacceptable.129  Vocal opposition from IL owners in Buffalo, Rochester, and Toronto pressured 
Shaughnessy to consider replacing the Cubans.130  Also, with Miami joining the previous season, 
was Havana necessary anymore as a southern IL port?131  These questions only increased the 
following year.                                       
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                                              1958 
 If 1955 was their best regular season showing, 1958 was by far the Cubans’ worst. 
Havana finished dead last in the IL with a record of 65-88; even their home dominance was 
decidedly over.132  Midway through the season, Reyes was fired and replaced by his assistant, 
Tony Pacheco but, again, this managerial change did little to impact the IL standings.133  The 
Kings’ batting hit its lowest point with only Elio Chacòn in the top thirty.134  The pitching, was 
back to its usual form, led by future Baltimore Oriole Miguel Cuellar.  Three Cuban hurlers 
finished in the top twenty-five, one in the top ten.135  However, in fielding they ranked dead 
last,136 and only three Reds wore a Havana uniform during the 1958 campaign.137 
Attendance rose to 178,340 paying customers; however the total is not indicative of the 
entire picture.138  Revolutionary victories grew with each passing month, curfews and restrictions 
increased across the nation, and bombings and protest occurred with alarming frequency.  As a 
result, many fans chose to stay at home.139  In fact, one of the highest attended Kings’ “home” 
games took place outside of Havana.  Allegedly to celebrate the building of a new stadium, but 
also to try and expand the Kings’ national popularity, they played a two-game June series against 
Buffalo in the small Camaguey town of Moròn, drawing around 7,000 fans each time.140 
However, back in Havana, to quote Bjarkman, the Sugar Kings, “seemingly couldn’t draw flies 
even in one of Latin American baseball’s hottest venues.”141 
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 Maduro was now bleeding money left and right. The local television and radio stations, 
that initially clamoured for broadcast rights before the Kings’ first season, were now attempting 
to jump their contracts.   In addition, Miami bailed on playing in Moròn for a July doubleheader, 
which cost the franchise $10,000.142  Outside pressure to move or replace Havana in the IL grew, 
with the Buffalo franchise particularly adamant in this regard.  Club president John Stiglmeier 
and Bison players expressed safety concerns as their primary reasons for initially refusing to play 
their season opening series in Cuba.143  The success of Castro’s revolution in early January 1959, 
heightened anti-Cuban sentiments across the IL.144  Even Maduro threatened that if the woeful 
financial trends continued, he would reluctantly move the team.145  Other cities such as Jersey 
City and San Juan, Puerto Rico generously offered to replace the unwanted Sugar Kings on the 
1959 IL schedule.146   Despite numerous rumors to the contrary, Shaughnessy announced the 
Sugar Kings would compete in 1959, inadvertently enabling their most successful season to 
unfold.147 
                                                                 1959 
 Under new field manager Preston Gómez, Havana dominated much of the 1959 IL 
opposition, finishing the regular season with a record of 80-73, enough for third place.148  Their 
batting featured two players in the top fifteen: #5 Carlos Paula and #11 Tony Gonzàlez.149  Their 
pitching came in second overall, with seven hurlers in the top thirty and three in the top twenty: 
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#4 Ted Wieand, #13 Walt Craddock, and #20 Rául Sánchez.150   In addition, the Kings’ success 
along with the presence of a semi-stable government drew fans back to Gran Stadium, with a 
200,094 turnout for the campaign.151  Also of note were the five Sugar Kings who suited up for 
the 1959 Reds.152 
 In terms of on-field activity this season is historically significant for two other reasons. 
The first was the aforementioned 25 July doubleheader against the Rochester Red Wings, held 
during the anniversary celebrations of Castro’s 1953 “demented” Moncada assault.153  These 
contests are thematically examined in more depth in Chapter 4, but some essential elements need 
to be explained here.  The first game ended uneventfully, ending in a 4-3 seven inning win for 
the Kings.154  The same cannot be said of the nightcap contest. In the bottom of the eleventh 
inning, with Rochester up by a single run, Havana’s American catcher Jesse Gonder155 led off 
with a double.   However, Ellis “Cot” Deal, the Red Wings manager was convinced Gonder 
forgot to touch first base before heading to second.  Whether Deal was right in his protests, and 
whether the umpiring crew was afraid of upsetting the over capacity crowd at Gran Stadium are 
unimportant.  What was relevant was first base umpire Frank Guzetta’s decision to eject Deal. 
This decision was important for two reasons.  The first was Gonder remained safe, which 
eventually allowed him to score the tying run.  The second was that utility infielder Frank Verdi 
had to take Deal’s third base coaching position at the top of the twelfth.156 
 Reports of what actually happened somewhat conflict but here are the basic facts. Back 
in the tenth inning, at the stroke of midnight, wild celebrations broke out in the stands as well as 
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on Havana’s busy streets in honor of Castro’s 26 July assault.  Echevarría compared the 
festivities to a “combination of the Fourth of July and New Year’s.”  As the Cuban exile also 
noted, it is quite common on New Year’s Day in Latin American countries for guns to be fired 
into the air.157  Although the majority of the Cuban capital’s fusillade occurred at midnight, 
sporadic gunfire occurred throughout the early summer morning.  Which gun fired the important 
bullets, either inside or outside the Gran, has never been determined, but the points of impact are 
indisputable: One grazed Kings’ shortstop Leo Cárdenas in the shoulder, and the other ricocheted 
off Frank Verdi’s plastic-lined ballcap, nicked his neck and ear, and floored him instantly.158 
Verdi’s teammates carried him immediately to the visitor’s clubhouse, and everyone else ran off 
the field.  Despite assurances from both the Sugar Kings and the Cuban government that it was a 
fluke accident, both Deal159 and Red Wings GM George Sisler refused to play the next game the 
following afternoon.  After heated negotiations, including alleged threats from the Cuban 
military, Rochester was eventually allowed to board a plane, and fly back to the States without 
either game being completed.  The box score of the twelve inning contest simply read: “Game 
called on account of gunfire.”160  Although largely forgotten in the American press less than a 
week afterwards, it eventually provided the necessary catalyst for IL owners to successfully 
pressure Shaughnessy to pull the franchise off the island.161  
The second moment, in hindsight a bittersweet finale for Cuban professional baseball, 
was the final game during the Sugar Kings’ postseason run.  As a result of finishing third in the 
IL, Havana qualified to play the Columbus Jets in a seven game semi-final series.  They pulled a 
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shocking upset by sweeping their Southern Division rivals in four games.  The Kings went on to 
beat the fourth place Richmond Virginians in six Governor’s Cup contests.  Surprisingly, the 
team had accomplished the impossible: finishing last in 1958 amidst threats of relocation and 
revolutionary conflict, to securing a berth in the Little World Series, with a chance to bring home 
arguably the second most prestigious championship in baseball.162  
The Kings’ final opponent was the American Association’s Minneapolis Millers, a 
Boston affiliate, whose lineup featured future Hall of Famer Carl Yastrzemski.163  The first two 
games were played in Minnesota’s capital, ending in a split.  However with the third contest 
cancelled due to snow and a looming blizzard expected to blanket the region, both teams agreed 
to play the remaining five games in Havana.164 
Every game was sold out.  Castro and his barbudo entourage attended each one, and the 
“Maximum Leader” threw out the ceremonial first pitch of Game Three.  TV sets and radio dials 
across the island were tuned into, as Echevarría described it, “the voice of Rubén Rodríguez.” 
The official newspaper of the new regime, Revolución, treated the Little World Series as front 
page news.165  A surreal moment occurred at the end of the third contest. After outfielder Ray 
Shearer knocked in the winning RBI in the bottom of the tenth inning, as Echevarría recalled, 
“The fans carried him on their shoulders in triumph. Fidel Castro exited . . . on board the jeep 
used to bring in the (relief) pitchers from the bullpen.”166 
It came down to the deciding seventh game, with the Kings winning Game Four, before 
the Millers staved off elimination with victories in Games Five and Six.  With over 35,000 fans 
jammed into the Gran Stadium, the Little World Series’ conclusion became another mass Cuban 
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revolutionary fiesta. With two outs in the bottom of the ninth, the score tied at two, Danny 
Morejón stepped into the batter’s box.  The native Cuban hit a grounder off Millers’ pitcher Billy 
Muffet that hopped over second base, allowing Raúl Sánchez to score the game-and series-
winning run.167  As Echevarría stated, “No sooner had he been called safe than the crowd surged 
onto the field and carried their heroes on their shoulders to the area in front of the Maximum 
Leader’s box . . . a gesture worthy of the Roman Coliseum.”168   Another Cuban historian, Jorge 
Figueredo, wrote, “I was there, among the delirious thousands that would not leave the stadium, 
as if trying to preserve forever the emotion of the moment.  It was most exhilarating and 
unforgettable for all us Cubans who loved the game.”169 
Echevarría noted:  
The Cuban Sugar Kings had-it cannot be forgotten-American players. So the nationalism 
expressed at that point was not necessarily anti-United States.  It was in line with the early 
aspirations of the revolutionary regime: to perfect a political system, not to destroy it, and to 
continue to profit from Cuba’s relationship with the United States.  In a few months this would 
change drastically. 170 
This spelt the end of IL baseball in Cuba by July of 1960.  
                                              1960 
By 1 July 1960, the Sugar Kings were determined to prove their Little World Series title 
had not been a fluke.  At the season’s halfway point, their 37-41 record secured fourth in the 
league, three Kings’ batting averages were ranked in the top twenty, and pitching remained 
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dominant.171  Tony Castano was the new field manager.  Preston Gómez had departed to coach 
Spokane of the Pacific Coast League.172  Havana continued to draw large crowds to Gran 
Stadium, but not quite the overflow capacities found during their 1959 championship campaign. 
For the first time, Maduro’s club was financially stable, with Castro’s government providing 
substantial monetary and promotional support.  The year prior, the de facto ruler of Cuba was 
famously quoted, in regard to keeping the club on the island, “even if I have to pitch.”173 
However it was not to be, as on 8 July, while the Kings were on the road facing Columbus, 
Shaughnessy announced its forced relocation to Jersey City, New Jersey on the pretense of 
“protecting our players.”174  The political reasons for this move, namely the Castro government’s 
nationalization of American businesses, increased communist leanings, and the Eisenhower 
administration’s drastic reduction of America’s Cuban sugar quota, are examined in the final 
section of this chapter.175 
The team finished the campaign as the Jersey City Jerseys/ Reds with hastily rebranded 
uniforms and a new coach.  Castano and several of his players resigned from the club in protest.  
His assistant, the familiar “Nap” Reyes, accepted the resulting promotion to manager.176  Despite 
Thomas F. Carter’s assertions to the contrary, most of the squad’s Cuban players finished out the 
season in Jersey City.177  In fact the majority of their roster remained emphatically Cuban, with 
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the likes of Miguel Cuellar, Octavio “Cookie” Rojas, Leo Cardenas, and Rogelio Álvarez 
remaining in the United States.178  
 Maduro was furious with Shaughnessy’s “completely outrageous” decision.  The Cuban 
businessman responded to the IL Commissioner by stating, “The International League is making 
a big mistake. Baseball was a strong link between the Cuban and American peoples . . . Cubans 
will interpret [the decision] as a demonstration to harm the nation . . . I don’t know what I’m 
going to do.”179   Now living under Castro’s government, and experiencing the first American 
business, professional baseball, flee the island, millions of Cubans likely asked themselves that 
very same question. 
                Cuba’s Revolutionary Tendencies                            
                                                               1953 
Batista’s military coup the previous year had stirred up resentment and anger amongst the 
Cuban population, especially within the student body at the University of Havana.  While the 
deposed Prío’s tenure had not been ideal, it had been legally placed in power via a fair and free 
election process.180  By overthrowing the established government and simultaneously refusing to 
hold elections, Batista’s actions infuriated and united a majority of the students.  According to 
writers Ramón L. Bonachea and Marta San Martín, this resulted in the formation/revival of 
several anti-government organizations both on and off Havana’s campus.  These included the 
Triple-A faction, the Acción Revolucionara Oriental, and most notably the Federación 
Estudiantil Universitaria.181  While not officially involved in any of these organizations, one who 
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was greatly involved in the student movement against Batista was none other than Fidel 
Castro.182  
  His exact role in the movement is somewhat hard to pinpoint pre-Moncada.  He was a 
card-carrying member of the Ortodoxo party, recent law school graduate, and was identified with 
several radical organizations even before Batista’s coup, most notably the Movimiento Socialista 
Revolucionario and the Unión Insurreccional Revolucionaria.183  He wrote articles for anti-
government periodicals such as El Acusador under a pseudonym, and even filed a lawsuit against 
Batista on behalf of the Cuban people.184  He held no official position in any of these 
organizations.  Nevertheless, he was definitely a major player on the revolutionary scene, 
particularly amongst his fellow Ortodoxos.  
In late 1952, from August through December, Castro began organizing contacts to 
undergo military-style training for an assault upon a yet-to-be determined target.  He had given 
up on a peaceful end to Batista’s reign, quoted afterwards as saying, “I already had the idea that a 
revolutionary takeover of power was necessary . . . Nothing was going to change.  The 
frustration and disillusionment were going to be repeated all over again.  And it was not possible 
to go back . . . back over those long-travelled roads that went nowhere.”185  Sometime early in 
1953, Castro decided how he was going to enact his revolutionary takeover: by targeting the 
Moncada military barracks in Santiago province on the eastern side of the island.186 
 As to why Castro chose Moncada, along with a diversionary assault at the Bayamo 
barracks, then a part of Oriente province, is irrelevant to this study.187  What is important is the 
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result of Castro’s attack itself.  In the early morning of 26 July 1953, ninety five men under 
Castro’s command launched the raid on Moncada while twenty-four others assaulted Bayamo. 
After a fierce battle, in which sixty-one rebels and nineteen batistianos were killed, Castro and 
eighteen survivors fled into the surrounding mountains.  Less than a week later, everyone 
involved had either been killed or captured.  Castro had been the government’s primary focus.188 
On 16 October 1953, after a lengthy show trial, Castro and eight of his co-conspirators were 
sentenced to varying prison terms.  As Bonachea and San Martín stated, “For the time being, the 
leader of the Moncada attack was out of circulation.”189 
                                                            1954-1955 
In terms of revolutionary activity on the island, 1954 and 1955 were remarkably similar 
in what transpired.  First, Castro remained imprisoned on the Isle of Pines until 15 May 1955, so 
for almost a year and a half Fidel was unable to effectively impact the situation going on in 
nearby Havana.  He smuggled letters from prison to various people across the island, but his 
presence in the revolution was minimally felt at best.190  When Castro was released due to a 
conciliatory agreement in which Batista freed all political prisoners, he wasted little time 
remaining in the country of his birth.  On 7 July, shortly after officially founding the 26th of July 
Movement, Castro and several others went to Mexico, from where they planned to regroup and 
eventually launch an invasion of Cuba.191  Castro spent much of the remaining year doing public 
speaking across the eastern United States, gathering support, arms, and finances from exiled anti-
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Batista organizations.192  The urban fight against the dictatorship during this two year period had 
to be led by other men. 
Even with Castro imprisoned and later exiled, the streets of Havana were not lacking in 
revolutionary activities.  Student leaders such as Frank País193 and José Antonio Echevarría 
enacted several anti-government demonstrations, protests, and even attempted military actions.194 
In February 1954, Echevarría took over as head of the FEU, the largest radical organization on 
campus.  During his first year in charge, he led numerous demonstrations, most notably in 
March, May, October, November, and December.195  Bombing campaigns in the capital became 
frequent occurrences, albeit not by the FEU.196  This strategy of peaceful protests mixed with 
violent acts continued, culminating in two major events: a massive riot in downtown Havana on 
27 November and a failed sugar worker’s strike which lasted from the 5th of December until the 
30th.197 
                                                  1956 
On 24 February 1956, Echevarría founded the Directorio Revolucionario (hereafter 
referred to as DR), the “student’s insurrectionary instrument,” and began fomenting armed 
insurrection.198  On 19 April, another radical group called the Organización Auténtica assaulted 
the Goicuría Barracks in Matanzas Province; they were slaughtered almost to a man.199  For the 
most part however, public demonstrations of anti-Batista sentiments were minimal until late 
autumn. 
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  Most of Castro’s involvement in the Revolution took place outside Cuban borders. 
Castro, along with eighty-two others, including his brother Raul and Ernesto “Che’ Guevara, 
trained in guerilla warfare tactics just outside of Mexico City.200  Besides dodging Mexican 
authorities, Fidel Castro spent most of his time either training or making preparations for the 
rebels’ eventual return to Cuba.  In early August, he secured over $70,000 from former president 
Prío for the revolutionary cause.201  On 31 August, Castro and other members of the July 26th 
Movement signed the so-called “Pact of Mexico” with DR representatives to coordinate military 
and propaganda efforts.  This resulted in a wave of October/November bombings, assassination 
attempts, and violent clashes with police in four different Cuban provinces, all orchestrated by 
the DR.  These actions were meant, according to Bonachea and San Martín, to “prepare the 
conditions for the general uprising that would ensue upon Castro’s landing.”202  
It was not until late November, however, that Castro set his invasion plan in motion.  On 
25 November, all eighty-three rebels boarded a rusting yacht known as the Granma, and set sail 
for Oriente Province.203  On 2 December, his forces ran aground in Cuba. But by the 5th they 
managed to regroup in the Sierra Maestra Mountains.  However, Castro’s army had been reduced 
to twenty men, and most of their weapons and survival gear lay on the ocean floor.  And with the 
news that an attempted uprising in Santiago province led by Frank País had met with disaster, the 
Granma’s survivors were hardly in the mood for New Year’s Eve festivities.204  
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                                                       1957 
For much of early 1957, Castro’s forces managed to play hide-and-seek with the Cuban 
military, practicing their carefully-honed guerilla tactics to delay their seemingly inevitable 
destruction, a destruction so inevitable that Batista announced Castro’s death on 3 December 
1956, a deliberate lie!205  Even after 17 January, when Castro gained momentum with a military 
victory at Las Platas, the average Cuban assumed he had been killed aboard the Granma.206  It 
wasn’t until 24-26 February, when the New York Times published three articles based on an 
interview columnist Herb Matthews had conducted with the M-26-7 leader, that Castro’s 
survival became public knowledge.207  Around this time his support amongst the Cuban 
population grew dramatically as a result of the interviews.  In addition, Matthew’s expose 
revealed the apparent support the U.S. government lent to Batista’s regime, mainly in the forms 
of weapons and military training.  This began to turn American public opinion squarely against 
his dictatorship.208 
The Cuban-American community threw a majority of their support behind Castro’s 
cause.  There were several protests as well as hunger strikes outside the United Nations 
headquarters in New York, and violent clashes with police became a common occurrence in 
South Florida cities such as Miami, Tampa, and Key West.209  Public perception of the Batista 
regime grew to be so negative that on 3 June America’s Cuban ambassador Arthur Gardner, 
proponent of supporting the dictator, was forcefully retired and replaced by the “wealthy 
investment broker” Earl E.T. Smith.210 
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  Four other major revolutionary events occurred during 1957 in Cuba.  First, from 28 May 
to 10 September, Castro’s forces waged an intermittent guerrilla campaign, with minimal losses, 
in particularly fierce engagements at El Uvero, Estrada Palma, Bueycito, and Pino del Agua.211  
They were so successful in their assaults that by mid-November, batistiano Major Castro Rojas 
wrote to the general staff begging that the army change its strategy to deal with the barbudos.212 
Second, on 28 July, Castro released the “Sierra Maestra Manifesto,” in which, according 
to Paterson, he “pledged free elections, rejected a military junta as an alternative to Batista, 
offered social and economic reforms, and warned against foreign intervention or mediation in 
Cuban affairs.”  While his declaration coincided with M-26-7 infighting, potential fatal 
“bickering” that endangered the uprising, more importantly it further entrenched Castro’s 
persona into the American mindset.213 
Third, throughout much of June,214 July, and August extensive bombing campaigns 
occurred across Cuba, including Havana, mainly attributed to DR revolutionary cells active in 
multiple provinces.  However, due in part to Batista’s suppression of the truth, low civilian 
casualties, and much of the military fighting taking place far away from tourist-infested Havana, 
these events were not widely reported.215  Economic sabotage and more intense bombing 
campaigns were waged in November and December.216 
Before that, however, on 5 September, the Cuban Naval Academy at Cienfuegos erupted 
into an uprising as, “young naval officers aligned with M-26-7 and Auténtico militants rebelled.” 
Although this revolt was quickly crushed, with the help of Cuban Air Force B-26 bombers 
purchased from the U.S., it was a Pyrhic victory for Batista, with hundreds of his best and 
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brightest naval officers dead.  As Paterson pointed out, “The foundation of his power-the 
military-was beginning to crumble.”217  By the end of the following year, that military had 
completely collapsed.218 
                                                    1958 
At the beginning of 1958, the American state department was undergoing heavy public 
criticism, both at home and abroad, because of its frequent approval of Cuban orders for 
weapons and vehicles for the island’s military.  America’s continued funding of Batista’s 
dictatorial regime was a public relations disaster.  In fact, sometime preceding the Cienfuegos 
revolt, the State Department decided to defer any further military requests from Cuba.219  Despite 
continued assurances from Ambassador Smith that Batista would restore constitutional 
guarantees and hold elections, arms flow from the “North” was cut off, at least officially.220  
After the dictator had made clear his “sincere desire for free elections” in early February, the 
arms flow resumed with a well-publicized shipment of armored cars.221  
However, on 12 March, Batista re-suspended constitutional guarantees, particularly 
freedom of the press.222  In response, the State Department sent a telegram on the 14th to the 
American embassy in Havana, that the U.S. was deferring process on “all Cuban arms requests 
and shipments.”223  Even though a few orders were eventually processed, the Pentagon-Batista 
relationship was on the downturn.  As Paterson exclaimed, the dictator had, “profoundly 
poisoned the political environment and his relationship with the United States.”224  
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On 9 April, a forced general strike organized by Havanan M-26-7 operatives ended in 
failure, with hundreds of militants killed by the National Police.225  While it proved a temporary 
setback for the Revolution, with Castro declaring “a moral rout,” police brutality further 
poisoned Batista’s image in the U.S.226  The incident also pushed Fidel to the fringes of his 
revolution’s ideology.  On 3 May, he and several of his top commanders held a meeting in which 
Castro emphatically declared that he was the one in charge and “named himself commander-in-
chief of the armed forces, including the urban militias.”227  This put moderate revolutionaries in a 
terrible quandary.  As Paterson wrote, “Their dilemma was real, for they could in no way abide 
the usurping bastistianos nor wholly embrace the radical fidelistas . . . the two primary 
protagonists in the Cuban conflict . . . Politics became more polarized.”228  This was true not just 
in Cuba, but the rest of the hemisphere. 
By late May 1958, it was quite clear that “Yanqui” influence was not viewed favorably in 
much of Latin America.  When Vice President Richard Nixon went on a regional public relations 
tour, he flew home prematurely, fearing for his life.  He had waded through riots in Argentina 
and Ecuador, been attacked with rocks and clubs in Venezuela, and received death threats in 
Peru.229  Press coverage of the tour exposed to many Americans what decades of unwanted U.S. 
influence had inflicted upon their southern neighbors, including Cuba.  Batista’s regime fell into 
further disrepute with the American public as a result, especially in the Cuban exile community.  
For much of the remaining year, pro-Castro organizations attempted to smuggle weapons and 
equipment to the rebels from all over the U.S. Eastern Seaboard.230 
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From late May until early August, the Cuban military waged an all-out offensive, 
Operation Verano, attempting to destroy the rebellion with brute force.  By 19 June, the army 
had Castro pinned down with deadly mortar fire, an incident from which Fidel barely escaped.231 
The revolutionaries were on the defensive for the remainder of the summer until suffering a 
crushing defeat at the Battle of Las Mercedes on 28 July.  Despite being routed by Batista’s men, 
the encircled M-26-7 fighters managed to escape, greatly demoralizing the Cuban army.232  By 
mid-August, Castro began drawing plans for an offensive of his own.233 
The most important event that occurred during Operation Verano was Raúl Castro’s 
unsanctioned kidnapping of fifty North Americans.  The American and Canadian hostages, 
comprised of business contractors and U.S. Marines, were taken captive during various rebel 
excursions between 26-30 June, in what is now Guantánamo Province.234  Operation Antiaeria 
was authorized by Fidel’s younger brother to create a human shield.  Not wanting to risk killing 
North Americans, Batista halted deadly bombing strikes on rebel positions.  In this regard, 
Antiaeria was a complete success, allowing the 2nd Front to regroup, resupply, and raise their 
morale.235  In addition, the American State Department sent representatives into the Sierra 
Maestra to personally negotiate for the hostages, which gave unintentional American political 
recognition to the M-26-7 movement.236  It also increased U.S. press coverage of the situation in 
Cuba to unprecedented levels, much of it negative towards Raúl Castro’s actions.237  However by 
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the time the last of the hostages were flown to safety on 19 July, as Paterson explained, “The 
U.S. press, more anti-Batista than pro-Castro, never spoke with one-voice.”238 
By mid-August, Operation Verano had entirely collapsed, as Batista’s forces stumbled 
out of the eastern mountains in tattered disarray.  By the end of the month, M-26-7 troops began 
pushing back.  On 31 August, Che Guevera and Major Camilo Cienfuegos led two rebel columns 
into previously unmolested Camaguey Province.239  Throughout September, the two guerilla 
leaders conducted effective raids on army patrols across the province.  Rebel fronts also were 
established in the Las Villas and Pinar del Rio regions in Cuba’s heartland.240  
M-26-7 attacks on American business enterprises across the frontlines were 
commonplace during the autumn months. During August, September, and October, the United 
Fruit Company lost over $50,000 worth of property, a Goodyear manufacturing plant burned to 
the ground, and the famed Nicaro nickel mine was overrun by Castro’s forces.241   Most notably, 
a large Texaco oil refinery in Oriente Province was frequently harassed by rebel threats, thefts, 
and kidnappings throughout October.242  Fidel Castro and the men under his command were fast 
becoming enemies of American big business in Cuba.  And, America’s biggest friend, Fulgencio 
Batista, was fast losing control of his dictatorial regime.243 
By the time long-promised presidential elections were held on 3 November, Castro and 
the M-26-7 movement held the upper hand both on the frontlines and in gaining public support. 
Castro had become so beloved by the peasant Cubans, that each new Batista crackdown upon 
constitutional liberties swelled M-26-7 ranks to unprecedented numbers.  When the dictator’s 
handpicked successor, Andrés Rivero Aguero, won in a rigged landslide victory, it effectively 
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crushed whatever public support Batista had left amongst the working and lower classes.244  One 
of Aguero’s election opponents sarcastically but accurately remarked, “Fidel Castro has won the 
elections.”245  And with Batista breaking his promise to hold fair and honest elections, the U.S. 
State Department unofficially withdrew the majority of their support, the little that was left, from 
Cuba’s president.246 
The events of late November and December 1958 are full of confusion and intrigue.  As 
Paterson explained, “Although Batista’s press censorship, inaccurate Cuban military press 
releases . . . repeated breakdowns of communications . . . made getting at the truth elusive, a 
pattern of rebel advance and Cuban army dissolution emerged.”247  On 30 November, Castro’s 
troops conquered the city of Guisa near Bayamo.248  Throughout December, Guevera and 
Cienfuego’s columns encircled the Las Villas city of Santa Clara249 while Castro personally 
targeted Oriente’s provincial capital, Santiago de Cuba.250  When Batista’s Santa Clara defenders 
surrendered on the 30th, combined with increasing internal and external pressure to abdicate his 
presidential position, he decided to flee the country.251  On New Year’s Eve, Batista and select 
officers boarded a plane at Havana’s Jose Marti Airport, and flew off to the Dominican Republic, 
never to return.252 Even though Castro and his forces did not enter Havana until 8 January, by the 
following morning it was clear to everyone in the capital that Fidel was now in charge.253                             
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Castro’s first year and a half in charge of Cuba, particularly in the island’s new political 
relations with America, can be divided into five time periods.  The first such period took place in 
the immediate aftermath of Batista’s flight.  Soon after Fidel’s arrival in Havana, summary 
executions began taking place. Batistianos were rounded up, given speedy trials, and then put to 
death by firing squad.254  By the time Castro’s handpicked presidential candidate, Manuel 
Urrutia Lleó, had arrived from exile in Venezuela and finished organizing the Revolutionary 
Government, dozens had been executed.255  In fact, by the end of January, an estimated 257 
Cubans were put to death by Castro’s military tribunals.256  Alleged denials of due process of law 
ran rampant both in the local and foreign press.  In mid-February to try and resolve the public 
relations disaster, the trials became open to the public, but that only fueled the fire further.257  
Public perception in America, while not yet ready to declare him a dictator, did began to take a 
negative direction.  This was intensified by his treatment of American hotel/casino owners, 
imposing heavy taxes and strict regulatory guidelines.258 
He was seen by many in the Western press as being nothing more than a “power hungry 
caudillo,”259 which was further underscored by his actions the following month.  On 1 February, 
Castro began implementing agrarian reform projects on the island, long perceived as an initial 
step towards communism.260  On the 13th, Castro declared himself the new Cuban Prime 
Minister, replacing José Miró Cardona, an Urrutia appointee.261  With Urrutia increasingly taking 
the role of a figurehead president, the man who chose the former federal judge to run Cuba, was 
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revealed to be the one truly in charge.262  By March however, executions were no longer 
commonplace, Castro was content as prime minister, and a rudimentary governmental setup was 
firmly in place.263 
The second time period, albeit a brief one, took place in April.  On the 14th, Castro 
embarked on a public relations/ fact-finding tour across North America.  His primary stop was 
the United Nations in New York City.264  He also visited Boston, Montreal, and Washington 
D.C., where he gave several speeches to the American press.265   By the time Castro returned to 
Cuba, he had become an American celebrity, and had entrenched his presence in the North’s 
national psyche.266  
The third period, April through July, was one of insecurity and uneasiness on behalf of 
the American State Department.  During his first four months in power, Castro had showed both 
positive and negative traits from a U.S. foreign policy standpoint.  As such, government experts 
deliberated endlessly what leadership role he would exhibit: capitalistic reformer or socialist 
dictator.267  During his D.C. trip, Castro had pledged to the Associated Press that if a war broke 
out between the United States and the Soviet Union, Cuban troops would contribute to the 
American war effort.268  On 30 April, he also told the Associated Press that, “I don’t agree with 
Communism.”269   Earlier that month, he demanded American companies based in Cuba to 
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increase their production output to stimulate the new and struggling economy, despite rumors 
alleging he planned to nationalize them.270 
In contrast, Castro publically supported left-leaning revolts in fellow Latin American 
nations, such as Panama.271  Rumours abounded in early June that he had personally supplied 
three rebel-crewed boats to Nicaraguan rebels fighting the American-backed Somoza regime.272  
Castro never officially denied or confirmed these rumors, but their existence made the State 
Department uneasy about its relationship with the island.273  On 17 May, Eisenhower’s 
administration reacted with alarm when the Agrarian Reform Act, seemingly a socialist 
economic strategy, became Cuban law.274  On 18 July, Urrutia unwillingly resigned the 
presidency, citing irreconcilable differences with Castro, namely that the former had come out 
very strongly against Communist influences.  His replacement, Osvaldo Dorticòs Torrado, was 
even more of a figurehead than Urrutia, further cementing an anti-American mentality 
surrounding Cuba’s revolutionary leaders.275  Even though 26th July celebrations went off with 
nary a mention of anti-Americanism, there was a sense that U.S.-Cuban relations were about to 
take a drastic turn.276 
The fourth time period, August-December gave little hints towards the break that was 
about to occur between the two nations.  Near the middle of August, Castro’s forces foiled an 
alleged Dominican-sponsored coup just north of Havana.277  In the middle of October, a British 
government delivery of fighter jets intended for the Cuban Air Force, was clandestinely nixed by 
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the U.S. State Department.278   Earlier that month, a Cuban airliner was hijacked by men 
wielding grenades, ordering it rerouted to Miami, where the attackers claimed asylum.279   
In early December, Eisenhower granted approval to the Central Intelligence Agency’s 
request to conduct a plan of sabotage and covert action against the Castro regime.280                     
                                    1960 
Almost as soon as 1960 began, the American-Cuban governmental impasse widened 
insurmountably.  First in February, Cuba signed a $100,000,000 trade agreement with Soviet 
deputy premier Anastas Mikoyan, a move pushing the island further into the Communist sphere 
of influence.281  In March, Eisenhower and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara approved 
Operation Pluto, intended to create a paramilitary group of exiled Cubans to overthrow Castro.282 
On 4 March, the French freighter La Coubre, carrying weapons and other supplies for Cuba, 
exploded in Havana’s harbor.  Almost immediately, Castro erroneously declared it to be the 
work of the CIA, which only enflamed tensions further.283 
On 8 May, Cuba and the Soviet Union officially reopened diplomatic relations with one 
another after having been suspended by Batista almost a decade earlier.284  In addition, Castro 
began nationalizing Cuban newspapers, effectively muzzling free press, a lingering mainstay of 
Americana.285  This action renewed angry feelings between the U.S. and Cuba as political 
rhetoric flew back and forth.  On 11 May, the revolutionary government alleged that Eisenhower 
was planning on invading Cuba, which fanned the island’s population into an anti-American 
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mob.286  On the 13th, Castro claimed the Cuban Navy had attacked a U.S. submarine just off the 
Havana coast.287  On the 23rd, American papers printed alleged Cuban persecution of its Catholic 
citizens.288  And on the 27th, Eisenhower publically revealed a 14 May mandate that ceased 
technical aid, around $200,000 annually, to the island.289 
During June and July, the two governments participated in what was essentially a 
diplomatic standoff.  Neither wanted to blink first.  In mid-June, Eisenhower and his allies in 
Congress released statements, threatening to eliminate the Cuban sugar quota, a potential 
crippling blow to the island’s single-crop economy.290  This was allegedly done to discourage 
further Warsaw Pact economic and political advisors flocking to the island, mainly from the 
USSR, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany.  It did not have the desired effect.291  Castro’s 
administration retaliated with statements revealing his intent to nationalize American business 
holdings.  On 28 June, Castro accused the U.S. government’s proposed sugar cuts of being, “not 
only immoral but treacherous . . . They reserve the right to do us harm in the magnitude they 
desire.”292  The Cuban prime minister did not wait long to make good on his nationalization 
threat. 
 On 29 June, Castro seized and nationalized three American oil refineries belonging to 
Texaco, Esso, and Shell, after each facility refused to refine Soviet oil.293  On 1 July, the U.S. 
Congress passed a resolution that gave Eisenhower executive privilege regarding the purchase of 
Cuban sugar.294  Five days later, the President reduced the U.S./Cuba sugar contract by 95%, 
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virtually banning the product from American markets.295  On 6 August, Castro decreed that all 
American oil refineries, sugar mills, and electric/telephone companies were to be nationalized by 
the Revolutionary Government.  U.S. businesses began evacuating personnel.  Between 
Eisenhower’s sugar cuts and Castro’s hostile takeovers, as writer Hugh Thomas described, “A 
baseball team decided not to play in Havana.”296 
 At the time that the Havana Sugar Kings’ first game was played in April of 1954, Fidel 
Castro was serving a fifteen-year jail sentence on the Isle of Pines.  By the time their last game 
ended on 8 July 1960, that same man had ruled Cuba for a year and a half.  The Kings’ IL arrival 
falsely portrayed Cuba to Americans as a quiet and unvolatile island country the island country 
seemingly was under Batista.  It also helped emphasize the friendly business relationship 
between Cuba and their American neighbors.  Their forced removal to Jersey City served as a 
forgotten yet symbolic exclamation point on the virtual cessation of diplomatic relations between 
the two nations.  The journey of the IL in Cuba and the Revolution’s path through the island 
nation resulted in two narratives unqiue to their own separate cultural worlds of politics and 
sports.  Rochester, New York’s newspaper coverage on these two intersecting narratives, along 
with my thematic analysis of it, is the major focus of Chapter 4 and this study. 
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                                                        Chapter 4 
                       Off the Cuban Cuff 
“The paroxysm of guilt that Frank Verdi’s shooting caused between my memory and my sense of 
self was no more than the effect of a successful public-relations presentation. The league smelled 
like roses because it got exactly what it wanted. My devotion to the newspapers is now revealed 
as no more than a willful submission to the self-serving pronouncements from the people who 
made the money off baseball. The joke is only on me. And the joke exists only because, against 
my knowledge to the contrary, I chose to take this issue seriously.”– Howard Senzel, Baseball 
and the Cold War.1  
  
 In the past three chapters, the alleged baseball cultural bridge between the American and 
Cuban peoples was thoroughly examined.  The study presented that international cultural bond as 
being real, yet almost entirely one-sided.  On one hand, Organized Baseball’s influence upon 
Cuba was profound as it not only impacted the island culturally, but economically and 
politically.  On the other hand, only Latin American stereotypes, cultural anecdotes, and a 
handful of big league prospects travelled from Cuba to the United States.  In this regard, the 
Havana Sugar Kings experiment was no exception from its barnstorming predecessors.  The 
question persists: with only “hot-blooded Latins”2 a “bongo orchestra, or whatever you call those 
tub thumpers,”3 and rare prospects such as Miguel Cuellar being presented to American 
audiences, how could the sporting cultural dynamic between the two nations have remained 
functional, despite the allegedly “anti-American” Cuban Revolution?4   
To answer this question on a small yet important scale, I turn to the two Rochester dailies 
of the time period, the D & C and the T-U.   For the city’s newspaper readership, these 
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publications were the primary purveyors and analysts of the American-Cuban relationship, both 
on and off the diamond.  In days long before the internet, local newspapers remained a primary 
source for Americans to learn about civic, federal, and global issues.5  What 1950s Rochesterians 
read in the D & C and T-U likely shaped and influenced how each individual reader, as well as 
the community in general, viewed the outside world.  By examining what the two dailies 
published, presented either by their own writers or other sources during this time frame, this 
study exposes a singular Gannett-Cuban position touted to Rochester’s public. 
This chapter consists of two encompassing sections in which the study’s findings are 
presented.  The first is a brief historical background on the Rochester newspaper industry up to 
the 1950s, specifically the beginnings of Frank Gannett’s multimedia empire.  As the D & C and 
the T-U, Gannett’s flagship operations, contained the majority of articles thematically analyzed, 
it was important to detail a chronological and philosophical blueprint of how the two dailies 
conducted business.  This section largely takes its conclusions from Bonnie Brennan’s For the 
Record: An Oral History of Rochester, New York Newsworkers.  It was an incalculable asset in 
this regard.6 
The second section chronologically analyzes the Gannett newspaper coverage of Cuban 
issues, mainly from outside the sporting pages.  This is key for four reasons.  First, while 
baseball was the primary excuse for Rochester-based reporters to visit Cuba, by the end of the 
1950s, it was not the most newsworthy island story, as Chapter 3 emphatically proved.  Baseball 
games took place during the Revolution; the Revolution did not take place during baseball 
games.  Essentially, Sugar Kings contests were nothing more than a lens through which Cuban 
political unrest could be viewed.  As such, analyzing the Rochester print presentation of the 
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entire Cuban narrative is academically necessary.  Second, most of these front page and front 
section stories were written by the Associated Press, United Press International, or writers co-
opted from larger, more influential newspapers.7  How the D & C and T-U utilized these essential 
media tools further helped contextualize how the sporting angle factored into Gannett’s portrayal 
of Cuba.  Third, editorial columns and Letters to the Editor revealed how important the dailies’ 
respective editors perceived Cuban events and how local readers reacted to them. As Senzel said: 
“My interests began to spread to the front sections of the newspaper, which I hadn’t realized 
existed . . . I turned my back on baseball. Invigorated by that great American energy of progress 
and self-development, I was moving on to more important things.”8  Since it is likely many 
Rochesterians did not read the sports section, it was important to analyze the front sections to see 
how much impact the sports section might have had upon the front pages.  Finally, it helped 
reveal publishing, editorial, and narrative differences between the morning newspaper, the D & 
C, and the afternoon daily, the T-U. 
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                   A Tale of Two Newspapers 
Émigrés from less conservative climes find the Rochester newspapers conspicuously lacking in 
any semblance of metropolitan journalism . . . A kind word for the Democratic Party or its candidate is 
harder to find than a downtown parking place. Without serious competition there is no necessity to 
crusade and therefore increase reader interest and circulation. (They) content themselves with a role of 
mere documentation . . . This estimate is slightly more accurate than cruel- G. Curtis Gerling.9 
 
When people complain about the allegedly liberal press, my God!  I can remember when we used 
to be afraid to turn a story in because it would reflect adversely on the Republican Party- Arthur Deutsch, 
former D & C investigative reporter, 1994.10 
 
Without or with offence to friends or foes, I sketch your world exactly as it goes- Lord Gordon 
Byron. This quotation ran underneath the D & C logo on the morning daily’s editorial page.11 
 
 Although newspapers have a long-established history in the Greater Rochester 
metropolitan area, to trace how the local media market evolved by the 1950s into a Gannett 
monopoly, requires a study directed on the period after the conclusion of World War I.  This is 
because between the late 1800s and the turn of the twentieth century, the industry remained 
largely the same, not in technology, but in the producer-consumer economic relationship. 
Throughout the 1800s, Rochesterians and those living in surrounding areas had a wide variety of 
local newspapers and broadsheets to choose from, featuring a fair range of political and social 
views between them.12  
In this regard, little had changed by the time of the Great War.  By early 1918, at least 
five independently-owned major dailies competed for control of Rochester’s circulation and 
advertising market.  The morning’s Democrat & Chronicle (the Daily Democrat and Daily 
Chronicle merged in 1870) and the afternoon’s Rochester Times and Rochester Post-Express 
represented the local Republican interests.  The city’s Democrat stalwarts received their daily 
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news from the Rochester Herald and the Rochester Union & Advertiser.13  By 1937 just two of 
the five remained in operation, and both were owned by Frank Ernest Gannett.14 
Having risen from the D & C delivery boy ranks in 1885 to owning his first newspaper, 
the Elmira Gazette in 1906, Cornell alum Frank Gannett would have accepted nothing less than 
achieving a media empire across the United States.15  In early 1918, Gannett and his business 
partner Erwin L. Davenport moved to Rochester in the hopes of buying an established daily.  The 
duo ended up purchasing both the Times and Union & Advertiser, immediately announcing a 
merger of the two newspapers.  The 9 March 1918 Union & Advertiser front page proclaimed: 
“The oldest and the newest are now brought together, consolidated into one GREAT 
NEWSPAPER under new and progressive management, and united for A GREATER AND 
BETTER ROCHESTER.”16  After this deal went into effect, Gannett proceeded to diminish the 
rest of his Flower City competitors into submission. 
Almost immediately following the newly minted Rochester Times-Union’s first printed 
edition, Gannett dubbed the T-U as a politically unaffiliated “independent paper.”17  In addition, 
the ownership group aligned themselves with local businessman, philanthropist and anti-union 
advocate, George Eastman.  Having founded the industrial giant Eastman Kodak, the elderly 
camera magnate was considered a hero amongst many Rochesterians across all social classes and 
political boundaries.18  His support of Gannett’s group undoubtedly held major influence over 
their subsequent rise to the top of the local market.  
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By 1924, Gannett had purchased five more major dailies across the Empire State. More 
importantly, he bought out his fellow T-U investors to become the afternoon paper’s sole 
proprietor.  Four years later, Gannett bought out his last original competitor, the D & C, and in 
an interesting move, decided to keep both papers instead of merging his two local acquisitions. 
With the Herald and Post-Express having left town, only one man stood in the way of Gannett 
having a Rochester monopoly: powerful newspaper magnate William Randolph Hearst.  From 
1922 to 1937, Gannett competed in the Flower City against Hearst’s daily, the Rochester-
Evening Journal, and his weekly publication, the Rochester Sunday American.  In 1937, 
however, the former proposed to the latter a mutually beneficial arrangement.  At that time, 
Gannett was trying to move into Albany, which had always been a Hearst New York stronghold.  
Over time, Hearst’s businesses in New York State’s capital city had incurred a massive amount 
of debt.  If Hearst would sign over the rights to his Rochester newspapers, Gannett would pay off 
the former’s debt and give up his incursions into Albany’s market.  After the deal was made 
official, Gannett closed both the Evening Journal and the Sunday American.19  
 From 1938 onwards, Rochester’s newspaper industry comprised, as Senzel described: “a 
Gannett morning paper, a Gannett evening paper, and never a liquor or cigarette advertisement 
between the two.  And given the character of the time and place, it would have been unthinkable 
for things to have been otherwise.”20  The character of that time and place, 1940-1950s 
Rochester, was a city of distinct economic and industrial growth. While Eastman Kodak brought 
prosperity to the greater metropolitan area since 1888, other companies populated the business 
landscape as well.21  Bausch and Lomb, a vison-wear company which had provided local jobs for 
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decades before Eastman’s development, experienced a boom in the aftermath of the Second 
World War.22  Xerox also prospered with its exclusive monopoly over the fairly new yet widely 
utilized invention, the photocopier.23  Genesee Brewing Co. experienced a local post-Prohibition 
resurgence that lasted for decades.24  Yet Rochester was still called, both by locals and outsiders, 
as “Kodak’s Town.”  As a naïve youth at the time, Senzel later recounted, “It was believed that 
there were no poor people in Rochester, only Kodak workers.”25 
 During the 1940 and 1950s, there were two seeming absolutes about Rochester, the first 
related to race.  Rochester was not just “Kodak Town,” but a white Republican town, at least on 
the surface.26  In terms of ethnic ancestry, British, German, and Italian were the most commonly 
traced lineages for the local-born up to the 1940s.27  There were also several sizable thriving 
Eastern European enclaves including over 20,000 Jewish residents.28  In the late 1940s, out of a 
civic population of around 330,000, just over 7,000 were classified as Negroes. Within less than 
ten years, that number more than doubled to well over 16,000.29  Until the late 1940s, there was 
barely any trace of a Hispanic community in the Flower City.  Those that did live there struggled 
heavily with a language barrier and ethnic discrimination.30  By the 1960s with a population of 
around 4,000, Puerto Ricans had entrenched themselves in Rochester’s community, founding the 
Puerto Rican Council in the mid-1950s.31  As official city historian Blake McKelvey pointed out: 
“newcomers were welcomed to Rochester-except for Negroes and Puerto Ricans.”32  
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 Despite this, according to several former Gannett employees, it wasn’t until the 1964 
citywide race riots that the two Rochester dailies covered local minority issues in any meaningful 
way.33  The D & C and T-U did not hire their first black writers until the mid-1960s: Earl 
Caldwell and Desmond Stone, respectively.34   In For the Record, one D & C reporter mentioned 
a photo editor that would deliberately white-out or crop black faces from photographs.35 Former 
T-U police beat reporter Robert Beck lamented in a 1994 interview that the Rochester media 
after the 1960s had allegedly become a “Negro throwaway,” and talked about African-
Americans and Hispanics in extremely negative terms.36  This study is not trying to make the 
case that Gannett’s Rochester publications were racist.  It is important, however, to consider how 
newspapers, alleged to be either blind or willfully ignorant of the city’s ethnic and racial 
divisions, would accept a baseball team comprised primarily of Hispanic and Negro players, 
many whom didn’t speak English. 
 The other absolute was Rochester’s and Gannett’s unwavering loyalty to the Republican 
Party.  Even before Gannett gained his Rochester media monopoly, the Western New York area 
had long been a Grand Old Party stronghold, outside of the Democrat hub in neighbouring 
Buffalo.37  Senzel recalled, “Government in Rochester was always conservative and always 
Republican.  Rochester always considered its own districts to be the safest Republican seats in 
Congress.”38  In 1957, local author G. Curtis Gerling commented that the city was run by“ultra-
conservative Republican policies and the administration’s short sighted miserliness,” albeit 
stating that those tendencies were then, “at least temporarily on the shelf.”39 Arthur Deutsch, 
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former D & C reporter, surmised: “If you did any digging it was Republican dirt because there 
was no other dirt to dig.”40  And in contrast to Buffalo, Rochester was definitively not a union 
town, with George Eastman’s paternalistic methods of looking after employees enough to 
prevent the labor movement from gaining much traction in the Flower City. 
Though Gannett promised in 1918 that the T-U would be an “independent paper,” 41 by 
the 1940s and 1950s, this was no longer the case.  Gerling claimed it frequently read as a “house 
organ of the Republican party” due to the “official” Gannett company policy: “See No Evil, Hear 
No Evil, Speak No Evil.”42  He also expressed sympathy for Rochesterians when the city “was 
relegated to the status of a one newspaper town, condemned to the consumption of carefully 
selected, slightly slanted, well masticated news regurgitated in printed form.”43  Ex-D & C 
reporter Mitch Kaidy commented: “There was pressure to not write certain stories, not to write 
about labor, and not to write about left-wing groups and not to write about consumer interests . . . 
There were stories that I thought the community should know about and the unseen editors 
didn’t.”44  Kaidy further reflected: “The Gannett newspapers were always right-wing. Gannett 
himself was far to the right of his editorial staff.”45  Deutsch claimed that Paul Miller, editor of 
the T-U as well as VP of the Gannett Board, was one of the “Big Three in Monroe County 
Republican politics.”46  Since these kinds of conditions did not bode well for reporters wanting to 
issue a pro-communistic message, despite Gannett’s death in early 1957, the previous paragraph 
should be well held in mind when reading the study’s findings.47 
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It is also important to understand how Gannett’s Rochester media monopoly operated. 
Despite the fact they shared the same owner and to an extent the same editorial polices, in both 
claim and in practice, the D & C and T-U operated as separate organizations.  As stated before, 
the D & C served the morning readership, the T-U the afternoon. But the differences went 
beyond just time of day.48  Outside of using the same printing facilities, the two dailies rarely 
collaborated on anything.  Each had its own editor and staff-ranking structures and functioning 
from separate offices until 1959.49 According to Brennan, the T-U was considered as Rochester’s 
“paper of record,” whereas the D & C was more of a “writer’s paper.”50 Gerling put it more 
colorfully: “The Times-Union right under the ivory tower . . . is only just saved from being hick 
town class . . . On the Democrat & Chronicle a far better spirit exists and is reflected in a far 
better product. Staffers enjoy working there: the proportion of skilled old-timers and bright 
young up and comers is properly divided.”51 
Brennan’s interviews with Gannett writers are proof that there was more of a rivalry and 
competiveness felt between the papers than any collective spirit.  Kaidy recollected: “We had 
two newspapers that competed, that feverishly competed. We tried to be first and of course tried 
to be the more accurate of the two papers . . . that was a point of pride.”52  T-U writer Charlie 
Luckett explained: “We were really rivals-geographically separated.  An afternoon paper is at a 
disadvantage time wise, we felt they were lazy-they were working for a morning newspaper.”53 
Due to this rivalry the tactic known as “scooping,” was intensely pursued.  Essentially, reporters 
would try to cover as many angles for a story as possible, “not just for objectivity, but to prevent 
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the other newspaper from getting a lead on the story.”54  As reporter Tim Connolly remembered: 
“One of the fears was that you would have half a story and you couldn’t go with it because that 
would open up the door for them to follow up and maybe get a bigger story.”55  It was due to this 
competitive nature that former employees of both dailies contended that despite public disbelief, 
it actually resulted in better, more accurate, albeit politically-biased news reporting.  In addition, 
they felt the 1940s-1960s to be the period when the two newspapers were at the peak of their 
civic influence.56 
      The Front Section’s “Paper Curtain”57             
Because public opinion in our country is largely created and shaped by the mass media, the news 
services assume a crucial significance in the formation of a policy towards Cuba . . . The little that has 
appeared in the daily newspapers or mass-market magazines, has been distorted . . . On the basis of the 
mass media, to be intelligently informed about Cuba would be impossible- Maurice Zeitlin and Robert 
Scheer, 1963.58 
 
The sports section played an influential role in creating the modern layout for many a 
daily newspaper. This role is too often ignored by academics who feel that sports history is 
insignificant if not irrelevant when compared with “real” history.  The same is true when 
examining an average local newspaper’s structure: the sporting news is relegated to its own 
section away from the “real” important issues facing the community, country, and globe.59 
Senzel described that politics, not sports, dictated what section of the news he read: “Baseball 
was a part of my life that had been rejected.”60  Even in a historic sporting town such as 
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Rochester, N.Y., any in-depth athletic coverage frequently could not be found on the front pages 
during the 1950s and 1960s.61 
But, sports did feature in both the D & C and the T-U outside of the designated sporting 
sections.  The Red Wings home opener always received substantial first page coverage, as did 
every postseason contest.62  Other local professional teams, mainly hockey’s Rochester 
Americans, also were covered to a similar extent.63  Both IL and MLB score-lines were almost 
always printed, usually in a bottom corner, on each daily’s opening page.64  Major sporting 
events such as the Olympics65 and the World Series prominently received front-section 
treatment.66  Also, contests featuring one of the three New York MLB teams or the Red Wings 
parent club in St. Louis would receive a headline or front page brief quotation on occasion.67  
When local Rochester sports hero and New York Giants pitcher Johnny Antonelli figured 
prominently in a contest, he sometimes appeared outside the sports section.68  For the most part, 
however, local sports, especially away-contests, were limited to the two sporting sections and the 
editorial page.  It was not “real” news.  In fact, when George Beahon wrote several front pages 
articles on the ongoing Cuban crisis, the D & C editors took great lengths to inform the reader he 
was only a “baseball reporter.”69  This newspaper dichotomy was the primary basis for this 
second section. 
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The goal of this second section was to establish how Cuba, under Batista, during its 
subsequent Revolution, and during Castro’s initial years in charge, were presented in both the D 
& C and the T-U outside the sporting pages.  To do this I separated the front page/local coverage 
into yearly segments.  Each segment then underwent a quantitative/thematic examination, with 
two important details impacting each analysis. 
The first or quantitative portion of the study, took into account how often Cuban stories 
appeared on Rochester’s newspaper front pages and local sections.  This portion does not include 
any extensive original charts or equations, only simple notation of how often the “Pearl of the 
Antilles” received non-sporting attention.  However, during the section’s latter part, which 
covered 1959-1960, a 1963 quantitative study conducted by Maurice Zeitlin and Robert Scheer 
was thematically compared to my findings.70 
  The second or thematic portion analyzed the tone of each respective D & C/T-U Cuba-
focused article printed outside the sports pages.  The vast majority of the pieces were not written 
by Gannett staffers; they were usually taken from the Associated Press, United Press 
International, and other nationally available press services.71  However, the editors in charge of 
both dailies were responsible for deciding what appeared within their respective final editions. 
As such, even when a column was not written by local writers, this study considered it to be a 
part of Gannett’s overall message.  The editorial section, where the few Rochester-based 
statements were printed, was particularly scrutinized.  This study also focused upon instances 
where baseball notably impacted representations of Cuba outside of the two dailies’ sports 
section.  Since the sportswriters were the only ones consistently writing about the island and its 
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relationship to Rochester, how their coverage filtered into the rest of the paper took on pertinent 
importance regarding this study.  
 
                           Another Day in Paradise 
                           1954-1957 
If one did not read the local sports section during the baseball season, a 1954 
Rochesterian could easily have been unaware that Cuba existed, let alone that it was a cultural 
and historical American ally.72  Outside of the sports sections, the Rochester dailies only printed 
two articles clearly about Cuba in 1954.  On 23 June, the T-U published an AP article on Page 
Two entitled: “Latin American Governments Neutral, but Anti-U.S. Groups Active.” In that 
article, Batista and other Latin American leaders’ opinions on a civil war then raging in 
Guatemala were listed and explained.73  On 15 August, the D & C’s morning edition ran a Page 
Fifteen UPI story which proclaimed: “President Batista of Cuba Steps Down to Run Legally.”74 
That day was a Sunday, and only the D & C printed Sunday editions.  However, none of the next 
six T-U issues featured this story or any other Cuba-related pieces.75  
In both dailies, neither the Red Wings 1954 exhibition series against the Sugar Kings in 
early April, their first regular season games in Havana in late April,76 nor their early May 
contests against them in Rochester, warranted coverage outside of the sports section.  Both the T-
U and the D & C’s sporting pages featured articles on each of these events.  In contrast, both 
newspapers featured front page stories about the Red Wings’ home opener against Richmond in 
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late April.77  Yet, the very next week, outside of IL scorelines, there was no evidence other than 
the sports section that Havana was playing at Red Wing Stadium.78  In fact, the only front page 
baseball article during that entire week was a 3 May AP piece run by the D & C about MLB St. 
Louis outfielder Stan Musial.79  Baseball was occasionally featured on the editorial page, notably 
a 7 April column entitled: “The Meaning of America . . . Baseball: Our Token of Power.”80  
However, Cuba, even via “beisbol,” was not considered newsworthy outside of the sports 
sections.  
One thing to make clear is that the D & C and T-U’s lack of articles on Cuba was not 
because of a simple U.S.-Latin American public interest gap.  Other Latin American nations 
received substantial front page and editorial coverage in Rochester dailies during 1954.  From 
early June to mid-July, Rochester was bombarded with front page stories, editorials, and even 
political cartoons focused on the Guatemalan crisis.  Alleged communist infiltration into 
Guatemala’s government, the subsequent right-wing civil war/ military coup, and its immediate 
aftermath garnered significant article space in both newspapers.81  This 22 June D & C cartoon 
not only summarizes the extent to which this issue dominated both dailies’ headlines, but also 
Latin American stereotypes that ran through Gannett’s portrayal:82 
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 Political upheavals in Paraguay, Brazil, Colombia, Nicaragua, and a few other nations in 
the region also received significant if comparatively brief coverage.83 
Between the two Rochester dailies, outside of the sporting pages there was one article 
about Cuba in 1955.  On the front page of the D & C’s local news section, the 5 April headline 
declared: “Factory Makes Giant Sugar Mill for Cuba.”  Accompanied by a picture showing the 
mill’s construction, the article touted how Rochester’s Consolidated Machine Tool Co. helped 
the Cuban economy.  The story concluded:  “The sugar cane harvest starts in July, and that’s 
when the mill is scheduled to start rolling.”84  In addition, there were several advertisements in 
later issues of both newspapers that told locals to: “visit sunny Havana.”85  At this point, it would 
seem that Cuba’s sole quality in the eyes of Rochesterians was either as an extension of the 
American economy or as a “so near and yet so foreign” tourist destination.86  Neither daily 
covered Fidel Castro’s mid-May release from prison or his subsequent flight into exile.  
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Gannett’s Flower City readership was also kept in the dark regarding the very vocal anti-Batista 
student movement in Havana.87  
Cuban baseball received the same Rochester non-sports section coverage it had in 1954. 
Outside of the IL scorelines on the front page, only one relevant article appeared in either the D 
& C or the T-U.  The day the Red Wings played their first home contest against Havana, a small 
headline ran across the opening page of the latter daily: “Wings, Fans There, but Not Sugar 
Kings.”  The article simply detailed a misunderstanding the Kings’ manager Reggie Otero,] had 
regarding the start time of the game, along with a recap of the first two innings of play.88 
Compared to the other IL teams, the Cuban franchise received neither more nor less front page 
coverage in Rochester newspapers.  In fact, outside of the mid-season replacement of Red Wings 
Manager Harry “The Hat” Walker with his brother Fred “Dixie” Walker, reported on the front-
page of both dailies, local baseball received no out-of-the-ordinary coverage.89  Baseball and 
Cuba were not enough to generate headline-worthy stories. 
In the sports sections, Cuba was receiving some in-depth coverage with T-U baseball 
writer Al C. Weber90 and his D & C counterpart George Beahon, each focusing on the 
differences between the Cuban and American games.  In an 8 August sports section column, 
Beahon dedicated its entirety to defending the Sugar Kings’ alleged “unfair” home field 
advantages. In it, the D & C writer declared: 
At hand is an urgent request from a Columbus, Ohio, newspaper friend to file a few 
words on why the Havana Sugar Kings beat the brains out of all International League foes who 
venture into Cuba. Up to date figures on the Cubans- 1955 won-lost record, before today’s 
activity- show the Cuban Petes are “running pool” on the opposition. They had lost only 14 of 65 
home assignments . . . There is nothing illuminating in reminding the customers that visiting 
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teams claim adverse effects from the long plane trips to Havana. Everyone has heard about the 
terrible psychological effect of the weird music in Gran Stadium  . . . Even the peculiar lighting 
in cavernous Gran Stadium has been blamed after poor hitting performances . . . We have heard 
all the wailing about the hazards of playing in Havana. What, I ask, about the hazards to Havana 
in bringing an almost exclusively Latin American cast into the United States and Canada . . .  My 
theory is that Havana is a fine ballclub that plays to its full potential on the road- and for 
BETTER reasons than seven other teams can find for losing in Havana.91 
 
Beahon expressed distaste for the complaints and stereotyping lobbed at the Sugar Kings 
by their IL colleagues, pointing out that the cultural shock the Cubans faced when playing 
outside the island was far worse. Unlike many of his colleagues, he exposed yet did not mock the 
language barrier many Latin players dealt with when they travelled the United States and 
Canada. He showed cultural understanding towards Cuba, if only through the lens of baseball. 
To at least one Rochester writer, the potential for a Cuban-American baseball bond was indeed 
present. However, this American-Cuban baseball bridge continued to be ignored on Rochester’s 
front pages.  
Other Latin American countries featured prominently on the front pages and in the 
editorial sections.  The main Gannett focus on the region centered upon growing unrest in Juan 
Peron-led Argentina.  During July and August alone, the two months leading up to Peron’s 
overthrow and flight into exile, the D & C published twenty articles about the Argentinian crisis.  
The T-U printed eighteen in comparison.92  While Argentina did not feature as prominently in 
political cartoons as Guatemala had the previous year, there was still an attempt to present a 
company, if not civic position, on the latest Latin American flare-up.  
For the two Rochester dailies, 1956 was an intriguing year from several perspectives. 
First, stories about Cuba were featured on a semi-regular basis in the T-U, throughout April, 
                                               
91
 George Beahon, “In This Corner,” D & C, 8 August 1955. 
92
 T-U and D & C archives, 1 July-31 August 1955. 
108 
 
108 
 
May, and isolated instances during the summer.93  On 4 April, a Page Two AP article 
proclaimed: “Cuba Nips Plot by Military…army officers face court martial today, accused of 
participating in an abortive plot against President Fulgencio Batista.”94  After almost a month of 
silence, a 24 April quotation appeared entitled: “Anti-Americans Stone 2 More Firms in 
Havana.”95 Six days later, the T-U’s front page blared: “With Revolt Over, Cuba Frees Ex-
Leader.”  Within the attached AP article, it mentioned Carlos Príos had been freed twenty-four 
hours after Batista’s army crushed a civilian revolt in Matanzas Province.96 On Page Seven the 
next day, the afternoon edition declared: “Cuba Suspends Civil Liberties after Crushed 
Rebellion.”97  The same day this cartoon ran:98  
  .  
The 2 May edition’s Page Twenty-one included the headline: “Cuban Congress Okays 
Revolt Curbs.”99  Ten days later, Page Four of the T-U, via the AP declared: “Cuban Stormy 
Petrel Back in Miami Exile,” in which Príos alleged he had been deported by the island’s 
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national police.100  After that the afternoon daily went silent about Cuba until late June.  On 26 
June’s Page Six, underneath a large article entitled: “4 Guatemalan Students Killed: Army is Put 
in Control”101 and next to one proclaiming: “Brazil Seizes Would-Be Assassin,”102 the T-U 
announced: “Mexico Nabs 20 Cubans.”  The article focused on a raid the Mexican police 
launched against Fidel Castro’s guerilla camp just outside Mexico City.103  The next day, the 
story was followed up on a Page Seven piece entitled: “17 More Held in Plot on Batista.”104  For 
the rest of the year. however, outside of the sports section, the T-U remained silent about Cuban 
matters. 
The D & C coverage on Cuba was slightly different.  Rochester’s morning daily printed 
no stories about the island outside of the sports section, with one exception.  On 23 May, a Page 
Seven story ran with the headline: “Judge Stops Expulsion for Ex-Cuban President.”105  Other 
than that no other Cuban-related stories appeared during the study period in 1956. The reasons 
for this are likely due to one or a combination of two contributing factors. 
 First mentioned in For the Record, reporters and writers from both papers were sensitive 
to the urge to “scoop” or from being “scooped” themselves.  Since in 1956 Cuba’s political 
unrest was only commencing to become noticeable to the average American newsman, the T-U 
staff perhaps simply scooped this angle off the AP wire over the D & C.  Second, most of these 
incidents occurred when the Wings and Kings played each other, and it is possible that the D & 
C felt that Cuba didn’t warrant any coverage outside the sports section.106  Beahon of the D & C 
mentioned political tensions in a handful of his 1956 columns, and perhaps that constituted an 
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“unscooped” angle on the Cuban situation, erasing the need for additional articles.107 Thanks to 
the T-U sources, it is indisputable that coverage of Cuba noticeably increased in at least one 
Rochester newspaper.  Relevant articles that appeared in the 1956 editions of the afternoon daily 
alone outnumbered those from the preceding two years of both the D & C and the T-U.  
Cuban baseball appeared out of the sporting pages four times, at least according to the 
scans. On 20 April, the D & C published the beginning of a Beahon article entitled: “Wings 
Tame Havana for Seasons 1st Win,” which covered Rochester’s home opener.108  Al C. Weber 
wrote a similar quotation for the T-U two days prior.109 On 2 May, the D & C published an 
above-the-fold Beahon piece under the headline: “Wings to Meet Havana in Home Opener 
Today.”110  The T-U also printed a front-page write-up about the contest.111  While the D & C 
columnist described Havana in detail, nothing emerged to differentiate the squad from the 
American or Canadian teams in the IL outside of simply calling them: “Havana’s swift and 
daring Sugar Kings” and “Reggie Otero’s Cubans.”112  Conversely, when the T-U’s afternoon 
edition hit the newsstands that same day, at least two innings of the game had already been 
completed.113  As a result, the article was much shorter, and did not contain any differentiating 
remarks regarding either Cuba or the island’s Sugar Kings.  Once again, baseball had failed to 
factor into Rochester’s slowly growing coverage of Cuba outside of the sports section.  In 
contrast, alleged Communist incursions in the rest of Latin America, particularly in right-wing 
controlled Argentina,114 received more than their fair share of stories, at least in the T-U.115                                                   
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From April through June 1957, Cuba managed to remain almost entirely off Gannett’s 
front pages.  During this three month period, the D & C only ran three Cuban-related pieces, all 
occurring in the last week of May.  On 26 May, a Page Seven story proclaimed: “Cuba Rebels 
Hiding in Hills.”116  On 29 May, their front page had a small article entitled: “Rebels Douse 
Havana’s Bright Lights.”117  Two days later, a Page Eight AP column proclaimed: “Batista Maps 
Out Drive to Wipe-Out Rebels.”118   In comparison, the T-U published only three relevant 
articles.  On 10 May, a Page Two brief quotation, referring to three American youths who fled 
Guantanamo Bay in March to join Castro’s forces, declared: “Two Quit Rebels, Third Stays.”119 
On 29 May, under a photograph of a burning building, the front page headline proclaimed: 
“Cuba Battle Erupts: Saboteurs Hit Havana.”120   Lastly, on 4 June, the T-U printed a story 
entitled: “3 Bombs Explode in Havana.”  In none of these articles was baseball discussed.121 
Ironically, these three months featured large amounts of Latin American coverage.  Both 
dailies were extensive in informing their respective readerships about important events in the 
region. Border skirmishes between the Honduran and Nicaraguan militaries received mention.122 
The ouster of Colombian president Gustavo Rojas due to a 10 May coup d’état also featured on 
Gannett’s front pages.123  Haiti was by far the most covered Latin American nation during this 
period, as the island’s citizens experienced violent protests, military suppression, and contested 
elections.124  During this three month period, the D & C printed at least thirteen Haiti-related 
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articles.125  In contrast, the T-U ran fifteen.  However, in the following two months, Cuba started 
to feature prominently in both newspapers in areas outside the sporting sections.126  This negated 
any further examination of Gannett’s coverage involving other Latin American nations as far as 
the study is concerned, as a definable Cuban position emerged. 
While the D & C failed to print any narratives on Cuba in July, their afternoon 
competition at the T-U more than compensated.  On 1 July a Page Four AP article appeared 
entitled: “5 Killed as Cuban Rebels Riot after Peace Rally.”127  Five days later Page Two was 
headed by a picture of an explosion, along with the caption: “Blasts Hit Cuba.”128  On 11 July a 
full page column written by AP writer Larry Allen proclaimed: “Cuba’s Wave of Prosperity 
Rolls, Freedom Ebbs.”  This article is extremely significant as it marked the first occasion either 
newspaper published an opinion piece regarding the Cuban situation.  Allen wrote: “Cubans are 
riding high, wide, and handsome on a wave of lush prosperity . . . It doesn’t wash out a burning 
desire for basic freedoms . . . Today only tight gun rule seems to be keeping most of Cuba from 
erupting into shooting revolt . . . Cuba’s constitution guarantees basic liberties . . . But the laws 
that protect seem only to be applied at the convenience of the government.”129  After 15 July, 
when a Page Six AP quotation informed the readership: “Cuba Rebel Bombs Mar Invasion,” the 
T-U went silent until the beginning of August.130  When they picked up the narrative again, they 
were no longer alone.  
For the first half of August, nine different days featured at least one story about Cuba 
between the two Rochester dailies.  On 2 August a Page Three T-U article proclaimed: “Army 
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Holds Cuba under Military Rule.”131  The next day their afternoon edition began on Page Two 
with the headline: “Cuban Bill Assails U.S. Envoy.”132  The D & C’s Page Three from that 
morning ran two AP Cuba-focused articles side by side.  The first read: “Cuban Rebels to Clash 
with Batista.”133  The second and much larger of the two was entitled: “U.S. Envoy’s (Earl T. 
Smith) Visit to Rebel City Studied for Diplomatic Blunder.”134  On 4 August the D & C’s Page 
Six printed a quotation from the AP wire that read: “U.S. Envoy Flies Back to Havana, Mute on 
Charges.”135  The front page of the 5 August T-U stated: “Cuba Rebels Push War of Nerves.”136 
Another AP quotation underneath that column announced: “Eleven “Propaganda” letters 
addressed to Red Wings players were received today from Rebel-agitated Cuba. Details on page 
34.”137  This was only one of two instances in 1957 where the Cuban Revolution and Red Wings 
baseball were mentioned together outside the sports section.  The second and more notable of the 
two, occurred six days later. 
 On 11 August, the D & C’s front page headline blared: “What is the Real Situation in 
Cuba? Rebel Bombings . . .Censorship . . . ‘Stay Home’ Squeeze by Natives.”  The attached 
article, promoted as “A Report from the Scene by D & C baseball writer George Beahon,” was 
the first time a local opinion on Cuba featured prominently in either newspaper.  Beahon 
described a striking scene: 
Sweltering Havana is a giant powder keg waiting to be fused by rebel leader Fidel Castro, 
the elusive attorney-turned warrior. Cubans are a strange breed of cats, reluctant to talk, 
unwilling to show emotion or feelings about their government. They whistle wildly over a 
bonehead baseball play and flip madly over an umpire’s decision. Politics and revolutions they 
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hesitate to discuss, giving an impression that no one can be trusted . . . No one openly admits 
sympathy for Castro. On the other hand, there is little open criticism except from the 
government-controlled press. Censorship and suppression of news in . . . Havana is exactly what 
you’d expect under a dictatorship . . . copy sent from Havana by wire services is strictly 
censored. All phone calls are monitored. 
 
Beahon then recounted a personal incident: 
In the press box in Gran Stadium . . . this reporter typed sidebar notes (about a bombing 
at a Havana Woolworth Department Store) . . . This copy was passed along to the cable operator 
who promptly let out a howl and called a meeting of his teletype colleagues. One who spoke 
English brought the copy back to me and said . . . ‘We wish you not to write anything about the 
situation here-for your sake and for ours. You are under censorship the same as everybody else.’ 
Well the office picks up the tab for these trips, but this does not include bail money, and the 
airline insurance does not cover risk of acquiring tropical crud in the Cuban pokey. So no serious 
attempt was made to beat the censors. Starting then, off-field distractions no longer appeared of 
earth shattering importance. Even though Cot Deal pitched a complete game that included pauses 
to estimate how far away from the bark the bombs were exploding. (One’s concussion actually 
was felt in the stadium, three cramped blocks from the theater it blew out.)138 
 
The D & C baseball writer concluded the two page article with a particularly baseball-
themed focus: 
More than 10,000 of the Cubans now living in Florida are reported contributing to 
Castro’s campaign and would love to see some of the Batista mob ventilated. . . Batista must 
stick and stay and hope it pays. Club-owner Bobby Maduro pays his bills and is prepared to fight 
an anticipated drive to force Havana out of the International League so long as the political 
situation is not cleared . . . Batista,” claims Maduro, “has the Cuban Negro population on his side 
and his is 35 per cent of our country. He also has the labor leaders and of course he has the 
Army. When you have the Army you are the boss.”139 
 
This article revealed several important states of the American-Cuban bonding dynamic, at 
least as portrayed in the Rochester press. First, the Cuban Revolution was now considered to be 
important enough to warrant front-page coverage. Second, the lens of baseball was indeed being 
utitlized to gain access to such stories, and to portray them to the Rochester readership in a 
familiar setting.  Aspects such as censorship, bombings, and political protests were not common 
events at Red Wings games, so this overlap with a baseball contest showed to the public that 
                                               
138
 First parenthesis mine, second is Beahon’s. 
139
 George Beahon, “What is the Real Situation in Cuba?” D & C, 11 August 1957. 
115 
 
115 
 
something was amiss in Cuba. However the most important revelation was that even the bond of 
baseball was not enough to keep the Cuban Revolution on the front page for long, showing the 
weakness the sport had as a cultural lens.  
The rest of August featured two more articles outside of the sport section, both in the T-
U.140  Coverage briefly picked up again in early September following the failed Cienfuegos 
uprising.  The D & C printed seven Cuban-focused pieces and the T-U printed five, respectively. 
However, by the middle of the month, Cuba fell out of each of the front sections for the 
remainder of the baseball season.141  Yet, when Red Wing training camp began in the spring of 
1958, the island had become permanently attached to both the D & C’s and T-U’s front pages.  
As this study’s findings for the last three seasons show, this was not because of baseball. The 
American-Cuban baseball relationship, while undeniably present, was simply along for the ride. 
                                              The Pot Boils  
                                                           1958-1959 
 The Cuban Revolution received a sharp coverage increase by the two newspapers in 
April 1958.  With Red Wings spring training almost half-over, the “Pearl of the Antilles” seemed 
to be the new headline staple.  On 1 April, the T-U’s third page announced via the “Times-Union 
Wire Services” that: “Batista Gets Dictator Powers.”142  The D & C’s seventh page that same day 
commented: “Cuban Rebels Hit Communications.”143  On 2 April, the morning daily’s Page Two 
exclaimed: “Cuban Rebels Kick off Total War on Batista.” 144  The T-U scooped its competitors 
that afternoon when it ran a story about the arrest of three Rochester-based businessmen, the 
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Bachman brothers, who were charged with smuggling weapons to Castro.145 The next page 
published an AP piece entitled: “22 Rebel Supporters Arrested in Miami,” with a photograph 
showing Cuban hunger strikers.146  The D & C’s Mitchell Kaidy reported the following day: 
“‘Amazing Bachmans’ Face Charges of Supplying Arms to Cuba Rebels.”147  In neither paper 
were the Bachmans criticized or praised. The T-U utilized its lead by running a full length 
column: “Kill if Necessary, Cuban Workers Told,”148 along with a Page Two article entitled: 
“Smuggling Guns to Cuba Big Business.”149  On 4 April the T-U’s headline declared: “Total War 
Will Start Tonight, if Necessary says Castro,”150 while the editorial section ran this cartoon:151 
                                    
 During the rest of April, the D & C published twenty-eight Cuba-related stories and the 
T-U ran fourteen.152  Headline after headline drew respective readerships into the ongoing island 
crisis.  In this regard, the two papers remained largely consistent with their coverage. On 5 April, 
Rochester’s morning daily ran the headline: “Cuban Rebels ‘Total War’ Opens in Ominous 
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Silence as Batista Readies Troops.”153  The following day, the front page featured a full length 
AP column entitled: “Castro Forces Now Isolated, Cubans Claim.”154  On 8 April, Page Three 
reported: “Police in Havana Arrest 26 Men in Fight on Rebels,”155 and 9 April’s Page Seven 
commented: “Cuba Civic Resistance Movement Claims Thousands Oppose Army.”156  The next 
day, the opening headline declared: “Havana Crushes Rebel Uprising: Batista Opens Counter 
Offensive.”  Two other Cuban-centered articles appeared alongside a photograph of a fire-
engulfed Havana street.157  The D & C’s 11 April front page announced: “Cuban Rebels Fail in 
Second Uprising.”158  Also that day the morning daily printed an op-ed editorial on the Cuban 
situation, the only one in either newspaper in April. The unauthored piece, entitled “Cuba’s 
Warning,” posed the following: 
              As rebel and government forces in Cuba spill blood in scattered clashes across the 
island, the American bystander is put in a curious position. Choosing sides isn’t easy. Fidel 
Castro and his abortive uprising aren’t likely to draw much American sympathy. Castro’s cause 
has won the sympathy of Cuba’s few Communists. For years Castro has behaved in a manner to 
suggest that he is a Red or a fellow traveler. As for Batista, his rule is a dictatorship rating as 
only slightly the better of two bad choices . . . Batista was elected president under a new 
constitution adopted in 1940, and was renamed president for another 4-year term in 1954 . . . in 
an election in which he was the only candidate . . . Under the terms of the Platt Amendment the 
United States could intervene “for the preservation of Cuban independence.” At least four times 
the U.S. intervened in Cuban insurrections. But not since the amendment was abrogated in 1934. 
Now its policy is “hands-off.” This isn’t Russia, which sent tanks and guns into a satellite to 
quell a revolt. At the moment the threat of a Communist coup in . . . Cuba, is remote but the 
possibility exists. Cuba may be warning us to intensify our propaganda program for freedom in 
the Western Hemisphere.159 
 
 Putting aside the writer’s assumptions on Castro’s political affilations, this article 
revealed a disturbing trend about Rochester’s view of Cuba. The Platt Amendment was brought 
up as a potential solution if a Communist coup were to unfold on the island, showing a sense of 
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how Cuba best served American interests, and not how they both could best serve each other. . 
Although the author reminded the readers that “this isn’t Russia,” the suggestion was that 
nothing should be taken off the table regarding, “our . . . program for freedom.” It was under this 
attitude that the next few months of the Revolution was portrayed in the Rochester press. 
 The next day a D & C front page headline proclaimed: “Dynamite Blasted by Rebels in 
Cuba after Swift Foray.”160  An opening AP article on 13 April was entitled: “Cuban Revolt 
Fizzles as Dissension Splits Havana Rebel Chiefs.”161  The following morning, two relevant 
pieces on the Revolution were printed on Page Three.162  On 15 April, a front page story 
declared: “Cuban Rebels Land on Coast for 2d Front.”163  On 16 April, a Page Two AP quotation 
announced: “Rebels Shoot-Up 3 Cuban Towns, Scatter to Hills.”164  On 18 April, a small article 
informed readers that: “Castro Shakes up Rebel Commands to Halt Bungling.”165 The next 
relevant story appeared on Page Three ten days later. 166  On 29 April, a Page Eleven quotation 
commented: “Cuba Calm Ends, Attacks Renewed.”167  The last day of April, a similar-sized 
quotation appeared on the front page which claimed: “Rebels Trapped, End of Uprising Seen by 
Cubans.”168 
For the most part baseball was a negligible influence, at least thematically, upon the two 
newspapers’ 1958 April coverage of Cuba, although baseball in relation to Cuba was featured 
four times outside the sports sections.  The first, written by the T-U’s baseball reporter Al C. 
Weber, appeared on the 14 April edition’s front page entitled: “Havana- - Or Else, Bisons Told.”  
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Due to the heightened political tensions and outbreaks of violence during early April, the Buffalo 
Bisons’ players voted not to play their season opening series in Havana, even under threat of 
forfeiting those games.  Weber commented: 
The directors, in an emergency meeting here yesterday, voted 7-0 to maintain its original 
schedule. Buffalo although invited to attend, was not represented. However, Buffalo through 
club president John Stigimeir, announced it would “stand by the action taken by its Executive 
Committee Apr. 12 and will not send its club to Havana . . . If Buffalo forfeits its games there, 
the Wings will be the first league team to appear in strife-torn Cuba. George Sisler, representing 
Rochester, after hearing assurances from Maduro that there was no risk involved . . . voted to 
maintain the schedule. The meeting heard other assurances relayed by League President Frank 
Shaughnessy from Earl T. Smith, US ambassador to Cuba . . .  Maduro read a telegram signed by 
six American-born players on his team and one umpire, Augie Guglielmo. It said they had 
played six exhibition games in Moron . . . 300 miles closer to the main trouble spot at Santiago 
than Havana, without incident or harassment of any kind . . . He said he would not transfer his 
games to Tampa, because conditions “are better in Havana now than at any time in two years.” 
Thus the Diamond Jubilee opening of the International League, oldest of the minors, appears a 
bit tarnished at the moment.169 
 
Unlike Beahon, Weber made little-attempt outside of “strife-torn Cuba,” to explore the 
revolution in-depth, seemingly content to simply discuss the baseball side of the equation.  This 
pattern also appeared throughout his sport section articles, as after 1957, Weber stopped 
travelling to Cuba with the Red Wings, thereby shrinking the baseball window Rochester had to 
the island’s revolution. 
 
The second was a Letter to the Editor that appeared on the D & C’s 18 April editorial 
page, which essentially declared any American-Cuban relationship via baseball as a fraudulent 
one. The letter proclaimed: 
As I write this the internal situation in Cuba is to say the least, uncertain. The opinions I 
express are non-political for my views are strictly concerned with baseball. Incidentally, I have 
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always scoffed at reports that it is also Cuba’s national pastime. Obviously, the Batista and 
Castro forces have other ideas. I cannot believe our George Sisler would be a part of a mandate 
to the Buffalo Bisons that they must enter Havana to open the baseball season midst the very 
definite risk of injury to personnel directly involved in the business of baseball, the players . . . 
Don’t they (IL Board of Governors) consider the entire island of Cuba a warzone battleground? 
Or do they think that Gran Stadium will be allowed to remain a playground? I feel that baseball 
players earn their livelihood in the game of baseball, not . . . as soldiers in wartime. I believe Mr. 
Sisler should explain his stand (which I cannot fathom as being his true feelings) to the fandom 
of the local team who subscribed to save baseball here, not to feed it to the rebels of Cuba. And 
just what are the feelings of the stockholders- the owners of the Wings?- SEBASTIAN J. 
FICHERA, 176 Fulton Ave.170 
 
This revealed how little at least one Rochesterian viewed the American-Cuban baseball 
bond: barely existent. If the majority of Red Wings fans shared his views, then no matter how 
positively Beahon may have covered the bridge, its ability to serve the greater good would have 
been largely lacking. 
The third was a surprise George Beahon column featured on the opening page of the D & 
C’s 16 April local news section, entitled, Everybody’s Business.  Beahon, amongst other baseball 
reflections, opined:  
Spring training is many things to a ballplayer. And many things also to a writer . . . It is 
the constant, conflicting series of reports-hearsay, rumor, censored stories-about what’s 
happening in Havana, where your ballclub has to appear before you get home . . . It is wondering 
whether your insurance is effective in Havana . . . It is talking with newsman who are forced to 
fly daily from Havana to Miami in order to avoid censorship: but are censored by restriction in 
their every movement under the martial law of Cuba.171 
 
 The final front page Cuban baseball entry was a second edition of Beahon’s Everybody’s 
Business on 23 April.  This one entitled: “Nothing Doing,” attempted to portray the Havana 
scene to Rochesterians, as the Wings had played a season series there over the weekend.  Beahon 
articulated: 
                In Miami one day last week a carload of Fidel Castro supporters celebrated the opening 
of the baseball season in their native Havana by massaging a Cuba legislator with Louisville 
sluggers . . . In Havana the same night Cuban government censors celebrated the opener by blue-
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penciling this line . . . “Havana tonight was as quiet as a drive-in theatre at high noon. Well, 
almost” . . . Cuban President Fulgencio Batista clearly won a round two weeks ago when he 
suppressed the attempt at a general strike. It would appear however . . . tremendous publicity 
accorded Castro’s disorganized armed revolt has almost completely paralyzed Cuba’s lush 
tourist trade. In a discount house in midtown Havana, a shopkeeper who does business with 
visiting ballplayers told me: “I had a full week in which not one customer walked into my shop. 
There is no reason for it. But that awful publicity and propaganda in the U.S. press ruined us” . . . 
Thousands of good, average Cuban breadwinners are not winning bread. It’s a national 
emergency without another shot being fired. And the man on the street has become more inclined 
to swing his blame away from the government and toward the costly war of nerves being fought 
by the rebels. Meanwhile, also, three more multi-million dollar tourist traps are in the planning 
stage in Havana. After all, it’s only money.172 
 
 In both of Beahon’s articles, he once again articulated a sense of attempted understanding 
between him and the everyday habanos he would come across.  Unlike his front-page 
counterparts, the “baseball writer” revealed the negative impact American coverage was having 
on the Cuban economy, namely the tourist trade. By comparing these two entries with Fichera’s 
op-ed piece, it also revealed a potential disconnect between the writer and reader. Unlike 
Fichera, Beahon had for the previous four and a half years travelled to Havana on a frequent 
basis, experiencing the Cuban spectacle firsthand. With baseball serving as his entryway into this 
spectacle, it perhaps also enabled him to understand the average Cuban more accurately and 
quickly. Since Fichera had no access to these resources, it is understandable why the bond had 
little impact upon his perception of Cuba. 
Cuban events, both on and off the baseball diamond, dropped out of the front sections of 
the Rochester newspapers for all of May and the majority of June.   Neither the D & C nor the T-
U printed a relevant story until 27 June.173  The T-U that day hit newsstands under a banner 
reading: “Cuba Rebels Kidnap 10 Americans,” and featured a front page article entitled: 
“Engineers Kidnapped in Cuba.”174  The following morning, the D & C trumpeted the headline: 
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“Cuban Rebels Kidnap, Hold 10 Americans.”175  These articles unknowingly signalled the 
beginning of a much larger hostage crisis, along with a drastic increase in coverage of Cuba.  By 
the time the crisis ended on 19 July, the two Rochester dailies ran thirty-nine combined stories, 
twenty-five in the D & C and fourteen in the T-U.176  While none of the articles mentioned 
baseball, it is important to mention that the kidnappings drastically colored local opinion of the 
Cuban Revolution.  On 3 July a T-U editorial entitled: “Cuban Rebels Lose American 
Sympathy,” reported: 
Strict censorship by the Cuban government has clouded the real situation. . . The rebels 
are said to resent the fact that the United States is not providing them with support and that it has 
been helping the government. In either case it is just as criminal for them to kidnap innocent 
Americans from their jobs . . . to express this resentment. They display a complete lack of 
understanding of freedom to resort to such means. Theses kidnappings suggest that the rebels 
would be no better than the present government.177 
 
 
A 6 July editorial in the D & C called for Castro to be “slapped,” and labelled the Cuban 
rebel leader, a “modern Simon Bolivar.”178  However, an 11 July editorial written by AP 
journalist J.M. Roberts contended: “Russia and the East German communists . . . make their 
attempts in petty ways. That’s even different from the way it’s done by the Cuban rebels who 
wanted foreigners as insurance against government bombs.”179  And yet, as soon as the captured 
Americans were returned, both the D & C and the T-U returned to not focusing on Cuba.180 
Ironically, the next three months, regarded as the turning point of the Cuban Revolution, 
developed the smallest amount of Rochester-Cuba coverage.  From the beginning of August until 
the end of October, only one relevant article between the two dailies was printed, an 11 
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September T-U photo exposé about gun smuggling.181  Cuba had gone from being an island of 
global importance to seeming irrelevance as far as Gannett’s newspapers were concerned.  This 
changed dramatically in the last two months of 1958. 
November and December featured extensive front-page coverage of Cuba in both the D 
& C and the T-U as twenty articles ran in the morning newspaper, and thirty-two were printed by 
their afternoon competitor.182  However, while the two dailies informed Rochester readers about 
controversy in the Cuban Presidential election,183 rebel-hijacked airplanes,184 and Castro’s forces 
besieging Santa Clara,185 not a single relevant editorial was printed in either one.186  In fact, on 
31 December, when T-U Special Services writer William H. Stoneham listed six “restive 
explosive situations . . . that are clear to the naked eye as the year begins,” neither Cuba nor 
Latin America was mentioned.187  So, while the Revolution increased its coverage in Rochester, 
the editors did not hold it to be a “true global crisis.”  Seemingly not even the baseball 
connection warranted any local press perspective on Cuba. Literally overnight, however, both the 
D & C and the T-U were forced to change their Cuban assessment as Batista fled the island and 
Castro came to power. 
               In this chapter’s introduction, I established I would utilize a 1963 quantitative study, 
conducted by Zeitlin/Scheer, when thematically analyzing 1959-1960. In this study, the 
Washington Post, San Francisco Chronicle, and San Francisco Examiner newspapers were 
examined to determine how prominent the Cuban Revolution was featured and portrayed in their 
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respective coverages.188  The answers Zeitlin/Scheer reached via their quantitative experiments 
served as the point/counterpoint to the Rochester analysis, and helped add academic weight to 
my study’s primary thematic conclusions.  However, two important distinctions must be noted 
between their research and my own before going further.  First, their study period was divided 
into three time frames: 1 January 1959-11 June 1959, 12 June 1959-11 January 1960, and 12 
January 1960-7 July 1960. These were chosen due to important events occurring on those 
particular dates.189  My analysis was more loosely divided into six time frames: 1 January 1959-
31 March 1959, 1 April 1959-30 June 1959, 1 July 1959-15 August 1959, 16 August 1959-15 
October 1959, 1 April 1960-15 June 1960, and 16 June-31 July 1960.  These were chosen due to 
what I saw as major themes relevant to my study occurring during each designated period.  
Lastly, Zeitlin/Scheer came to their quantitative conclusions based on measuring column inches 
in their chosen newspapers, whereas I simply counted the number of articles.190  
            In both the D & C and the T-U, the Cuban Revolution’s immediate aftermath dominated 
front-page coverage, albeit steadily decreasing each month.  In January, the morning and 
afternoon dailies published seventy and sixty-three relevant articles, respectively.  The following 
two months, the D & C ran twenty-nine Revolution-focused stories and the T-U ran twenty-
seven.191  The “Pearl of the Antilles” had definitively become an event of “global importance, at 
least as far as Rochester newspapers were concerned.  
 While the published pieces ranged through a wide variety of topics, there were two major 
narratives that the D & C and T-U focused on, each one representing an issue that a baseball 
bridge would have to overcome.  The first, featured primarily in January and somewhat in 
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February, had each Rochester newspaper print some editorials praising Castro for deposing 
Batista, while simultaneously warning that the head rebel had to prove himself to the “North” 
before gaining American support.  In a 3 January D & C editorial entitled: “Good for Cuba! (We 
Hope),” an unknown writer pontificated:  
Let this not be construed as favorable to Gen. Fulgencio Batista . . . His blood-spattered 
adminstration since he seized control in 1952 invites only disgust. On the other hand, who knows 
anything about . . . young Fidel Castro? A courageous young man? Yes. An oddball? Yes, one 
who openly insults other nations by kidnapping foreigners to dramatize his cause. A Communist? 
Maybe . . . but probably not, although he is the darling of the Moscow Press . . . Meanwhile a 
brief pause here up north in terms of . . . endorsement will do Uncle Sam no harm, while Cuba 
figures out whether or not it has skidded out of the political frying pan and into the fire.192  
 
                 A 9 January T-U opinion piece, after the Eisenhower administration officially 
recognized the Revolutionary Government, similarly concluded: “Recognition is apparently the 
formal handshake. The embraces will come when recognizable democratic government is 
established in Cuba.”193  On 15 January in the T-U, a front-page column by AP News Analyst 
James Marlow queried: “The announced purpose of Fidel Castro’s revolution, which threw out 
the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista, was to restore democracy to Cuba. The question now is, 
will it?”194  Based on how the two Rochester newspaper editorial staffs covered the war criminal 
executions, the second major early 1959 narrative, the answer was an emphatic no. 
    According to the Zeitlin/Scheer study, between January and June 1959, thirteen to thirty-
nine percent of 418-858 total column inches of their examined coverage focused on trials and 
summary executions by Castro’s forces.195  Based on my own brief quantitative analysis, January 
and February featured numerous related articles, as my Rochester examples showed.  Of the 
sixty-three total Cuban-related pieces printed in the T-U in January, thirty-two of them were 
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primarily focused on the ongoing executions.196  The few editorials on the same topic both in the 
T-U and in the D & C, negatively portrayed Castro’s actions in this regard. Many of them 
claimed all the American public needed to support the executions were for the accused 
batistianos to be given “trials by due process,”197 not by “mob justice.”198  On 16 January, the D 
& C ran the headline: “‘200,000 Gringos to Die’ if U.S. Interferes with Killings, Castro 
Declares.”199  In response, the D & C’s editorial page on 22 January took condemnation of the 
executions one step further.  Under the headline: “Two Views on Fidel Castro,” were printed two 
op-ed columns. David Lawrence, staff writer for the New York Herald-Tribune wrote:  
Two wrongs do not make a single right. This moral principle seems to have been 
abandoned not only in Cuba, but by some people inside this country who condone the savagery 
which has prompted the executions of dozens of persons without trial . . . Can any government 
which does not give a fair trial to a person accused of crime be regarded as civilized? . . . Yet 
above all Castro could think of the other day was that the United States might intervene 
militarily. So he promptly threatened to massacre Americans.200 
 
AP writer J.M. Roberts stated: “When Castro reacted against congressional critics . . . he 
was reacting against those who fought for his country 50 years ago and then declined to take it 
over as any other world power would have done . . . The United States won Castro’s war for him 
when it finally cut off those (Batista’s) arms.”201  Overhead, the D & C ran this cartoon (see next 
page):202      
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This seemed to be a quite loud damnation of Castro’s exectutions, with little 
understanding of any favorable position. Both articles, despite being labelled “Two Views on 
Fidel Castro,” shared essentially the same viewpoint, one which any American-Cuban baseball 
bond would have had a hard time overcoming.  
In the D & C’s sports pages, Beahon covered the fate of the Sugar Kings semi-
extensively, culminating in a full page 31 January article entitled: “League Okays ’59 Baseball in 
Havana.”  In his piece, Beahon referred to a report Maduro gave to the IL Board of Governors 
while presenting to Rochester an optimistic outlook on the IL’s future in Cuba.  The D & C 
Baseball Writer expressed: 
Significant developments were: 1.The revolutionary government headed by Fidel Castro 
has assured Maduro the fullest cooperation, even to the extent of helping to sell season tickets. 2. 
Castro will throw out the first baseball of Cuba’s IL season before an expected throng of 25,000 
in Gran Stadium April 14 . . . It is quite possible the victorious rebel leader will flu to Toronto to 
repeat the courtesy for that club’s home opener April 29. 3. Dr. Manuel Urrutia, new president of 
Cuba, has repeatedly and publicly promised help for all sports in Cuba. 4. As evidence of 
Maduro’s standing with the new government, Army Capt. Felipe Guerra, the new director of 
sports, offered Maduro a non-salaried job as coordinator of all amateur sports in Cuba. 5. The 
same Guerra’s first official act was to check out rumors that the Sugar Kings might not be 
playing at home . . . 6. Castro’s government will attempt to destroy the “numbers racket” . . . that 
conspires to keep Cuba’s lower income population financially broke, and this should help 
promote baseball attendance. 7. The civic resistance to the overthrown dictatorship, a two-year 
long “stay home” strike is naturally a thing of the past and the fans will return to the ballpark in 
greater numbers than ever before. 203 
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There are three important revelations regarding this article. First, unlike his front-page 
counterparts, Beahon tried to focus on a positive side of the Cuban Revolution, if solely in a 
sporting context. Again, his background in baseball may have enabled him to see between the 
lines on this issue. Second, it is solely through the baseball window that either Rochester paper 
received any in-depth in-house writing on the Cuban Revolution. Most importantly however, is 
that once again, this was buried in the sports section, far from the front page, and many a D & C 
reader. 
As the previous paragraphs clearly show, the American-Cuban baseball relationship was 
being ignored by the Rochester front pages.  No article or editorial in either daily outside of the 
sports section mentioned the Sugar Kings in the first three months of 1959.204 With executions 
and suppression of liberties going on, baseball was apparently irrelevant in terms of important 
news from Cuba.  This trend of apathetically disregarding the cultural bond of baseball’s 
potential in terms of international diplomacy continued during the following three months. 
From the beginning of April to the end of June, coverage of Cuba in the Rochester 
newspapers remained level in terms of quantity.  In total number of columns, the D & C ran 
twenty-four in April, eleven in May, and seventeen in June.  During those same months, the T-U 
printed sixteen, twelve, and eleven articles, respectively.205  The Revolution remained an 
important issue, but not enough to dominate either daily’s headlines.  
Thematically, the Rochester press narrative also remained static.  Executions were no 
longer the focus, shifting towards Castro’s plans for agrarian reform and his views regarding 
Cuba’s relationship with the United States.  Most of the articles seemed to present a sympathetic, 
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if wary, view of his regime.206  Paul Miller, the T-U’s editor, who served on the Gannett Board of 
Directors, published an 18 April column in which he recounted the speech Castro gave in 
Washington D.C. the day before.  Miller remarked:  
It was an appealing performance . . . He (Castro) is brave and . . . intelligent. He is also 
inexperienced and beset by towering problems. Most of those who heard him . . .found 
themselves generally sympathetic but they will wait and see . . . Time will tell whether an earnest 
young fighter for freedom can now keep the Commies and their assorted fronts from becoming 
the scavengers of his victory.207 
 
With the exectuions in the not-so-distant past, Miller’s review showed a Rochester press 
focused primarily on the future of Cuba under Castro, one which he felt Americans should be 
optimisitic, yet wary about.  
This trend continued through June, most notably expressed by T-U staff writer Bill 
Ringle, who went to Havana for a story.  On 9 June, the T-U’s front page ran the headline: 
“Under Castro, Cuba is Gripped in Almost Evangelical Fervor,” and then in smaller print: “But 
There’s Some Distrust of his Aims, Methods.”  Within the article this distrust mainly revolved 
around the issue of land reform.  Regarding other Cuban issues however, Ringle noted: “In 
talking to both . . . supporters of Castro and those who despise him, you find they agree: That 
Castro has made Cuban government honest . . . That Batista was despicable  . . . (share) 
puzzlement and resentment over American objections to executions of Batista followers . . . The 
Cubans I talked to thought killing was too good for them.”208 
Ringle’s article is notable for another reason, one arguably more important in regard to 
this study.  His trip to Havana was made possible due to the Havana Sugar Kings, a relationship 
not disclosed in the article.  Earlier in the week, another Ringle front-page article appeared, about 
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Floridians running guns to anti-Castro forces.209  This article coincided with an away-from-home 
series the Red Wings were playing against the Miami Marlins.210  The aforementioned Havana 
column also took place following the conclusion of the Wings-Kings series in the Cuban capital. 
The sole mention of baseball came on 8 June, when, above the Rochester Times-Union logo, 
appeared: “In Cuba, They’re Fanaticos. Meet Them on Page 40.”211  In the article, Cuban passion 
for the game is clearly defined and placed on display for the T-U readers, as Ringle wrote: 
Take a fanatico, then give him some chicharrones, a bottle of beer, an occasional jonron, 
some tubeys, and well-timed ponchados. The result: one happy Cuban . . . Apart from the 
“Barbados,” Castro’s bearded followers . . . the first differences the Rochester fan notices are the 
ticket hawkers standing outside the big cast-concrete stadium . . . Once the game begins, he (the 
fanatico) becomes more effervescent than Wings fans usually do. Every pitch is an event, a hit a 
signal for cheering, a triple or home run an excuse for pandemonium . . . U.S. ball players 
experienced in Latin America think Cuban fans have more savvy than Americans. “They really 
know the game,” says Wings manager Cot Deal, who has played in Latin American winter 
leagues . . . Havana baseball officials don’t agree. “Sure, they’re more passionate than U.S. 
fans,” says one. “That’s our Latin temperament. But they also think they know more baseball. 
Every guy is a manager. They don’t come to see the game they only come to see the home team 
win. They don’t really like baseball. They come here to criticize more than to enjoy the ball 
game” . . . Havana absorbs a lot more baseball than Rochester in a year. In the winter a four team 
Cuban League operates in La Gran, Some of the Wings played in it . . . The Cuban baseball 
vocabulary is borrowed from the American. Most terms have no roots in Spanish, but 
approximate the American sound . . . The average attendance per game is 3,000 in a summer 
season . . . Cuban fans like to catch pop flies, clap in unison for no reason at all and, more than 
Americans, boo the umps. They booed yesterday when they felt the Wings were stalling in the 
second game on which a time limit had been agreed. Missing yesterday was one of the hallmarks 
of Sugar Kings baseball – the fans’ rhumba band which used to play constantly while the Cuban 
club was at bat. But with no rhumba band to listen to, some fans contented themselves with 
listening to play by play accounts, over small radios, of the game they were watching.212 
 
Since Ringle was not a sportswriter, there are several key notes to mention about his 
article. First, unlike Beahon, he resorted to using stereotypical language to describe the Sugar 
Kings’ fanbase, something the former had stopped using years before. In fact, Ringle went one 
step further by throwing Spanish words in the first sentence, without bothering to translate for his 
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English speaking readership. This showed how ineffective limiting the baseball lens to the sports 
section had prepared the average Rochesterian to utilize it in understanding their Cuban 
counterpart. Second, it also described the atmosphere at a La Gran contest, something which 
could have gone a long way towards entrenching a Rochester-Havana cultural connection if it 
had received front-page coverage.  
Most importantly, in order to read this article, to find out it was about baseball, and even 
to learn that Ringle had written it, one had to turn to the opening page of the sports section and 
locate it right next to the box score.213  The T-U’s editorial staff essentially exploited the Red 
Wings as a way to get a local perspective on the Cuban situation, without actually mentioning 
such means. With baseball arguably being the best way to establish a cultural bond of friendship 
between America and Cuba, the IL connection was ignored by Rochester’s front pages. This 
trend briefly subsided during the rest of June but emerges reinforced at the end of the following 
month. 
 Quantitatively, July 1959 saw a drastic increase in Cuban-focused stories in both the D 
& C and the T-U, running thirty-five and thirty-three front-section articles, respectively.214  On 2 
July, an editorial article ran in the D & C which prophesized: 
 A land-distribution law . . . certain to plunge Cuba into a long depression unless 
drastically altered . . . At the same time political purges are being carried out in Havana’s schools 
. . . Reports have been coming out of the island for months about allegedly growing Communist 
strength . . . A man who means so well is doing so badly that his efforts will result in the 
opposite of what he wants for his people.215 
 
Not only was the coverage increasing, but as the previous quotation revealed, it was 
primarily negative towards the current regime. 
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On 16 July, a T-U editorial criticized Castro for anti-American rhetoric when the former 
commander of the Cuban Revolutionary Air Force, Pedro Luis Díaz Lanz, testified before a U.S. 
Senate Subcommittee that Cuba’s government had fallen to heavy communist infiltration.  The 
article argued, “As hard as it may be for some Cubans to understand, a Senate Subcommittee 
does not speak for the United States.”216 
 Two days after Cuban President Manuel Urruitia’s forced resignation, in what Senzel 
described as a “personal finger-wagging warning to Castro,”217 a 21 July D & C editorial further 
lamented: “Castro has spent most of his time in office castigating this country. Talk about biting 
the hand that feeds you! He’s been trying to take ours off at the elbow . . . Castro must 
understand the unwritten rule: Don’t kick your best customer.”218 
During July, Cuban baseball was nowhere to be seen in the front page or editorial 
discussions, even during the Wings-Kings series.219  In the early morning of 26 July, the Verdi 
shooting incident briefly changed that.  The coverage of it also clearly showed that Cuban 
baseball did not bring the Revolution to Rochester’s front pages, but the other way around.  
             First we need to focus on George Beahon’s front section coverage of the event, as his is 
the most notable. The D & C’s 26 July morning edition ran with the headline: “Marines Storm 
Ontario Beach in Windup of Lake Operations.”  And, as Senzel described: “At the top of the 
page, in the right-hand corner and obviously a bit late in arriving: BULLET HITS VERDI IN 
CUBAN BALLGAME.”220 The entire article read:  
Frank Verdi, coaching at third base for the Rochester Red Wings, was grazed by a “July 
26 Celebration” stray bullet early today.  The Wings immediately walked off the field with the 
score tied 4-4 after eleven innings. Havana shortstop Leo Cardenas was also hit by another stray 
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bullet. Neither player was injured seriously, the bullet not breaking the skin. An outbreak of stray 
firing in Gran Stadium began shortly after midnight, the beginning of the anniversary of the July 
26 Movement. Many troops were in the stands, some carrying tommy guns and side arms. Other 
details, see page 1C.221 
 
Ironically, on page 14A that same morning, a Beahon piece written prior to the same 
game was featured.  Entitled: “Cubanistas, Machetes at Sides, Gather to Cheer Rebel 
Anniversary,” the article described: 
Free Cuba on the eve of its first big celebration is a city of many contradictions. In the 
streets below my hotel window, the impromptu parades have started, nearly 24 hours in advance. 
The bars are closing at 6 p.m. because Fidel Castro . . . does not want his little people to get in 
trouble tonight before they pay homage tomorrow. In the lobby, an American whispers: “This 
man is a wild idealist. He can’t guarantee seven million tons of sugar, which is the make-or-
break industry. But he is taking farms from the landowners and splitting them out to the peasants. 
Not to grow sugar. He is economically unsound.” On the streets the Cubanistas walk, machetes 
swinging at their side. They are incredibly polite and well behaved . . . the monied Cubans talk 
disparagingly of Fidel, “He is promoting a circus tomorrow . . . The whole thing is corny.” In a 
shopping center, a Cuban storekeeper was angry. “Why must you suspect everything bad . . . 
Your government helped Batista when he was torturing and murdering our students. Now Castro 
is trying to put the pieces together and give Cuba real democracy, but you Americans pick, pick, 
and pick. Why?” . . . He is an incredible hero here . . . Said a hotel man hopefully, “They are 
certainly entitled to their demonstrations and celebrations but when does he get down to business 
in the cabinet meetings instead of at mass meetings and on television shows?”222 
 
Once again, Beahon was trying to portray both sides of the Castro debate, this time with 
nary a mention of baseball. This led further credence to the theory that baseball had helped, at 
least within Beahon, establish a bond with his Cuban interviewees. This also marked a turning 
point as the usage of baseball within his front-page coverage of the island would drastically 
decrease after the Verdi incident, further revealing how separate the Rochester press wanted to 
portray the two storylines: baseball and the spectacle of Cuba. 
The following morning the D & C’s main headline proclaimed: “Millions in Havana 
Cheer as Castro Warns Critics, Accepts Post as Premier.”  The attached AP column, described in 
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lengthy detail the anniversary celebrations, minus any mention of baseball.223  However, next to 
the article was a picture of Frank Verdi poking his finger through the bullet hole in his ballcap, 
while surrounded by other Wings.  Underneath the photo was a Beahon article entitled: 
“Nightmare in Havana – Wings in Real Danger, other stories, picture, Page 31.”  Behaon related:  
Were they real bullets flying around in Gran Stadium Saturday night? They were. Were 
they aimed at the two players who were struck by the nearly spent missiles? Unquestionably not. 
Was the danger that prompted the Red Wings to refuse to finish the series today and pull out of 
Cuba several hours ahead of schedule, real or imagined, or exaggerated? The answer to that 
question is not easy . . . One thing cannot be argued: When highly emotional Cubans-armed 
young soldiers wearing pistols, rifles, and sub-machine guns-begin blasting into the air and into 
the ground in a wild, uncontrolled celebration, there is danger . . . It was impossible to determine 
whether the bullets that struck Verdi and Cardenas came from inside or outside the stadium. 
 
After describing the Verdi incident in detail Beahon continued: 
 
There will be varied versions of this Latin-American baseball “shoot-em-up.” To this 
reporter, from a press box vantage point, it looked this way: Promptly at midnight, rockets 
behind the stadium signalled the start of . . . celebrations. The Cuban anthem was played, and 
everyone rose to sing. At the same time, weapons inside and outside the ballpark began firing, to 
desist only while the anthem was finished. The umpires had a conference, debating whether to 
call the game right there, with Rochester leading 4-3 after 10 ½ innings. The arbiters decided not 
to risk the wrath of perhaps 5,000 fans whose team . . . was losing. Shooting was sporadic for 
several minutes and play halted several times while barbudos fired their weapons from various 
sections of the spacious stadium. One soldier, sitting next to Red Wing General Manager George 
Sisler Jr., in a front row box seat, emptied a .45 automatic into the turf near the dugout . . . (Then 
after Verdi was hit,)224 The general effect was terrifying to many. One veteran Cuban writer . . . 
hit the deck when the firing started. Many players from both teams, and the umpires, were 
visibly shaken even an hour after they left the field. Immediately after the game, Deal said he 
would not ask his players to take the field today for a double-header . . . Guzzetta the 
International League’s umpire in chief, told this writer he would, “not umpire . . . on Sunday 
even if it costs me my job.” 
 
Finally, after describing the failed “negotiations” between Red Wings and Cuban officials 
to resume play of the doubleheader, Beahon concluded: 
The entire incident last night is due to the simple fact that many of the Cuban soldiers are 
untrained in handling of weapons. Almost daily, in barracks and on streets, Cubans are wounded 
or killed in gunfire accidents. In the dugout and the stands and in the press box, you rub elbows 
and shoulders with weapons at all time. Even during the games . . . soldiers are on the field. This 
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lack of training, plus emotion, caused last night’s near-tragic incident. Today it might have been 
perfectly safe to play, but as general manager . . . Sisler felt he had no right to subject his players 
to possible danger. As this is written in my Nacional Hotel Room . . . thousands of Cubans line 
the Malecon, waiting for the mass celebration and Fidel Castro’s speech.225 
 
 As the most thoroughly detailed account of 25-26 July 1959 in Gran Stadium, this article 
magnified several key elements of American-Cuban baseball relations, at least through the lens 
of Gannett publications. First, compared to many other Revolutionary incidents, the coverage on 
the Verdi shooting was calm, detailied, and put a familiar face upon Cubans for Rochester 
readers to identify with. In this manner, baseball was still in the mind of George Beahon, a 
bonding agent between American and Cuban fans. It should not be thrown away lightly. 
However, due to Beahon being the sole Rochester voice on the incident, the impact of the 
bonding agent is lost on his audience. Second, it marked one of the few instances where the 
event on the field was considered more important than the Revolution. Most of the baseball 
stories covered in this study talked about how the sport impacted the Revolution. This one 
focused upon how the Revolutionary fervor interrupted the ‘will o’the wisp’ of baseball. Finally, 
outside of the editorial page and the sports section, the Verdi incident was not mentioned on the 
D & C’s front pages again for the remainder of 1959, showing how little appeal baseball had as a 
Revolutionary lens by the Rochester press.226 
In contrast, outside of the editorial and sports sections, the Verdi incident featured only 
on the T-U’s front page. Since the T-U did not print a Sunday edition, their editors had to wait till 
Monday, after the Wings had already arrived back in Rochester, to comment on the story. On 27 
June, this photograph ran on the front page (see next page): 
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Attached to the picture was an article written by sportswriter Dave Occor, who had 
interviewed Verdi at the Rochester airport.  Afterwards, Occor’s journalistic energies shifted 
focus toward opinions regarding the Havana situation from around the IL.  He quoted Montreal 
manager Clay Bryant, Miami manager John (Pepper) Martin, Richmond manager Steve Souchak, 
and Columbus GM Harold M. Cooper expressing refusal to travel to Havana.  Toronto 
representatives, while unable to be interviewed, were said by Occor to “reportedly have signed a 
petition saying they would not play in Havana anymore this season.”   He also summarized IL 
commissioner Frank J. Shaughnessy’s remarks that stated: “the incident was a ‘fourth of July’ 
type celebration” and said there is no reason why Toronto and Montreal (the next two Havana 
home opponents,) should not go to Havana.”  Then Occor interviewed Sisler Jr., who made no 
mention about potentially having to return to Cuba. The article concluded: 
Manager Cot Deal says he wouldn’t balk at going to Havana again. ‘This was a one-shot 
thing’ . . . The Wings had in their possession Verdi’s hat. Near the peak on the hat band was a 
hole the circumference of a man’s little finger. A plastic liner under the hat saved Frank from 
serious injury. Pitcher Cal Browning summed up the feelings of the deplaning Wings with a grin 
and, ‘I was one of those who missed the purple heart.’”227  
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In contrast to his morning counterpart, Occor did not attempt to portray the incident 
through the lens of the Cuban Revolution, ie why it had happened in the first place. Instead, he 
shaped it as simply being a baseball story. Admittedly, as the several IL officials he interviewed 
attested, this was by no means a normal baseball occurrence, but Occor failed to explore it 
beyond that point. Whereas the D & C would remove Beahon’s baseball narrative viewing of 
Cuba from the front pages the following year, the T-U had already abandoned what was left of 
their coverage.  
Just like their morning counterpart, the T-U failed to mention the Verdi incident for the 
rest of 1959, outside of the editorial and sports sections. From 28 July to 3 August, a total of four 
editorials relevant to the 26 July episode were published between both Rochester dailies.  On 28 
July, one such T-U piece reasonably proposed:  
The incident Saturday night was not anti-American or anti-Red Wing. The casualties 
were equally divided. It was just one of those things that happens in a place where a large 
number . . . carry guns and are in the habit of firing them off to show their exuberance. This is 
not the atmosphere for baseball . . . Red Wing Manager Cot Deal, who was there, does not 
consider the incident an example of what normally could be expected in Havana . . . But since 
July 26 now has been proclaimed a day for similar celebrations in Havana, it’s something for the 
schedule makers to take into account. Better schedule the . . . Sugar Kings in some other 
International League city on that day.228 
 
In response to Shaughnessy’s statement that “there is no reason why Toronto and 
Montreal should not go to Havana,” a 30 July D & C Letter to the Editor waxed pessimistically 
that: “At this time may I suggest that if ‘Fearless Frank’ really believes this line, and thinks the 
players would be on the ‘chicken’ side if they don’t go he, and any other League officer who 
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feels the same way, should volunteer their services for all the remaining Cuban home games as 
foul line umpires.”229 
On 2 August, a D & C editorial entitled “Lethal League” proposed:  
There is a report that some Red Wing ball players are reluctant to play . . . in Havana, on 
grounds that gunfire is not a normal occupational hazard of baseball. Inasmuch as these seem to 
be days of changing . . . affiliations and formation of new leagues, we suggest a league 
composed of the following areas ( for a starter) which have a good deal in common: Cuba, Viet 
Nam, Tibet, Iraq, Matsu, and Jordan. Any player surviving a swing around this circuit would be 
eligible for a bonus, retirement, and the hall of fame.230 
 
Finally, a 3 August D & C Letter to the Editor featured Marianne Dean of 507 Grand Ave 
complaining: 
Is Rochester that much off the map, that “Maverick” . . . cannot be skipped for one night 
to make room for the Vice President . . . in a very important debate? I would also like to mention 
that the shot fired at one of our baseball players in Havana was mentioned 50 times in the news 
broadcasts. Could 25 times possibly be considered enough and could the time for the other 25 
minutes be used for the Vice President . . . This . . . is not the first time that we have been 
deprived of internationally important events when they coincided with the drivel on our local 
stations.231 
 
These were four different quotations with different viewings of the Verdi incident, and 
yet they all lead credence to the same argument. The 28 June T-U article showed Beahon-esque 
understanding of what happened, simply proposing that games on 26 July not be played in 
Havana anymore.  The two corresponding D & C editorials each argued, through levels of 
sarcasm, that IL baseball should not be played in Havana regardless of the date.  Both compared 
sending another IL team to Cuba as parallel to sending soldiers to a dangerous warzone.  Mrs. 
Dean’s Letter to the Editor showed incredulence that something baseball related was taking away 
from “real news” involving the then-Vice President. In fact, she condenmned the “drivel from 
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our local stations,” from depriving Rochester listeners of “internationally important events.”  
Despite being seemingly different there was three key similarities between them. 
First, they all showed indifference if not outright hostility to the concept of any 
American-Cuban bond, let alone through baseball.  Second, they viewed baseball as something 
separate from “international important events.” The D & C editorials felt that Cuba was too 
hostile to send in simple ballplayers. Mrs. Dean felt the story itself was not even worth covering. 
Finally, they marked the last time until the following year that this narrative was covered in 
either dailies’ front sections. 
On a side note, from 4 August to August 7, the Sugar Kings came to Rochester for a 
three-game series.  It was briefly discussed on the front page of the 4 August T-U edition, which 
proclaimed: “‘Beisbol,’ Sugar to Sweeten Fans.” This photograph of a Red Wings tickethandler 
surrounded by bags of sugar and travel brochures was attached to the accompanying article:232  
                                       
 In both dailies’ sport sections, the first game of the Wings-Kings series was advertised in 
a comical fashion (see next page):233 
                                               
232
 Al C. Weber, “‘Beisbol,’ Sugar to Sweeten Fans,” T-U, 4 August 1959. 
233
 “Night Baseball,” D & C Sports Section, 4 August 1959. 
140 
 
140 
 
                          
That is how the Verdi crisis ended on the front pages of Gannett’s Flower City dailies, as 
a comical unimportant footnote.  It also appears to show that the newspaper editors viewed 
supposed American-Cuban cultural baseball bonds as mere jokes. 
The last three months of the 1959 baseball season featured a dramatic decline in the 
number of Cuban-related stories in both Rochester dailies. While in August the D & C and the T-
U printed twenty-five and twenty-one relevant front section articles, respectively, in September 
and October the two newspapers only published eight, combined.234  They spoke briefly about 
the counterrevolutionary invasion crushed in part by American barbudo William Morgan,235 as 
well as the nixed deal between the British government and the Cuban Air Force.236  For the most 
part Rochester went back to a semi-silence regarding its southern island neighbor.  To follow the 
Sugar Kings miracle run to the Little World Series championship, or to even know they had 
made the final, one would have had to read the sports sections.237  Not only was baseball failing 
to serve as an American-Cuban cultural bond, but America’s pastime could not even make 
Castro, by this point a huge “cause celebre,” appear in either Rochester newspaper.  By the 
following spring, the “Maximum Leader” was firmly entrenched within the D & C’s and T-U’s 
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opening sections.  The American-Cuban baseball relationship prompted several articles to 
appear, notably two lengthy front-page columns by Beahon.  However, the utilization of the 
relationship was barely acknowledged. And when it was acknowledged, it was solely to express 
division between the two nations.     
                                        
            The Pot Runneth Over and the Benches Clear  
                                       1960 
 From the end of the Red Wings training camp in early April to early July’s forced Sugar 
Kings relocation to Jersey City, both Rochester dailies published a stream of relevant front 
section articles.238  In April, the D & C ran twenty-seven stories about Cuba, while their 
afternoon competitors ran twenty-nine.  In May, the morning daily published twenty-four and the 
T-U published twenty.  The month of June featured the D & C print twenty-nine and the T-U 
print twenty-two.  Finally, in July, the morning newspaper ran fifty-five and their afternoon 
counterpart ran thirty-six.239  Quantitatively, this was the high water mark of Cuban-centered 
stories featured in the two Rochester dailies.  Thematically, both local newspapers portrayed 
Fidel Castro in a singular and overbearing fashion, as an enemy of the American people, who 
only spouted anti-U.S. diatribes.  
 On 5 April, the front page of the sports section announced: “Maduro Sees No Reason 
Why IL Should Quit Cuba.”  Beahon, after conducting an interview with the Sugar Kings owner, 
announced: 
Bobby Maduro . . . is a proud man. He is hurt by all the talk about whether the 
International League should evacuate his native Havana. He was bitterly disappointed when the 
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Baltimore Orioles reneged on exhibition dates in Cuba last week, thereby spotlighting the 
scheduled April 20 IL inaugural on the Island. The Red Wings, controversial figures in the 26th 
of July . . . incident last year, are scheduled “to go in the first wave,” as one baseball man 
facetiously put it. This is Bobby Maduro’s side of the story as he told it to the Democrat and 
Chronicle here before he flew back to Havana to prepare, he hopes, for a full season of baseball. 
“I feel like the child of a divorced couple . . . I love Cuba and I love the United States. Which 
way can I turn this thing? . . . I do not feel that politics and baseball should mix . . .  Everyone . . 
.  seems to adopt the attitude of wondering who will be responsible if something should happen. 
I’ve got five U.S. players on my club right now. They are neither complaining nor asking anyone 
to take responsibility . . . Tell me about responsibility. I get my hair cut in the barbershop of the 
Park Sheraton Hotel when I am in New York City. This is where Albert Anastasia was killed. 
Who’s responsible for me in New York City? Last week, the Richmond Virginians had some 
shoes and gloves and a wrist watch stolen from their clubhouse in a Florida training camp. If this 
had happened in Havana, it would have been an international news item. A terrible thing . . . 
What I really don’t understand is why all this excitement about sending teams to fill league 
commitments in Cuba, only 95 miles from your country, when you are sending teams to compete 
in nearly all sports in Russia. Russia is alright, but Cuba is not. Is that the picture?”240 
 
Again, this showed Beahon’s movement against the grain as he attempted to portray the 
other side of the relocation coin ie giving Maduro a chance to address those criticizing him, both 
in Rochester and elsewhere in the IL. He did not agree with or refute the Cuban’s points, but laid 
them out for his readership to absorb, albeit solely in the sporting pages. However, this 
seemingly marked the end of Beahon’s concillatory nature as his articles both on the front page 
and in the sports sections took an increasingly critical tone. 
On 6 April, the headline on the morning newspaper’s fifth page blared: “Cuba Catholics 
Rapped for Opposing Regime.”241  On 9 April, the front-page headline announced: “Castro 
Betraying Ideals of Freedom, says Eisenhower.”242  An editorial that same day warned of a 
potential “Guantanamo Grab.”243  The next morning, the editorial page had two anti-Castro 
columns and a cartoon which implied that Cuba was a “bad apple,” which left unchecked would 
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spread Communism across Latin America.244  On 16 April, a William S. White editorial 
declared: “Is it better to go on with the policy of do-nothing and lose Latin America’s and the 
world’s respect? Or is it better- to take up our clear duties, and act . . . Surely the question 
answers itself.”245  The next morning, the D & C baseball writer, George Beahon commented in 
a front-page article entitled: “Cubans Building towards Inevitable Bloodshed.”  Sent to the 
Cuban capital to cover the Wings season opener against Havana, Beahon’s lengthy column 
concluded:  
The bloodiest internal struggle in Cuban history could result. Even before then, the 
United States might be pushed to the point where it is forced to break off diplomatic relations. 
Castro behaves exactly like a man with that goal foremost in his workings. When? Nobody will 
offer a guess. Five days to five months, say accredited newsmen who have spent decades 
covering such scenes. They agree on but one point: It is a pressure chamber that must blow. 
After that? Possibly a sober government, possibly an out and out Communist state. But certainly 
bloodshed.246 
 
 The only hint of baseball in the article was the notification which read: “Havana Sugar 
Kings to be transferred to Jersey City within 30 days, forecasts Sports Writer Beahon, in a sports 
special today on Page 1C.”247  On the 19 April front page appeared a quotation entitled: “Least 
Popular, That’s Beahon.” Further, the article announced:  
 Beahon has been under fire by Cuban press as a result of recent events . . . an exclusive 
story saying baseball had less than 30 days to live in Havana. Said a U.S. wire service 
correspondent to Beahon via telephone from Havana today: “You are not quite the No. 1 public 
enemy of baseball in Cuba. The . . . spot is reserved for Lee MacPhail, the Baltimore general 
manager who called off the exhibition games. You are however running a close second.”248 
 
These two articles showed that the D & C editorial staff, if not Beahon himself, were now 
deliberately separating the baseball from the Revolution in their constructed narrative. In order to 
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read the baseball story, one had to go to page 1C ie the sports section. Second, the latter article 
fails to take into consideration the possibility Beahon’s falling out amongst Cubans had more to 
do with his insinuation that Cuba was about to break out into civil war rather than his stance 
about the Sugar King’s place in the IL.  
 
On 20 April, underneath “Indians Overcome Amerks, 3-2,”249 a front-page article 
proclaimed: “Wings Open in Havana Tonight.”  After a two sentence quotation detailing 
manager Clyde King’s plan to utilize power hitter Luke Easter against Havana’s pitching, the 
article read: “George Beahon story on Page 28 (ie. the sports section.)”250  The following day’s 
front-page saw a Beahon piece which announced: “Prime Minister . . . Castro and U.S. 
Ambassador Phillip Bonsal attended the same party tonight, but they didn’t mix.”  After further 
chastising Castro for showing up minutes late, Beahon commented:  
Someone in the press box wondered out loud why it had not been arranged for Bonsal to 
catch the Cuban leader’s first pitch, “After all,” reasoned this dubious wit, “Castro has been 
doing all the pitching and Bonsal all the catching up to now in Cuba.” Fan reception for the Red 
Wings in pre-game ceremonies was tremendous, offering added evidence that . . . troubles still 
are confined to government level. . . . Game Story, Page 45.251 
 
This article also offered evidence of splitting the two narratives, baseball and political, as 
far as possible from each other. It is also important to note that this was the last time Cuban 
baseball appeared on the D & C’s front page until the end of June, while the T-U did not feature 
the Wings-Kings series at all on its front page.252 
During the month of May, both Rochester newspapers primarily focused upon the alleged 
“muzzling” of Cuba’s press.253  Articles taken from the AP repeatedly talked of Castro’s regime 
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“nationalizing” newspaper after newspaper, primarily Diario de La Marina254 and Prensa Libre. 
In fact, on 17 May, Page Two of the T-U declared: “Castro Seizes Last Free Daily.”255  A 21 
May T-U editorial proclaimed:  
Prensa Libre, Havana’s last outspoken independent newspaper was taken over (with 
government approval) by employees who refused to print an editorial denouncing, “the sinister 
international plot led by Russia against our soil” . . . Still the United States adhered to its policy 
of patience, patience, and more patience, although the longer this continues the more costly it 
will be in human anguish and treasure to bring some order out of the chaos which seems drawing 
nearer in the Pearl of the Antilles.256 
 
This differs from Zeitlen/ Scheer, who attempt to make the claim that the newspaper 
workers did it without the government’s approval.257  Whatever the case, it was clear that the 
Rochester press was fully buying into the “nationalizing angle,” and were not interested in 
hearing opposing viewpoints. Baseball was nowhere to be found in either the attached AP 
articles or the locally written editorial columns during May.258 
Throughout June, both the T-U and the D & C ran several anti-Castro editorials. On 7 
June259 and 11 June, each daily ran a separate op-ed column calling for Congress to slash 
America’s sugar quota with Cuba.260  The D & C’s 12 June editorial page printed an article that 
proclaimed:  
A Cuba becoming a Soviet base, a cog in the vast Communist apparatus, is something the 
Western Hemisphere cannot afford. What can be done about it without reverting to old-style 
Yankee “imperialism” . . . That would wreck our relations with Latin America and possibly do 
far more damage than a Communist Cuba . . . Meanwhile, U.S. self –restraint is put under even 
more severe strain by the fanatic Castro. That self-restrain could break.261 
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The article essentially argued which would be worse: destroying American relations with 
all of Latin America by invading Cuba, or allowing communism to infilitrate the western 
hemisphere via U.S. inaction? This framing device continued throughout the remainder of the 
study period in both Rochester dailies. 
During the latter part of June, both Rochester newspapers published article after article 
about a potential break between the U.S. and Cuba in their long-established sugar trade.  This 
was the environment in which Beahon was sent to Cuba in the month’s final weekend.  On 27 
June, both dailies ran a front page AP quotation which declared: “Munitions Blast Rips Havana: 
2 Die, 50 Hurt.”262  At the bottom of the article, the D & C announced: “Electrical power was cut 
off to part of the city, and an International League doubleheader was delayed, (See story on Page 
20.)”263  On Monday, 28 June, featuring a notification which read: “D & C sports writer George 
Beahon developed this exclusive report on Cuba while covering the Red Wings-Sugar Kings 
baseball games in Havana during the weekend,” an article was printed entitled: “U.S., Cuba Gap 
Widens Daily: Reds Pour In.”  Beahon lamented: 
The breach between the U.S. and Cuban government widens every day. And the world’s 
foremost Communist organizers are pouring through the gap in droves. This is not hearsay nor 
speculation. It is the considered opinion of the State Department, as expressed to me in Havana 
yesterday by an Embassy spokesman . . . Havana, 235 miles from Miami  . . . is a demoralized 
city that has not begun to fight against communism’s crash program here . . . Russian architects 
are in Havana, working on plans for a five million dollar embassy. This carries a note of 
permanency . . . “Their job is only to hate our guts,” said a U.S. newsman. “We are in a very 
critical, crucial stage,” says the source close to the Embassy. “Anyone who does not agree is 
either a liar or a damn fool . . . This is what we fight here in Cuba, the propaganda battleground, 
the key nation” . . . In the face of this (calls to cut the sugar quota,) while Cuba makes land grabs, 
Guevara shouts that we pay the sugar bonus, “to enslave the Cuban people” . . . Consensus gives 
Castro 40 per cent of the Cubans as active supporters. Estimates as to where the other 60 . . . 
stand are varied . . .  In the Stadium Club, which is the Havana baseball plant, Castro was 
available on TV after the game Friday night. The receiving set is in the bar section of the club. 
There were three people in that section. Twenty-five or 30 others shunned the magic lantern, and 
instead sat in a separated section in which service was much slower. It was obvious why they 
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chose the other section. Embassy people considered this significant . . . All agree on one 
prediction: An uprising with bloodshed, and lots of it, before the year is ended. Meanwhile, 
Americans rush out, Communists rush in. It is indeed a depressing situation. And the fate of all 
the Americas could depend on future events in Cuba.264 
 
Once again, this article revealed two important facts about the state of the American-
Cuban baseball bond.  First, the front page did not consider baseball important in the grand 
scheme of international relations with the island nation, as Beahon only mentioned it once in the 
piece. Second, Beahon was now firmly anti-Castro. Since Castro was to many Rochesterians the 
public face of Cuba, this stance by Beahon hurt the bond. Beahon had been one of the sole 
sources of positive stories from the island nation in the Rochester press, and this change in his 
postion only meant more negative pieces about Cuba, not less.  
The first two weeks of July featured four events: Three American oil refineries were 
nationalized by Castro’s regime, President Eisenhower officially cut off sugar purchases from 
Cuba, the Sugar Kings unknowingly played their last road series in Rochester representing 
Havana, and the front pages of Gannett’s local dailies ignored the baseball connection.  
On 1 July, the Sugar Kings began a four-game series against the Red Wings. They played 
a doubleheader the first day, and then one game each of the following two days.265  Despite both 
dailies featuring news about the seized oil refineries and the proposed sugar cuts on each day of 
the series, the respective game reports failed to leave the sports section.266  Perhaps it was 
because the Rochester press was no longer interested in, if it ever was, maintaining a cultural 
connection with the Cuban people.  On 4 July, the D & C printed an op-ed piece entitled: “Castro 
Spending Plenty to Subvert Latins,” William S. White wrote (see next page): 
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The infection in Cuba is reaching the point of intolerable danger to the free world in this 
hemisphere. This is not the judgement of mere hysterical professional “anti-Communists” who 
see Moscow agents everywhere. It is the coolly considered conviction of elevated and truly 
liberal leaders of South America with whom this correspondent has talked . . . have told our State 
Department plainly that . . . Castro has permitted Cuba to become nothing less than a bridgehead 
for Soviet communism within 100 miles of the United States . . . they have suggested to the State 
Department, politely, that the United States government has so far failed to explain the realities 
to the American people, of whom only a tiny minority has any notion whatever of the facts of 
life in Cuba . . . This small step, however, if and when it is actually taken-will be only the barest 
beginning toward the development of a policy adequate to quarantine the Castro virus . . . 
Professional ‘liberals” who in the beginning howled Castro up as a kind of secular saint, have 
ceased their syrup eulogies of this bearded, this sensitive, this poetic lyncher . . . It is no longer 
possible to look at this hemisphere as a low-priority foreign policy area. It is becoming 
absolutely necessary to look homeward as well as across the sea.267 
 
This piece continued the trend of calling for Americans to turn their attention towards 
Cuba in order to prevent communism from gaining a foothold in the Western Hemisphere, with 
little attention given to the actual people living on the island. Interestingly, the article claimed 
that the United States government was not portraying Cuba accurately to Americans, while 
simultaneously inaccurately portraying Cuba to Americans on its own.  
The following afternoon, an editorial in the T-U called for the establishment of a “New 
Monroe Doctrine.”  The attached article stated that America should not “become so morally 
hogtied it can’t tell black from white . . . There is a wide variety of measures of increasing 
severity available for use in fighting Castro’s embrace of communism . . . The time to start the 
big squeeze is now.”268   On 6 July, a D & C Letter to the Editor argued: “No Cuban team should 
represent an American sport while the hammer and sickle are at work. This has no reflection on 
the players themselves, but as a part of the team these young men are being jeopardized morally 
and physically as long as they represent a country of Communist leanings.”269   As it turned out, 
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the Havana Sugar Kings, at least under that name, only featured three more times on the front 
pages of either Rochester daily.  
On 7 July, in an article entitled “Baseball’s Ax Falls on Cuba,” Beahon announced:  
The International League has played its last game on Cuban soil. The Havana franchise 
will be yanked from its roots through execution of an emergency measure-within a few days. The 
Cubans, currently playing in Columbus and due home a week from today, will finish out their 
1960 season in a three-way split schedule, the Democrat and Chronicle learned exclusively last 
night. Havana will play some of its game in Cincinnati’s Crosley Field, a few in Jersey City, and 
others . . . in the parks of clubs that normally would be playing in strife-torn Cuba . . . Maduro 
for obvious reasons must resist the move by the league, but actually is powerless, barring a 
complete breakup of the club, which carries many Cubans on its roster. The IL directors gave 
Shaughnessy this emergency power . . . in a meeting last December in St. Petersburg. “We can’t 
hurt Madruo, that’s important,” said Shaughnessy. “But I guess the time has finally come . . . 
We’ve got to make a move . . . We just can’t send any more of our teams into Havana.” 
Shaughnessy’s statement eliminated any remaining vestige of doubt in the matter . . . At least 
five (league directors) of them are opposed to playing any more games in Cuba, simply because 
of the increasing tension between dictator Fidel Castro’s government and the U.S. . . . The Red 
Wings are scheduled to play in Havana next month.270 
 
 
It is important to note that this article did not mention any specifics as to why Cuba was 
strife-torn, simply that the situation was as such and that it necessitated a Sugar Kings relocation. 
Even, when baseball was the primary focus of a Beahon front-section story, it was treated as a 
footnote in regard to the overall Cuban situation.  
To further follow Havana’s relocation in the D & C, a Rochester reader would have had 
to have been exposed to the next week’s several sports section articles. Nothing appeared on the 
morning daily’s front page.271  The T-U did not have any front-page columns on the announced 
Kings Jersey emigration from Cuba, choosing only to have a single sentence printed above the 
Rochester Times-Union logo which read: “International League Pulls out of Havana, Page 26.”272  
Again, all of the published articles about the relocation would have had to have been read in the 
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afternoon newspaper’s sporting pages.  The next, and last front-section article on the Havana 
Sugar Kings, came in the form of a 15 July AP quotation on the T-U’s opening page which 
declared: “Baseball Manager Called ‘Traitor.’  The unnamed writer elaborated:  
Nap Reyes, newly named manager of the former Havana team in the International 
Baseball League, is a ‘traitor and an enemy of his own country,’ the semi-official newspaper of 
Premier Fidel Castro’s Cuban government said today . . . The front page story in today’s 
Revolucion said Reyes defended his action by saying he was employed by the Cincinnati Reds . . 
. The story said he ‘behaved like a Yankee.” The story continued that Reyes now is working “for 
the U.S. State Department and the Yankee dollar and is a traitor to the cause of Cuban baseball 
which in this case is the same cause as the Cuban Revolution.’(Other details, Page 23.)”273 
 
This article showed two key factors regarding the endstate of the Rochester-Havana 
cultural bond via sport as portrayed by the Gannett Flower City press. First, although it was a 
front page story, it was penned by an outside source, showing how unimportant the bond was 
thought to be by T-U editors.  Second, even in its own story baseball was portrayed as a footnote 
to the larger Revolution.  
 
The final coverage the Sugar Kings received in either the front pages or the sports 
sections occurred two days later in an edition of Beahon’s semi-daily column, In This Corner. 
The D & C baseball writer reflected: 
Goodbye, Havana: I’ll miss the talks with the pit bosses in the casinos when the action 
was good, interesting men and real experts in a specialized field. I’ll miss the black bean and rice 
soup, sprinkled with fresh chopped onions. And the sunsets over the Malecon. But I’ll never miss 
the depressing poverty of the streets. I’ll miss the tremendous color of Gran Stadium when the 
crowds were there: the trumpets in the stands: the lighted candles when the team was losing: the 
shrill whistles that served as the Cuban raspberries. I’ll miss Johnny Diaz Lopez, the clubhouse 
boy who helped the trainers, Danny Whelan and Sir James Dudley. And the pool at the Nacional. 
But I’ll never miss the first stories of Batista brutalities incredible but later authenticated. I’ll 
miss the honest, dedicated faces of the young barbudos, the bearded, rifle-bearing farmers down 
from the hills, when they saw Havana for the first time after Batista went down. I’ll miss the 
little men in white who always dashed into your hotel room to shutter the blinds five seconds 
after you closed the door. And the fresh pineapple juice. But I’ll never miss the eviscerating 
midday heat, and the bad drinking water, and the bad stomachs. I’ll miss Willie, at the Siboney 
Store, and his “nice cold cokes,” and the bartering he couldn’t deal without. I’ll miss the Stadium 
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Club, and some of the ugly and not-ugly Americans who used to visit there after the games. And 
the ever delightful trio at the Club 21. But I’ll never miss the 10-a-night bombings, (Molotov 
cocktails) that were executed in the streets like clockwork, before Castro. I’ll miss the wonderful 
courtesies of Bobby Maduro, and the visits to his beach front home. I’ll miss the chef at “21” 
who used to kid us about the Sugar Kings. And the always thrilling taxi trips: horns only, no 
brakes allowed. But I’ll never miss the tourists who complained loudly and in public places, that 
“These people don’t even speak English!” I’ll miss the impassiveness of the high-life European 
gambler who fought it until 7 a.m. and lost $32,000 at the Capri. I’ll miss the lottery salesmen, a 
vanishing breed: and the street scenes: and the fabulous color of Tropicana. And arroz con pollo 
at Monseigneur. But I’ll never miss the arrogance of Batista’s censors, or the increasingly bad 
manners of some of Castro’s officers.  I’ll miss the curious way the bartenders set the bottles in 
front of the customers, never caring how much or how little you pour. I’ll miss the thrill and 
dignity of a visit to the residence of the U.S. ambassador, the dedicated career diplomat, Philip 
Bonsal. And the appreciation of the good Cuban fans for the artistic play and the extra effort on 
the diamond.  But I’ll never miss all the sweet souls who were too quick to needle me about my 
spring prediction that baseball was finished in Cuba, and that Havana would wind up in Jersey 
City. 
This article showed why Beahon represented the best chance for a baseball bond to 
succeed between America and Cuba, if only in the mind of one Rochester-based sports writer. 
He clearly was well-travelled throughout the Havana scene, both amongst his fellow tourists and 
the locals. He appreciated many aspects of Cuban culture, and celebrated the unqiue attributes of 
island baseball, both on the diamond and in the grandstands.  He was seemingly well-informed 
regarding Batista’s negative impact upon the country, referencing both the brutal war crimes 
carried out in his name and the censorship Beahon experienced firsthand. However, the article 
also showed why any baseball bond would not succeed in the Rochester press, primarily for two 
reasons. First, as shown by the last sentence, Beahon regarded Cuban baseball, while deserving 
of praise, as being limited in scope. He semed to think that with the departure of the Sugar 
Kings, that the sport itself was also leaving the island. Second, similar articles, even those 
written by Beahon were either limited to the sports section or had the baseball narratives 
removed.274 
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The Havana Sugar Kings, now dubbed the Jersey City Jerseys/Reds, were permanently 
absent for the rest of either daily’s 1960 editions as far as their front-sections were concerned.275 
However, in many respects this is not that much different from their coverage from early 1954 to 
mid-1960.  While the Sugar Kings, and to a minute extent, the American-Cuban baseball cultural 
bond received obligatory front-page article space, it had been largely considered a footnote of the 
Revolution, and had little place outside the sports section. 
 My study’s quantitative and thematic analysis of Rochester newspaper coverage of Cuba 
outside the sports section make two thing perfectly clear.  First, whatever sympathy the Flower 
City press had for the Revolution in early 1959 was long gone.  All talk of Castro as being a 
“man with the best of intentions,”276 had been replaced by editorial harangues calling him a 
“dictator.”277  While the people of Cuba were not criticized in print form to the same extent as 
the socialist Revolutionary Government, the island had been firmly painted in the minds of the 
Rochester media as a Soviet satellite.278  As a result, any attempt at utilizing the American-
Cuban baseball cultural bond to increase positive dialogue between the two countries would have 
been hindered by the extensive negative coverage featured on Gannett’s front pages during 1959 
and 1960.  To help solve this problem, either the D & C or the T-U would have had to include 
the Red Wings-Sugar Kings dynamic frequently in their front sections.  Neither did. 
 The word incidental aptly describes Gannett’s front-section coverage of American-Cuban 
baseball relations, especially when it came through the window of the local IL franchise, the Red 
Wings.  While Buffalo players threatening to strike in 1958, the Verdi shooting incident in 1959, 
and Beahon’s assuredness of the Sugar King’s New Jersey relocation in early 1960 all received 
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decent column space outside the sports sections, each event was portrayed as a simple after-
effect of the Revolution instead of something to impact Cuban-American relations.  The few 
times that this bond was addressed, it was regarded as insignificant.  Beahon was frequently 
referred to, even when his articles failed to mention baseball, as either a “baseball writer” or a 
“sports reporter,” never a respected journalist.  
 As such, regardless of how much coverage the American-Cuban baseball narrative may 
have received in either or both of the D & C’s and T-U’s sports sections, the apathy it underwent 
in their respective front pages arguably negated whatever impact the sports section may have 
had, which is why, for this study, the sports sections were not examined in any meaningful way.
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                                                           Chapter 5 
        Diplomatic Footnote: A Conclusion  
At the beginning of this study, I asked a simple question: Was the local newspaper 
reporting sympathetic or critical of Cuba’s move towards Castro and eventual communism, and 
how did their baseball coverage factor into this portrayal?  Or to put it another way, how was the 
Cuban Revolutionary period covered in the Rochester press, and how did their baseball writing 
impact coverage?  When I initially asked, it might have seemed strange to put the baseball aspect 
at the query’s end, especially with over half the paper being sports-centered.   
            While baseball may be the shared national pastime of both the United States and Cuba, 
my first three chapters established that any cultural bond between the two hemispheric neighbors 
on the diamond was decidedly one-sided.  Back in the first half of the twentieth century, 
extending to today, many Americans view baseball as “their” game.  In Chapter 2, I used Ken 
Burns’ Baseball to show the huge impact the sport has had on American national identity and its 
prospective use as a cultural bridge.  However, that Yankee “will o’ the wisp,” at least during the 
imperialist-colonialist period, was not used as leverage to remove dividing cultural prejudices, 
but rather as an exterminator of concepts, movements, and even human beings which disagreed 
with “American” values and interests.  Baseball was meant to convert “heathens and savages” 
into civilized members of advanced society, who would pay economic and social tribute to the 
United States in exchange for their cultural salvation.  
 Seemingly, from the minds of Americans, baseball did not give another country the right 
to come up with their own rules and laws outside of Washington D.C. approval.  All it gave the 
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“converted” nation, in this case Cuba, was the right to be promoted as having been “saved” by 
American imperialism.  Baseball simply helped Cuba into the U.S.’s sphere of economic and 
social influence, where they would be forced to abide by their northern neighbor’s policies via 
cultural assimilation.  The average American gained little to no cultural understanding or 
sympathy towards their Cuban allies, with the diamond sport simply serving as proof of U.S. 
natural superiority.  The U.S.-Cuba baseball relationship was always displayed either with or 
against the notion that Organized Baseball was the superior brand.  Even modern day historians 
such as Bjarkman and Echevarría, who hugely disagree whether the CWL or the post-
revolutionary League Nacional was superior, unknowingly state their positions through the same 
American lens. 
As Chapter 3 showed, the Cubans were forced to change and adapt to American 
regulations in order to be accepted into Organized Baseball, further diluting any potential 
cultural bond.  The CWL had to promise to punish Mexican League defectors and accept losses 
of more and more homegrown talent to MLB, which in itself was not happy letting its employees 
participate in winter play, largely due to the physical injury factor.  Cuban blacks had to endure 
racist housing and transportation policies, meager pay, and a sizable language barrier, just to play 
at the Class D Level.  Fans were forced to accept weaker and weaker CWL competition in order 
for the American game to prosper.  Their American counterparts had to make no such 
concessions and therefore only witnessed minimal contact with Cuban culture via the sporting 
arena.  When the Revolution broke out, other than a geographic connection and a stereotypical 
understanding of Cuba, there was no cultural bond to connect the two countries, even though 
they shared the same national pastime.  The Cuban relationship was viewed as a footnote by 
Organized Baseball, and the Sugar Kings were no different.  
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If the Havana Sugar Kings existed in the lead-up to the Spanish-American War, maybe 
the cultural connection would have received more Rochester coverage, as a pre-Platt 
Amendment baseball bridge would have better served U.S. interests.  Spanish attempts to muzzle 
baseball’s American influence by trying to remove the Kings from the IL, would have been met 
negatively by the U.S. press, under the rallying cry of “Cuba Libre.”  In that conflict, Americans 
were supposed to be on the same side as the Cubans.  However during the Cuban Revolution, 
with U.S. newspapers unsure of whether to back Batista or Castro, inserting baseball into the 
situation would have surely “confused” American readers.  And as Castro’s Cuba slowly slipped 
away from the U.S. sphere of influence, any attempt to humanize or make Americans more 
understanding of those soon to become possible enemy combatants, would have been 
discouraged.  This, combined with newspaper prejudice towards the sports section, with events 
such as baseball games not considered “actual news,” caused the potential bonding agent of the 
Sugar Kings to be ignored.  From 1954 to 1960, Rochester’s T-U and D & C coverage of Cuba 
went from being unaware, to indifferent, to slightly optimistic, to finally being outright hostile 
towards Fidel Castro and Cuba.  The two dailies’ baseball coverage impacted this portrayal very 
little, except for adding an additional lens through which to perceive American propaganda. 
From 1954 through 1956 very few Cuban-centric articles, let alone those about Cuban 
baseball made the Rochester front pages.  If the American-Cuban cultural bond on the diamond 
was as significant as some modern academics like to claim, Cuban stories in general would have 
appeared much earlier on both the T-U’s and the D & C’s opening sections.  In these early Sugar 
King campaigns, both Gannett publications sent beat reporters to cover Red Wings trips to the 
Cuban capital.  Any reports they gave regarding political and social upheaval on the island nation 
were relegated to each respective daily’s sport section.  There was no attempt to dig any deeper 
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into the Cuban cultural psyche.  While other Latin American countries such as Guatemala and 
Argentina received extensive coverage in Rochester’s newspapers without any history of 
baseball, Cuba remained largely ignored in the Flower City’s press during these three years.  In 
1957 the “Pearl of the Antilles” received a drastically increased presence in both the T-U and D 
& C, with baseball barely playing a role in such presence.  
 With revolutionary violence exploding across Cuba, including Havana, the island 
appeared much more frequently in both Gannett publications.  Outside the sports section 
however, the cultural connection of baseball was virtually ignored.  In fact, during the entirety of 
1957, only one such article appeared in either daily’s opening section. George Beahon’s 11 
August column did not use baseball as a bridge between two cultures.  Instead, the story of his 
encounter with Batista’s censorship at Gran Stadium was offered as proof that Cuba was starting 
to spin out of control.  
In 1958, the T-U and the D & C again increased their Cuban-related content, but with the 
exception of April, baseball was never the focus outside the sports section.  And when it was 
focused upon, either in a D & C editorial which scoffed at the idea of the island sharing its 
national pastime with the United States, or in Beahon’s foray into the local news section, it was 
not to establish any cultural bond.  When the T-U gave the Shaughnessy vs Stiglmeir feud brief 
front page coverage in early April, it ignored the larger ramifications of taking IL baseball away 
from the island.  While by no means were any of these articles in support of Batista’s regime, 
neither did they impact on the negative press Cuba received in Rochester.  In fact, editorials that 
came out during the failed strike in early April and the hostage crisis in late June roundly 
condemned Castro forces, laying much of the blame for the death and destruction primarily at the 
barbudo’s feet. 
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Once Castro came to power in early 1959, both Rochester dailies maintained a constant 
stream of pieces about Cuba published in their front and editorial sections.  While they both 
applauded the overthrow of Batista, both editorial staffs focused on criticizing the new Castro 
government.  The numerous post-revolution war crime tribunals and summary executions 
especially prompted negative editorial after negative editorial.   Any talk about potentially 
moving the Havana franchise off the island was directly contained within the T-U and D & C’s 
sports section, with only Beahon providing consistent coverage on it.  Shaughnessy’s decision to 
allow the Sugar Kings to remain in Cuba garnered little fanfare in either daily.  
 Before the Verdi incident, Cuba again picked up steam in the Rochester press, but not via 
baseball.  While the Red Wings’s Havana connection provided local reporting opportunities for 
the likes of the T-U’s Bill Ringle, the diamond’s role in prompting such opportunity was 
drastically downplayed.  While Ringle did publish a full-page article on the Cuban “fanáticos,” it 
was the only one of his four subsequent columns relegated to the sports section.  In fact, if 
BULLET HITS VERDI had arrived too late to run on the D & C’s front page, the only Cuban-
centered article was Beahon’s full page expose that carried nary a single mention of baseball. 
The Sugar Kings seemingly only provided a means to get local reporters on the Havana scene, 
with the sport itself only a secondary importance. 
 The Verdi incident only served to inflame American-Cuban tensions on the front pages of 
the Flower City press.  The T-U pasted a full page photograph of Verdi’s bullet scarred ballcap 
over an article which quoted IL representative after representative as being against returning 
league play to Havana.  The D & C, while running a front-page Beahon column which arguably 
removed any intent/ill-will directed at the Americans during the incident, also featured numerous 
editorials calling for the franchise to be relocated to the United States.  In fact, a letter to Paul 
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Pinckney, D & C sports editor, that was rerouted to Bobby Maduro, as well as the Sugar Kings 
owner’s written response, only featured in the sports section.1  After the initial two to three days 
of coverage, articles on Cuba focused solely away from the baseball diamond. While the 
American-Cuban baseball bond may have prevented the Verdi incident from being taken out of 
proportion, it did nothing to relieve the overall tensions between the two Western Hemisphere 
nations.  
 By 1960, Rochester’s baseball window into the Cuban crisis was far from closed, yet was 
not featured in the T-U and barely mentioned in the D & C.  Even though Beahon ran three front 
page columns because of his Red Wings assignment, only one of the articles mentioned baseball. 
His first, a quotation of a game report covering the IL season opener, portrayed Castro and 
Bonsal as being on opposing sides.  He once again stressed that this division was only between 
the two nation’s governments; however it was not the average Cuban Eisenhower needed to 
appease.  Beahon’s second article warned the Rochester readership that massive bloodshed 
would be seen in Cuba’s near future as more and more Cubans turned against the Revolutionary 
government. Beahon’s final front section column definitively labelled the island as having turned 
into a Soviet satellite, a place where America was no longer welcome.  
 By the time the sugar quota debate arose in late June-early July, both Rochester dailies 
inflamed tension amongst their readership with little regard for unity with Cuba.  Baseball’s 
presence in the crisis once again took a back seat, at least in the opening sections.  The very 
week Eisenhower virtually eliminated sugar purchases from Cuba, Havana was in town to play a 
three-game series against the Red Wings.  And yet, outside of the sports pages, this diamond 
connection was either supressed or ignored by both dailies’ editors.  In Beahon’s 3 July piece: 
“In This Corner, the baseball writer proposed (see next page): 
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 Paul Pinckney, “Maduro Replies to Rochesterian,” D & C, 22 August 1959. 
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Shaughnessy and the league had ample anticipation of the current mess . . . Apparently, 
however what the U.S. government worries about does not work Frank Shaughnessy, who 
observes all of this from his sunny, third base field box in Montreal, Que. That’s exactly where 
Shaughnessy will be-in Montreal-when Toronto plays in Havana next July 26. Last year’s near-
tragic shoot-em-up in Gran Stadium could be excused. There was absolutely no malice 
connected to this simple celebration . . . The Cubans are an emotional people. They are so 
emotional that next July 26 they may be taking an entirely different view of goings-on, even 
playful, between Cuban and American athletes. By that time, the Cuban sugar quota to the U.S. 
probably will have been slashed to the minimum. Because the U.S. finally is taking a different 
view of the situation in Cuba. Reducing the sugar quota could have one direct effect in Cuba. It 
could take bread from the mouths of Cuban babies. By that time, the hate-American campaign 
being directed and executed by Communists in Cuba could be getting through loud and clear. 
Perhaps not loud enough to be heard in Montreal. But acoustics in Gran Stadium are remarkable. 
Luck, and health, too, to the Toronto Maple Leafs.2 
 
 During this crisis, Beahon’s line of taking bread from Cuban children was one of only a 
handful of sympathetic remarks in either daily, and it was buried away from the front page. So 
while there may have indeed been the chance for a transnational cultural bond between Cuba and 
the United States via baseball, it was effectively hidden within sports sections such as those at 
the T-U and the D & C. 
And when the IL finally forcibly relocated the Sugar Kings to Jersey City, outside of one 
front page column in the D & C, there was little Rochester press recognition of how that which 
had transpired impacted a cultural sporting bond between the United States and Cuba.  Instead, 
the two dailies focused their attention solely on Castro’s seemingly unending outbursts of anti-
American rhetoric.  Not only did Gannett’s newspapers ignore baseball as a potential American-
Cuban bonding agent, the sport was further used to widen the gap between the Rochester 
readership and their Havanan counterparts.   
 Most telling, however, was the word choice Beahon used in these articles. It was not the 
IL’s baseball axe that fell on Cuba, nor was it MLB or even Organized Baseball.  Quite simply, it 
was just baseball.  Beahon gave no credit to the CWL which was still alive on the island, nor the 
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 George Beahon, “In This Corner,” D & C, 3 July, 1960. 
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amateur game still hanging on.  There was no talk of stickball games in the streets or pickup 
contests in local parks.  According to Beahon and the Rochester press, that all-American 
institution of baseball would vanish from Cuba along with the capital’s Sugar Kings.    
In summation, baseball had very little impact on Rochester’s evolving coverage of Cuba 
from the Sugar King’s IL entrance in 1954 to their 1960 exit other than providing an additional 
and unique lens through which to view the island’s revolution. The indifferent, to wary, to 
negative tones taken by the T-U and D & C featured little to no baseball in the majority of 
relevant articles.  This diamond narrative was relegated away from the “real news” to the sports 
section. As the American-Cuban baseball bond had primarily been nothing more than attempted 
enforcement of U.S. political and social agendas, rather than trying to truly understand and 
coexist with Cuban culture, it is far from surprising this was the case.  The Rochester press felt 
that baseball was nothing more than a footnote in American-Cuban relations, and the Havana 
Sugar Kings-Red Wings connection did nothing to amend that sentiment. 
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